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Introduction
This doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters on the pricing of sovereign debt and
inflation-linked products. The first chapter examines the relative pricing of nominal and
inflation-linked debt of the three largest Eurozone sovereign issuers. Its main contribution
is to present evidence of a selective default premium in real bond yields. The second
chapter shifts its focus to the US inflation-linked product markets and quantifies liquidity
premium in TIPS and inflation swap rates. The size of this compensation for exposure
to asset level and liquidity risk helps to explain a large part of the TIPS-Treasury puzzle.
The third chapter studies whether nominal bond markets are segmented across different
maturities and contributes to the policy discussion on long term discount rates of the
Solvency II Directive.
Sovereign bonds and inflation-linked products are crucially important financial instru-
ments for a wide range of large institutional investors, with a special emphasis on pension
and insurance funds. The inclusion of inflation-linked assets in investment portfolios facil-
itates hedging against inflation risk and the indexation of long term liabilities. Sovereign
bonds also pay a major role in both sides of the balance sheet: long maturity nominal
bonds often serve as an input to attain precise estimates of long term discount rates for
asset management and for valuation of liabilities for regulatory purposes. Additionally,
the adequate understanding of the risk profile of sovereign debt is crucial not only from
a risk management perspective, but also from a monetary policy point of view. By iden-
tifying the risk premiums in the yields of these securities, institutions can better manage
their portfolios and comply with prudential regulation, whereas governments can issue
bonds that are correctly priced.
The first chapter1 presents evidence of a selective default risk premium in inflation-linked
sovereign bond (ILB) yields of Germany, France and Italy. Selective default is an event,
in which a sovereign issuer chooses not to meet obligations on a class of bonds, while
servicing her other debt. This effect is identified by means of a unique empirical strategy.
1This chapter is based on the working paper titled: “Not risk free: The relative pricing of euro area
inflation-indexed and nominal bonds”.
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First, we construct breakeven yields, the difference between ILB and nominal yields,
from maturity-matched bond pairs within each country. In the next step, we pair these
breakeven rates across countries, by minimizing maturity gaps between the original bond
pairs. The result is the spread on breakeven strategy, which is the difference between two
bond pairs from two different countries. The differencing controls for common Eurozone
level components in yields, such as the effect of inflation expectations, monetary policy
or interest rate risk. What the differencing does not take out is the exposure to risks
that do not affect nominal and inflation-linked bonds equally within a country. We
show that there are two systematic risk factors that drive a wedge between inflation
expectations and the breakeven rate: liquidity and sovereign credit risks. This implies
that yields of ILBs and nominal bonds carry different levels of liquidity and sovereign risk
premia. The latter suggests that even without explicit seniority between the two types of
bonds, the market fears that an issuer is more likely to selectively default on its riskier,
inflation-linked debt in periods of financial distress. Our findings are also linked to the
ILB-nominal puzzle of Fleckenstein et al. (2014). In a frictionless world, one can replicate
a nominal bond with a portfolio of an ILB and inflation swap contracts. They find that
the replicating portfolio has a lower price than the nominal bond, suggesting that ILBs
are underpriced. We provide evidence that this underpricing is in part due to relative
risk premium differences between nominal and inflation-linked debt: ILBs are less liquid,
moreover investors perceive them to have higher credit risk during the financial and euro
crises, further increasing the yield difference between the two securities.
The second chapter2 examines the US Treasury bond and inflation swaps markets. We
provide evidence that in both index-linked bond markets and inflation swap markets liq-
uidity is an important determinant of prices. To study this phenomenon, we propose an
asset pricing model with a liquidity risk factor and asset-specific liquidity characteristics.
To estimate the effect of liquidity risk, we measure an assets exposure to a non-traded
liquidity factor, which is derived from the measures of Amihud (2002) and Roll (1984).
In addition, the level of liquidity is proxied by asset-level characteristics, following Kr-
ishnamurthy (2002) and Houweling et al. (2005). We conduct our analyses based on US
data and under the assumption of either end of the spectrum: completely segmented or
integrated markets. In our benchmark specifications, assuming segmentation, we find
strong evidence that the level of liquidity, in contrast to liquidity risk, affects yields on
inflation-indexed bonds, whereas inflation swap yields include a liquidity risk premium.
We also quantify liquidity effects in nominal bond yields and find a small liquidity risk
premium. These results are robust to the inclusion of various controls and to shifting to
the proposition of integrated markets. Our second main contribution is that we examine
2This chapter is based on a joint working paper with Joost Driessen and Theo Nijman, titled: “The
missing piece of the puzzle: Liquidity premiums in inflationindexed markets”.
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whether the above diversity in exposures to liquidity and liquidity risk could explain the
persistent difference in relative bond prices, as documented in Fleckenstein et al. (2014).
They show that there exists a substantial price difference between a nominal Treasury
bond and its replicating portfolio that consists of a TIPS issue and inflation swap con-
tracts. We provide evidence that a large part of the TIPS underpricing disappears when
we control for the estimated liquidity effects in TIPS yields and inflation swaps rates.
The third chapter3 provides comprehensive evidence on the pricing differences of short
and long maturity nominal bonds. Long maturity bonds are popular assets among in-
vestors with long investment horizon, such as pension funds and insurance companies.
Despite its practical importance and potential welfare consequences, modelling and ex-
amining the long end of the nominal term structure has attracted little attention in the
academic literature. This chapter aims to fill this gap by studying the differential pric-
ing of short and long maturity bonds, especially focusing on segmentation in yields and
liquidity. By using data on German nominal bonds between 2005 and 2015, we aim is to
answer the following question: Are yields of long-maturity bonds distorted by demand
pressure of clientele investors, regulatory effects, or default, flight-to-safety or liquidity
premiums? We find that although there are statistically significant differences in the
pricing and drivers of short and long maturity bonds, the corresponding economic effects
are rather small. This means that long yields are not extensively distorted by demand
pressure, default or liquidity premiums, therefore there is little evidence for substantial
yield segmentation. Additionally, we present evidence for some degree of liquidity seg-
mentation across short and long maturities, with equally small economic effects. These
two findings have important policy implications for the European insurance and pension
regulatory framework, the Solvency II Directive. Part of this discussion on valuation of
pension and insurance liabilities is on the modelling of long term discount rates. The cur-
rent approach is based on the ultimate forward rate method, an extrapolation technique
used to calculate discount rates for maturities beyond the last liquid point, based on
statistical models and interest rate swaps. However, in light of our empirical result based
on a simple method for extrapolation, this practice seems unnecessary: if long maturity
bond yields are not distorted, we could extrapolate long term discount rates from these
yields observed in bonds markets.
3This chapter is based on a joint working paper with Joost Driessen and Theo Nijman, titled: “Much
ado about nothing: A study of differential pricing and liquidity of short and long term bonds”.
Chapter 1
Not risk free: The relative pricing of
euro area inflation-indexed and
nominal bonds
1.1 Introduction
Understanding the relative pricing of inflation-linked and nominal sovereign debt is impor-
tant. First, these securities directly determine the breakeven inflation rate, the yield dif-
ference between nominal and inflation-linked bonds, henceforth ILBs, which is a market-
based proxy for inflation expectations. However, if different levels of risk premia drove
these bond prices, the breakeven rate would be distorted. Consistent with this idea,
Pflueger and Viceira (2015) and Driessen et al. (2014) show that the liquidity premium
differs among indexed and nominal bonds. Second, these securities play an important
role in the portfolio choice of a wide range of investors. For instance, pension funds
and insurers are seeking inflation-linked products, thus indexed-bonds too, to incorpo-
rate into their portfolios. Moreover, the adequate understanding of the risk profile of
sovereign bonds is crucial not only from the risk management perspective of investors,
but also from a monetary policy point of view. By identifying the risk premia in the
I am grateful to the German Finanzagentur GmbH, the Italian Dipartimento del Tresoro and the
French Agence France Tresor for generously sharing data on primary dealer transactions with me. I would
also like to thank Roel Beetsma, Dion Bongaerts, Frank de Jong, Joost Driessen, Will Gornall, Zsuzsa
R. Huszar, Theo Nijman, Carolin Pflueger, Veronika Pool, Stefan Ruenzi, Patrick Tuijp and seminar and
conference participants at Tilburg University, Catolica Lisbon, University of British Columbia, University
of Toronto, Simon Fraser University, the Federal Reserve Board, University of Mannheim, University of
Luxembourg, Ortec Finance, Summer Workshop of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 6th Annual
Financial Market Liquidity Conference, Netspar International Pension Workshop, FMA Europe 2016 for
their insightful comments and suggestions.
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yields of these securities, institutions can better manage their portfolios and comply with
prudential regulation, whereas governments can issue bonds that are correctly priced.
The key result of this paper is the empirical evidence of selective default risk premium in
inflation-linked sovereign bond yields of Germany, France and Italy. We define selective
default as an event in which a sovereign issuer chooses not to meet obligations on a class
of bonds, while servicing its other debt. We identify this effect from the difference of
breakeven rates from pairs of countries. Differencing eliminates common components,
such as the effect of inflation expectations, monetary policy or interest rate risk. What
the differencing does not take out is the exposure to risks that do not affect nominal and
inflation-linked bonds equally within a country. We show that there are two systematic
risk factors that drive a wedge between inflation expectations and the breakeven rate:
these are liquidity and sovereign credit risks. This implies that yields of ILBs and nominal
bonds carry different levels of liquidity and sovereign risk premia. The latter suggests
that even without explicit seniority between the two types of bonds, the market perceives
that an issuer is more likely to selectively default on its riskier, inflation-linked debt in
periods of financial distress.
The idea of comparing yields of securities with similar exposures to certain risks is not
new in the literature. Longstaff (2004) compares yields of US Treasuries to those of
bonds issued by the Refcorp (Resolution Funding Corporation), whereas Schwarz (2015)
examines yield differences of German federal government bonds and bonds issued by
KFW, a government owned development bank. The key feature of theses agency bonds
is that they have explicit government guarantees, and consequently the same credit risk
as government bonds. However, the liquidity of government bonds is substantially higher
and thus the yield difference measures general market liquidity conditions. What we do
in this paper is similar but goes the other way around: while controlling for liquidity
on both the nominal and inflation-linked bond markets the same way, we show that the
remaining yield difference is attributed to sovereign risk. This idea is also consistent
with the alternative interpretation of the Refcorp and KfW spreads - some say that these
yield differentials, rather than capturing liquidity, can also be interpreted as breakup or
selective default risk measures.
The secondary contribution of this paper is to provide partial explanation for the ILB-
nominal puzzle documented by Fleckenstein et al. (2014). They claim that there exists a
persistent mispricing between nominal bonds and ILBs of the US and other G7 countries
on a significant scale. In a frictionless world, one can replicate a nominal bond with a
portfolio of an ILB and inflation swaps. They find that the replicating portfolio has a lower
price than the nominal bonds, suggesting that ILBs are underpriced. For the US market,
Driessen et al. (2014) show that a large part of this price discrepancy is attributable to
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liquidity risk. However, there are other factors that could drive the mispricing, namely
the impact of the deflation option1 embedded in ILBs, liquidity and counterparty risk
premia in the inflation swap quotes, or even different levels of selective default risk premia
in nominal and real bonds.
The fore mentioned identification strategy can also be derived from the ILB-nominal
puzzle, substituting the breakeven rates by the mispricing between nominal bonds and
their replicating portfolios. Instead of examining these two prices in one country, we take
this price difference and compare across countries. A unique feature of this cross-country
sample is that in these three euro area countries both inflation swaps and inflation-indexed
bonds are linked to the same price index2 and the same deflation protection applies to all
bonds. Therefore, as a result of the differencing, the swap component and the price effect
of the deflation option mutually cancel out, reducing the new strategy to four bonds or
a spread on two breakeven rates. The differencing sheds light on the drivers of the ILB-
nominal puzzle: inflation swap quotes or the value of the deflation option cannot account
for the overall magnitude of the puzzle. Second, we estimate the difference in liquidity
and credit premia in ILB and nominal bonds and find that although the mean effect of
liquidity is small, these two effects can explain the persistent nature of the puzzle. And
lastly, we find that investors perceived ILBs to have higher sovereign risk exposure than
nominal bonds during the financial and euro crises, further increasing the yield difference
between the two securities.
Unlike most papers in the literature, we do not restrict our attention to examining the
nominal sovereign spread. Our primary aim is to understand what drives the wedge
between breakeven rates and inflation expectations, in other words the relative pricing
of indexed and nominal sovereign bonds. Other papers looking at the relative pricing of
nominal and indexed sovereign bonds are Campbell et al. (2009), Christensen and Gillan
(2011), Pflueger and Viceira (2011, 2015), Fleckenstein et al. (2014), Fleckenstein (2013)
and Driessen et al. (2014). Fleckenstein (2013) specifically focuses on the relative pricing
of nominal and indexed bonds in G7 countries, whereas Driessen et al. (2014) show that
most of the price difference between nominal and indexed US Treasuries is due to liquidity
risk premium in prices.
By exploring the liquidity features of indexed and nominal sovereign bonds, we contribute
to the long-standing literature on the effect of liquidity on asset prices (Amihud and
Mendelson (1986); Amihud (2002); Bekaert et al. (2007) among many others). More
1The deflation floor provides protection for investors when negative inflation occurs. In the absence
of the par floor, negative inflation would erode the value of the principal. In all European inflation-linked
bonds, the principal value is protected against deflation, but not the intermediate coupon payments.
2HICP stands for Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. This index is the weighted average of
inflation of Eurozone countries and is published by the European Central Bank on a monthly basis.
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specifically, we provide new evidence of liquidity risk being priced in major Eurozone
sovereign bond markets. Other studies often examine liquidity in the context of spillover
effects between European nominal sovereign bond and CDS markets (Calice et al., 2011)
or focus on specific markets to show how liquidity improved upon EBC interventions
(Pelizzon et al., mingb). Moreover, Darbha and Dufour (2014) show that even after
controlling for interest rate and credit risks similarly to Fama and French (1993), liquidity
is an important determinant of sovereign yields both in the cross-section and during the
financial crisis.
Naturally, this paper also links to the strand of literature on European nominal sovereign
market. Ejsing et al. (2012) investigate the dynamics of credit risk premium in bank and
sovereign CDSs during the financial crisis, especially focusing on the effect of government
rescue packages. Moreover, papers also examine the information content of sovereign CDS
contracts and bonds (for instance Fontana and Scheicher (2010)) or look at the basis, the
yield difference between these two assets (Arce et al., 2011; Palladini and Portes, 2011).
In this paper there is novel evidence on the price of credit risk on both nominal and
inflation linked sovereign bonds. Further, we also provide evidence on a subtler aspect of
credit risk, namely selective default risk in the bonds under examination.
Our analysis is closest related to recent work on Euro area government bonds research
that considers both liquidity and credit risks. Beber et al. (2009) disentangle the effects
of liquidity and credit quality in 10 Eurozone countries to identify flight to quality and
liquidity episodes. They show that liquidity is a non-trivial determinant of yields with
an increasing prominence when flights occur, whereas credit quality affects valuation.
On the other hand, by means of market related measures, Schwarz (2015) separates the
components of yields due to liquidity and credit risk. She estimates a model of liquidity
risk and finds that liquidity is priced in the cross-section of (nominal) sovereign debt.
Ejsing et al. (2012) quantify liquidity and credit risk premia in German and French gov-
ernment bond yields based on a state-space model with two latent factors. Bai et al.
(2012) examine what caused the sovereign debt crisis – illiquidity of markets or deteri-
orating credit conditions – and find spillover, but not feedback effect between aggregate
level credit and liquidity risk in a country. And finally, Darbha and Dufour (2014) study
the term structure of default and illiquidity in a sample of nominal Euro area government
bonds, whereas Monfort and Renne (2014) present an arbitrage-free model of euro-area
bond spreads, whose dynamics are driven by liquidity and credit risk. They find a non-
diversifiable euro-area credit component in these yields.
Our work differs from the above papers in two main aspects. First, we examine a cross-
country sample that goes beyond the nominal segment of bond markets and allows me
to look at the relative pricing of nominal and inflation-indexed bonds in the Eurozone
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– allowing me to set up clean, more stringent tests: the asset pricing tests we run are
particularly strong, in the sense that we control for many confounding factors by the
differencing. Therefore, in the subsequent step we are less likely to capture the effect
of factors other than differential liquidity or credit risk. Second, the unique identifica-
tion strategy based on differencing also allows me to address the empirical challenge of
disentangling alternative explanations of the ILB-nominal puzzle.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the Euro-
pean bond markets and the methodology, whereas Section 1.3 explains the data and the
estimation strategy. In Section 1.4 we present the empirical findings alongside with a
discussion, and finally; Section 1.5 discusses possible extensions and concludes.
1.2 Are liquidity and credit risks priced in European
nominal and inflation-indexed bonds?
In this section we shortly present the three major European sovereign bond markets:
France, Germany and Italy. We specifically focus on market conventions, microstructure
similarities and the inflation-linked bond segment. After showing why this is an ideal
setting to study the relative pricing of real and nominal bonds, we discuss the identifi-
cation strategy that helps to disentangle price effects of liquidity and credit risks in the
corresponding bond yields. We present a multifactor asset pricing model with illiquidity
and credit risk factors, inspired by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen
(2005), and Fama and French (1993). Then we show how to generalize this relation-
ship to breakeven rates, and Appendix 1.A shows how this relates to the trading rule
of Fleckenstein et al. (2014). The economic interpretation of the generalized model is
the cornerstone of this paper: both liquidity and (sovereign) credit risk premia can differ
among nominal and inflation-linked bonds of the same issuer.3
1.2.1 European bond markets
France, Germany and Italy are the three largest sovereign debt issuers of the Eurozone.
These countries are part of a monetary union, consequently investors investing across
these countries do not face exchange rate risk and have access to a wider range of bonds.
However, the common monetary policy is not the only thing these markets share: the
3Finding differing credit risk premium in nominal and inflation-indexed yields of the same issuer would
comply with the notion of partial or selective default, a possibility allowed by numerous macroeconomic
models, like in Barro (2006) and Bolton and Jeanne (2009).
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institutional features, market conventions, even the market (micro)structure of these
products are similar across these three countries.
Although in the past issuance via syndication was a common practice, nowadays both
nominal and inflation-linked bonds are issued via auctions of the corresponding Treasury
agencies: the German Finanzagentur GMbH, Treasury Department of the Ministry of Fi-
nance (Dipartimento del Tresoro) in Italy and the Agence France Tresor. These auctions,
identical to those in the US, are open to primary dealers, institutional investors who buy
these assets. These institutions, typically either directly or through subsidiaries, partici-
pate in markets of all three countries. After the issuance and often multiple re-openings,
these bonds are traded on the OTC secondary market, which in Europe consists of a
handful of trading platforms. Most of the platforms trade all securities, however, there
is some degree of specialization among them.
Nevertheless, it is not only the way these securities are traded that is similar in this cross-
country sample. These products also have the same market conventions. This is especially
interesting for inflation linked bonds in this study. The inflation-linked bond markets of
these three countries are among the largest inflation-linked market segments of the world
(Fleckenstein et al., 2014), their total value ($450 million) is half of the corresponding
US segment. An interesting feature of the ILBs in our sample is that they are linked to
one price index, to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, henceforth HICP. This
index is the weighted average of inflation of Eurozone countries and is published by the
European Central Bank on a monthly basis. Moreover, the same deflation option applies
to them: the principal payment of these bonds is protected when deflation occurs.
These countries started to issue ILBs in the past two decades. First, France issued
inflation-linked bonds in 1998, a year after the US, but those were indexed to the French
Consumer Price Index. Later, in 2001 they added HICP-linked bonds to their range of
products. These bonds were especially popular among institutional investors across the
Eurozone, as they were the first to compensate for Eurozone inflation with moderate
sovereign risk at that time. Since 2003, the Ministry of Economy and Finance in Italy
has also been issuing HICP indexed bonds. Today, they have the largest outstanding
inflation-linked debt in the Eurozone. And at last, the German Finanzagentur has also
issued its first ILB in 2006, and Germany was the first to issue an ILB after the financial
crisis in 2008.
In conclusion, these three countries constitute a unique cross-section to study the relative
pricing of real and nominal bonds. The fore mentioned features are the same across all
bonds in the sample, therefore it is unlikely that any convenience yield would arise due to
differences in trading or market conventions. Moreover, despite sharing the same currency
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and monetary policy, these countries still have different fiscal behavior, which results in
diverse risk exposures of these debt securities.
1.2.2 Identification of liquidity and credit risk effects
The simplest way to quantify liquidity and credit effects in bond yields is to look at the
individual asset markets in each country and estimate models with the corresponding risk
factors separately. This can be applied to both indexed and nominal bonds. Practically
this means that we would estimate a separate model for each bond segment: altogether
six models in this cross-country sample. The clear advantage of this method is the direct
comparability to results from the US Treasury market, as in Pflueger and Viceira (2015)
or in Driessen et al. (2014). However, the major shortcoming is that not only one has
to impose a lot of structure and assumptions on the estimation, but also that we cannot
efficiently measure the relative riskiness of real and nominal bonds by only comparing
risk exposures and price of a certain risk among different segments. Moreover, estimation
might be infeasible due to insufficient data in segments with short time series and small
cross-sections, such as the German ILB segment.
The methodological innovation in this paper is to directly estimate relative risk exposures
of nominal and inflation-linked bonds and prices of their differential risk exposures. For
the latter we model the holding period return of a single asset as a combination of market,
liquidity and sovereign credit risk exposures. The next section explains how this pricing
relationship applies to breakeven rates, whereas Appendix 1.A links it to the trading rule
in Fleckenstein et al. (2014). An implicit assumption of the analysis is that Eurozone bond
markets are integrated, which in light of the monetary union, common currency and other
features of these markets is fairly reasonable. However, assuming integration not only
has interesting economic implications but also a crucial role in the aggregation: it helps
to restrict the number of parameters in the estimation and allows for the identification of
the model in the cross-section of breakeven rates. Therefore, we define the market return
as the equally weighted average return4 of all bonds: inflation-linked and nominal bonds.
Liquidity is a multifaceted concept; both the level of asset and market liquidity (Amihud
and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2007) and liquidity risk (Pastor and
Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Schwarz, 2015; Driessen et al., 2014) are
likely to be priced. Moreover,Driessen et al. (2014) show that the importance of the
level and risk aspects of liquidity differ across TIPS, nominal Treasury and inflation swap
4Equal weighting over-represents the smaller ILB segment, potentially exposing the market factor to
liquidity and credit risks, which would weaken our results. As a robustness check, we will introduce a
value-weighted market factor.
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markets in the US. Therefore, we include both features: the level of liquidity of an asset
is proxied by bond characteristics, such as age or size of an issue, whereas liquidity risk is
captured by a liquidity factor. Moreover, we also control for sovereign credit risk. Most
studies that examine credit risk look at the differences across countries (Arce et al., 2011;
Beber et al., 2009; Ejsing et al., 2012) Despite that these differences are pronounced and
highly economically significant around major credit events, such as the Euro crisis, looking
at within country dissimilarities can be equally interesting: a country could choose to
default on certain types of obligations, but not or to a different extent on others. This
selective default can manifest in delayed payments, restructuring or the refusal of any
payments to groups of creditors.
A fairly recent historical example5 described by Duffie et al. (2003), is Russia defaulting
on its ruble-denominated internal debt in 1998, whereas not on its eurobonds, shows that
the occurrence of such event might not be unlikely. Moreover, eurobonds are similar to
inflation-linked debt in nature, as the exchange rate and inflation risks both introduce
uncertainty concerning the future payments that the issuer has to deliver. Inspired by this
anecdotal evidence, we examine whether selective default risk is priced after controlling
for liquidity and market risk exposures. To do so, we propose to describe expected returns
in each market segment of the three countries with the following relationship, where all
risk factors measure Eurozone-wide risks:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡 =𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽MKT,𝑖 (𝑅MKT,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡) + 𝛽LIQ,𝑖𝜂𝑡 + 𝛽CR,𝑖𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1.1)
E (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡) =𝜅E (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜆MKT𝛽MKT,𝑖 + 𝜆LIQ𝛽LIQ,𝑖 + 𝜆𝐶𝑅𝛽CR,𝑖. (1.2)
In the above equations 𝛽MKT,𝑖, 𝛽LIQ,𝑖 and 𝛽CR,𝑖 are exposures to market, liquidity and
sovereign credit risk factors, respectively. 𝜂𝑡 and 𝜃𝑡 are the liquidity and credit risk factors,
and E (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) captures the level of liquidity, proxied by asset characteristics. 𝜆MKT, 𝜆LIQ
and 𝜆CR are the market, liquidity and credit risk premia.
To directly test the proposition of selective default, one has to compare the prices of
credit risk in the nominal and inflation-indexed bond markets. If these two prices were
not equal, that would provide evidence that nominal and indexed bonds are exposed to
credit risk to a different extent. The next section presents a more direct approach, with
which selective default risk can be directly measured.
5More recent examples are Argentina defaulting on its dollar denominated debt from the IMF in 2002,
or the default of Ecuador in 2008.
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1.2.3 The spread on breakeven (SBEI) strategy
In order to directly measure risk exposures, we propose to estimate risk premia based
on pairs of breakeven rates. Breakeven rate or breakeven inflation is the yield difference
between a nominal and real yields of bonds with similar maturities and credit quality. This
yield spread is often thought of as a proxy for inflation expectations (e.g. Ciccarelli and
Garcia (2009)), however it contains convexity and compounding effects (Kerkhof, 2005),
inflation risk premia (Gürkaynak et al., 2010; Grishchenko and Huang, 2013) and other
risk premia, such as compensation for liquidity risk (D’Amico et al., 2010; Pflueger and
Viceira, 2015). Looking at the breakeven rate in one country is informative, nevertheless,
taking the difference between pairs of breakeven rates across countries allows me directly
identify relative risk premia in the underlying bonds.
Most studies that analyze the breakeven rate rely on the difference between two smooth
zero coupon curves. As opposed to this, we choose to focus on pairs of bonds with the
smallest possible maturity mismatch6 between potential pairs across countries. We do
this because on the one hand this allows me to use observable yields, therefore incorporate
market information; on the other hand, we have to impose less assumption on the data
as we are not fitting yield curves. Additionally, fitting the real curve could be challenging
at the country level due to insufficient number of cross-sectional data points. Also,
pairs of breakeven rates are practically bond portfolios with long and short positions.
Consequently, we can show that the asset level models from the previous section can be
aggregated to the portfolio level, additionally, as a result similar pricing relationships
arise. Appendix 1.A shows, that one could derive the same model and pricing relations
based on the trading rule of Fleckenstein et al. (2014).7
Differencing breakeven rates eliminates common components, such as 1) the compounding
and a large part convexity effects that arise due to inflation; 2) the effect of inflation
expectations and inflation risk premia; 3) any other factors that are the same across the
three Eurozone countries, such as the effect of monetary policy or market or interest rate
risks. The residual that the differencing does not take out is the exposure to risks that do
not affect nominal and inflation-linked bonds equally within and across countries. While
testing relative risk exposures, we also examine the assumption underlying the literature
that studies relative liquidity of inflation-linked and nominal bonds that these bonds have
identical sovereign credit risk exposures. Furthermore, this differencing based strategy
6In matching maturities, we follow Fleckenstein et al. (2014), however, one could also develop dynamic
strategies based on matched duration or minimizing the convexity gap between nominal and inflation-
linked bonds.
7In matching maturities, we follow Fleckenstein et al. (2014), however, one could also develop dynamic
strategies based on matched duration or minimizing the convexity gap between nominal and inflation-
linked bonds.
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not only allows me to study liquidity and credit risk premia in sovereign bond prices
alongside with excluding the above alternative explanations, but it also proposes a more
stringent test of the relative pricing of inflation indexed and nominal bonds.
I propose that after excluding a battery of common components by the differencing, the
residual yields are most likely driven by liquidity and sovereign risk differences – both
within and across countries. Note that we can only identify significant credit premium
in either one of these cases: 1) if the loadings of such premium differ across nominal and
indexed bonds, or 2) if the price of credit risk differs between ILBs and nominal bonds.
This latter possibility could arise due to selective default risk premium. Yet, similarly
to liquidity risk, we focus on the effect triggered by Eurozone-wide credit shocks, due
to the fore mentioned identification restrictions. For notational simplicity, we show how
























where 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑡 stands for the return on the country-level breakeven or bond portfolio.
This return, can be proxied by the yield difference of nominal and inflation-linked bonds,
following Campello et al. (2008), who treat yield-to-maturity of a bond as a forward-
looking expected return proxy. Then if we apply the pricing relation of Equation 1.2 to


































































Note that the above betas are asset level risk exposures and can be estimated at the
asset level. To get these betas we regress excess individual bond returns on the three
risk factors of Equation 1.1. Then we impose that the above yields can be described as
a combination of factor exposures and their respective premia, as in Equation 1.2. This
is similar to the second stage of the Fama-MacBeth approach. In what follows, we apply
these assumptions and we conjecture that the level of liquidity has the same coefficients
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Nevertheless, if we wanted to quantify the respective risk premia from Equation 1.5, we
would have to estimate nine of them. Given the limited number of maturity-matched
basis pairs in the cross-section, we need to restrict the number of parameters to identify
the regressions. Therefore, we focus our attention on cases where all risks are integrated
at the Eurozone level. We do this by restricting the price of market, liquidity and credit
risks to be equal across the four market segments in the SBEI pairs. Economically this
means that liquidity and credit risk exposures are consistently priced in the cross-section














































And finally, by relabeling the portfolio of betas and liquidity characteristics as net effects,
Equation 1.7 becomes a multifactor model inspired by Fama and French (1993) and






















The next section presents the estimation and gives a detailed explanation on how these
equations are applied to the data.
8One of the robustness tests relaxes this assumption by allowing kappa to depend on the size of the
underlying bond segments, which takes into account the relative size differences of nominal and indexed
bond segments.
9In their paper net beta refers to the sum of market and the three distinctive liquidity betas that
they estimate. Otherwise they also estimate a multifactor model with systematic and liquidity risks.
12 1.3. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
1.3 Estimation strategy
This section presents the data and describes their various sources. It is followed by
the presentation of the main variables: the different liquidity and credit risk measures,
the risk factors and a note on how expected returns are proxied. Finally, we give a
detailed description of the estimation of both the market segment-level and breakeven-
based strategies.
1.3.1 The data
The data are coming from different sources. The daily mid-quotes of nominal and
inflation-linked bond prices are from Bloomberg, alongside with information on indi-
vidual bond issues, such as issue and redemption dates, amount issued and coupon rates.
The sample contains all available HICP-linked inflation indexed issues from the three
countries: 5 from Germany, 9 French and 13 Italian ILBs. We focus on these assets as in
the euro-area both inflation swaps and many inflation-indexed bonds are linked to this
harmonized price index, while both Italy and France issue index linkers that are indexed
to local inflation indices. However, having the same price index is crucial for the iden-
tification strategy. Alongside with inflation-linked debt, the sample covers a wide range
of nominal issues, approximately 50-60 bonds from each country. The maturity dates of
these bonds typically range between 2005 and 2055 and daily closing prices are adjusted
by accrued interest following the respective market conventions. We collect data for the
period between July 2004 and February 2014.
To capture the price effect of liquidity and credit risks, we complement the above data
with 5-year sovereign quanto CDS prices for the credit risk factor, next to additional
controls, such as the VIX and its European equivalents, the EURIBOR and EONIA
indexes from Bloomberg. In order to define liquidity measures, we obtain the 10-year KfW
agency bond yields and that of the 10-year constant maturity German nominal bond index
from Datastream. To construct the benchmark liquidity proxy, we get data on monthly
aggregate primary dealer transaction volumes directly from the German Finanzagentur
and the Italian Dipartimento del Tresoro.10 These figures are based on reports submitted
by primary dealers on all transactions with other such institutions or third parties. Then
these numbers are aggregated across counterparties and over the month and are available
for the nominal and indexed segments separately.
10In one of the robustness tests we also use volume data for French bonds, which was obtained from
the Agence France Tresor.
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In the Eurozone, German bonds are argued to be the safest, therefore we use the 6-
month constant maturity German sovereign yield as the risk free rate in our sample.
Unfortunately, there are no bills issued with maturities shorter than 6 months, thus by
imposing the assumption of bills having a flat term structure, we use it as the proxy for
the 1-month rate to match the implicit holding period of the regressions.
1.3.2 Main variables
Asset, market and expected returns
Bond returns are the ratio of consecutive prices corrected for coupon payments. Market
wide returns are based on the implicit assumption of Eurozone integration, and are de-
fined as the equally weighted average across all bonds in the three countries. Standard
asset pricing tests are usually performed on realized excess returns. As opposed to this,
we quantify the effect of liquidity from bond yields, following Campello et al. (2008);
Bongaerts et al. (2011); Pflueger and Viceira (2015); Driessen et al. (2014). We do so
because yields are more persistent and less noisy than realized return estimates of a short
sample. Under a set of assumptions, bond yields can be treated as forward-looking ex-
pected return proxies. First assumption is that markets are frictionless and that the term
structure of expected returns is flat. For nominal bonds this relationship holds under the
condition that yields follow a random walk process. As for ILBs, we also propose that
inflation is constant in expectation and it is independently and identically distributed
with yields. Absent liquidity and credit effects, one could show that the swap rate equals
the breakeven rate. That case it can be proxied by the difference of nominal and real
yields, therefore with the difference between two random walk processes that also follows
similar dynamics.
Liquidity and credit measures
To explore the effect of liquidity, we include both asset and market level liquidity measures
in the analysis. As in Fleckenstein et al. (2014) and Driessen et al. (2014), we face a
similar problem that the directly observable bid-ask spreads are indicative quotes, thus
not reliable and the Roll measure also cannot be constructed as bond returns tend to
be positively serially correlated. Moreover, due to data availability, constructing the
same set of measures for the six bond segments and the swap market is also infeasible.
Therefore we proxy bond liquidity by using issue characteristics, such as age or amount
issued, following Houweling et al. (2005). The reasoning behind a bond’s age capturing
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liquidity is simple: the more time passes since issuance, the more likely that a bond
gets locked-up in buy-and-hold investors’ portfolios. This decreases its liquidity, which
suggests a positive relationship between illiquidity and age, whereas issued amount is
negatively related to the latter: larger issues tend to be more liquid. We define age as the
years passed since issuance, whereas we use the natural logarithm of the amounts issued.
I also construct market wide liquidity measures that serve as a basis for the risk factor
construction. One such proxy is the ILLIQ measure of Amihud (2002).11 I define the
measure as the ratio of monthly absolute bond market returns over monthly aggregate
trading volume, where the volume is aggregated across all dealers and all securities within
their segment and is observable at the monthly frequency. The second measure that we
incorporate in the analysis is the KfW spread, which like Schuster and Uhrig-Homburg
(2013)and Schwarz (2015), we define as the yield difference between a German agency
bond issued by the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau and the maturity-matched nominal
government bond. In constructing this liquidity spread, we follow Longstaff (2004) who
quantifies liquidity premium as the yield difference between two securities that have the
same credit risk but differ in their respective liquidities. Nevertheless, another potential
interpretation of this measure is that it captures breakup risk or selective default risk. If
this was the case, then using this spread as a liquidity measure could capture part of the
credit risk premium in prices, which would result in an underestimated credit premium.
To capture each country’s credit risk, we collect quotes from 5-year quanto CDS contracts.
We use the changes in levels of the spread to construct the credit risk factor. Appendix 1.B
provides graphs of the time-series of the different ILLIQ measures, the KfW spread, swap
market measures and the three CDS spreads. Next to the previous liquidity and credit
proxies, we construct additional controls that are included in some of the robustness
checks, such as yield volatility or a control for the slope of term structure of bonds. Yield
volatility is defined as the difference between the standard deviations of individual issues
and the cross-sectional average standard deviation of quoted yields, where the average is
taken over the different maturities for a given month. This definition is the same across
both swaps and bonds. For bonds we also include time-to-maturity, which is defined as
the remaining years until maturity of a given issue. This variable controls for a maturity
structure and incorporates the slope effect of the term structure of bonds.
11The ILLIQ measure used in this study is based on holding period returns, while Amihud (2002) uses
price returns. However, this does not influence the main results of the analysis as the resulting measures
and risk factors based on the two types of prices are virtually identical.
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Liquidity and credit risk factors
In order to examine Eurozone integrated effects of liquidity and credit risks, we construct
factors that incorporate the country-level measures, and take out their variation by using
principal component analysis. The Eurozone-wide liquidity measure consists of the four
ILLIQ measures from Italian and German markets and the KfW spread. All the above
measures are formulated so that the factor loadings ensure they all capture illiquidity.
Similarly, to get an integrated credit risk measure, we take the first principal component
of the individual measures from the three countries. In both cases the first principal
components capture the most part of the variation, and serve as input for the factor
construction. We define the risk factors as the unexpected or surprise component of
these persistent measures:
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 − E [𝑀𝑡−1] , where 𝑀𝑡 = [𝜂𝑡, 𝜃𝑡] (1.8)
The above residual defines the risk factor: the difference between M and its expectation
in the preceding period. To compute these innovations, we impose a first order autore-
gressive structure on the different principal components capturing both liquidity and the
credit measures in the sample.
1.3.3 Estimation method
In this section we explain how liquidity and credit risks affect asset returns: how Equa-
tions 1.2 and 1.7 are applied to the data. For this, we first estimate bond level betas to
measure risk exposures, then in the second step we aggregate these betas to measure the
price of relative risk.
Bond betas
To estimate the relative risk exposures from the breakeven rates, we turn to the standard
two-step procedure based on Fama and MacBeth (1973). Unlike in most asset pricing
tests, we do not sort our assets into portfolios, as we are interested in their individual
characteristics and this way we can also take advantage of their larger cross-sectional
variation. However, this comes at the cost of having less precise beta estimates. Thus
in the first stage we estimate the betas from bond level time-series regressions where we
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regress bond excess returns on the liquidity and credit risk factors, 𝜂𝑡 and 𝜃𝑡, respectively:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽MKT,𝑖 (𝑅MKT,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡) + 𝛽LIQ,𝑖𝜂𝑡 + 𝛽credit,𝑖𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,
for 𝑡 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇 for each 𝑖, market and country in the sample. (1.9)
Equation 1.8 showed that the risk factors are residuals from autoregressive regressions.
We estimate betas and risk loadings for each nominal and inflation-linked bond in our
sample. We restrict our attention to integrated risk premia, where the market, liquid-
ity and credit betas capture a common, Eurozone-wide risk exposure to the underlying
factors. Given the liquidity and credit measures, we are able to measure an asset’s covari-
ation with the integrated market liquidity and credit risk. The former captures the same
facet of liquidity risk as Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), whereas the credit beta proxies
the exposure to the average sovereign credit risk in the Eurozone. These covariances
suggest that market liquidity and credit risks affect required returns positively, such that
the more illiquid or credit risky a bond is, the higher returns investors expect, which
decreases the asset’s price.
Breakeven betas and the price of differential risk exposures
Given the limited number of available breakeven pairs, identification and estimation of
the betas and risk factors is nontrivial. If we wanted to conduct the usual Fama-MacBeth
procedure, in the first stage we would need to regress the spread on breakeven rates on





𝑡 , respectively to get beta estimates. However, there is no need to do this,
as in the previous step we have already estimated the respective risk exposures based on
Equation 1.9. Moreover, we are only interested in loadings on Eurozone risks – the ones
that are common and likely to play an important role in both countries in the strategy.




























The net betas are portfolios of the respective risk exposures of the two nominal and
indexed bonds that comprise the SBEI series. In this portfolio, the sign of each bond is
according to that of the position in the breakeven rate. We also control for asset level
liquidity, as shown in Equation 1.7, which is constructed as a portfolio of asset level











This transformation is applied to the asset characteristics for which we have data on all
four bonds in the strategy, such as amount issued, age or time-to-maturity. Then to
run repeated OLS regressions, we substitute expected returns by their forward-looking
empirical counterpart12 , by the breakeven rates, and estimate the following regressions:













for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 for each 𝑡 and basis pair in the sample,
(1.12)
where 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑡 is the yield difference between the respective ILB and nominal issues, thus
the breakeven rate. Estimates from these repeated regressions are averages across time
and errors include both a 12-month Newey-West correction and account for the averaging
of the coefficients. Moreover, the resulting premium estimates are directly interpretable:
they show how large a part of the yield difference is accounted for by the reward for all
four bonds in the strategy being exposed to liquidity and credit risks. This is a direct
measure of partial or selective default risk premium.
1.4 Empirical results
This section presents the results of this study. First, we show the descriptive statistics
of the main variables, then proceed with reporting the estimated betas and the net
or portfolio betas. We also discuss the time-series properties of the factors. Then we
proceed, with the analyses of the relative pricing of nominal and indexed bonds. These
are based on the direct approach following Equation 1.12. At last, we present various
robustness checks, such as pooled OLS regressions, convexity calculation and trading
volume weighted liquidity level estimation. We conclude this section with a discussion
that touches upon the size of the credit effect, CDS liquidity, and macro implications and
mechanisms behind the results.
12Appendix 1.A explains why this substitution is conceptually feasible.
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1.4.1 Descriptive statistics, betas and factors
Table 1.1 contains descriptive statistics of the main variables, whereas Table 1.2 provides
an overview of the beta estimates for both the benchmark and segmented market cases.
In Table 1.1, Panels A to C compare the different features of nominal and inflation-linked
bond. The main variables are in line with expectations: in ILB markets the yields are
lower and, on average, less volatile than nominal ones, where the German average yield
is the lowest. German ILBs are the youngest as these bonds are only issued since 2006,
whereas nominal bonds are older in all three markets. In Germany the average size of
nominal issues is almost 30% larger than ILBs, whereas in Italy and France this difference
is even larger, 50% and 100%, respectively. We also present the ILLIQ measure that shows
the absolute euro change in price triggered by trading 1 million EUR. This price impact
is the highest in the German ILB and the lowest in the German nominal segments. This
observation verifies that German nominal bonds are highly liquid, especially in times of
flight to liquidity. Inflation swaps have an average yield of 2.19% whereas the difference
between average indexed and nominal yields is 67 basis points in Germany, and 164 and
83 basis points in France and Italy, respectively.
Figure 3.1 depicts the time evolution of both the country and Eurozone level illiquidity
and credit factors. All series have their peaks at the financial and the euro crises, which is
in line with anecdotal and previous empirical evidence. The country level liquidity factors
differ slightly: in Germany it is constructed by taking the first principal component of
the KfW spread, and the ILLIQ and zero return measures from both the nominal and
indexed segments. All of these measures have a positive loading in the first component,
except for zero returns in the ILB market. However, this is not surprising in light of the
segment being relatively young and there are a high number of zero return days in the
months succeeding its introduction, but not later. For Italy, the principal component is
based on the different ILLIQ and zero return measures, where the constituent measures
show the same relation: all measures constituting the German and Italian factors are
positively correlated to one another. Individual measures are depicted in Appendix 1.B.
The three illiquidity factors from the bond markets follow similar dynamics and hence
their correlations are sizeable: it is 0.41 between the German and Italian liquidity factor.
The credit factors are based on the unexpected changes in the sovereign CDS series.
These series tend to closely follow each other, as can be seen in Figure 1.B.5 and exhibit
correlations above 90%. After taking the residuals from the respective autoregressive
processes, the countrywide credit factors remain highly correlated: all coefficients are
above 0.7.
Table 1.2 presents the distribution of beta coefficients across the six bond market seg-
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ments and the net betas from Equation 1.13. The betas are estimated from asset-level
time-series regressions of excess returns on the market, illiquidity and credit factors; un-
der the assumption of either integrated or segment-level market factors.13 Under these
assumptions the market factor is the Eurozone or asset segment-wide equally weighted
average return, respectively. In both cases we expect liquidity and credit betas to be
negative on average, whereas the segmented market betas being close to one. On the
one hand, this is not what we find in the data in all cases. Market betas in all segments
are different from one and often negative. This is due to the non-homogeneous and im-
balanced nature of the market factor, whose composition changes whenever a new issue
enters or an old one reaching maturity leaves the sample. On the other hand, there is a
pattern in nominal integrated market betas that is consistent with flight-to-quality: Ital-
ian nominal yields increase whenever European systematic risk rises, French bonds show
only a slight effect, whereas the negative beta of the German nominal sector suggests that
investor find safe haven in these assets. The other irregularity of the betas is that not all
liquidity and credit betas are negative on average. In German and Italian markets this
seems less of a problem, unlike in France, where we cannot construct a segment-specific
French illiquidity factor to measure the respective beta. Instead we substitute the missing
information with the integrated, Eurozone-level liquidity factor.
1.4.2 Net betas
Net betas can be found in Panel D of Table 1.2, as well as they are depicted in Figure 1.2.
Net betas are a portfolio of nominal and ILB betas that constitute the spread on breakeven
strategy. There are twenty such strategy pairs in the sample that have at least 12 monthly
observations. Panel D shows that the average net beta is negative in all three cases, in
addition, Figure 1.2 is also in line with this observation. Economically speaking, if the
liquidity and credit risk exposure were the same among nominal and inflation-linked
bonds, net betas would line up at the zero. Therefore, finding values other than zero
suggests that exposures differ among the two bonds, moreover, this difference is also not
consistent or the same across the two countries. Moreover, the sign of these betas also
suggest which of the underlying four bonds drives the result, this can be derived from
the sizes and signs of the individual bond betas.
Liquidity net betas can be found in a narrow range around zero, while credit net betas in
the mid-panel are more dispersed and larger – often even by two orders of magnitude. The
13I also looked at median betas and observation-weighted average betas. This latter method would
tilt the average towards more precise estimates, the ones that are based on more monthly observations.
However, the resulting betas are not significantly different from the ones that are presented in the table:
they are similar in magnitude and have identical signs.
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negative liquidity betas suggest that ILBs are less liquid than nominal bonds, a finding
in line with previous literature. However, one of the most surprising finding of this paper
is that we find that credit risk exposures of bond within a country, issued by the same
issuer, are also large enough to survive the double differencing. The sign of the credit
betas also provides suggestive evidence of which bond is driving this relationship: ILBs
are more exposed to sovereign risk, whereas there is also a natural ordering across the
countries in terms of their riskiness: Germany is the safest from a sovereign perspective,
Italy is the least creditworthy, whereas there is mixed evidence for France. Finally, the
market net betas in the lower panel are the largest in size and dispersion, despite that
one would expect such exposures to be zero. These loadings are a clear proof that the
breakeven spread is exposed to integrated non-diversifiable Eurozone risk, similarly to
the finding of Monfort and Renne (2014). This is due to the integrated market factor
capturing some aspects of liquidity and credit risks in the euro area, which are apparently
relevant in the pricing of the markets under scrutiny.
The beta estimates reflect how difficult it is to disentangle the effect of liquidity and credit
risk, two concepts that are highly correlated and intertwined, especially in distressed
periods. There have been many papers trying to separate them, and our approach is
the best attempt to explore such a highly relevant question in this recently available
cross-section of indexed and nominal euro area sovereign bond data.14
1.4.3 The relative pricing of indexed and nominal bonds
There is evidence from the US Treasury markets that both the level (Krishnamurthy,
2002; Goyenko et al., 2011; Fleckenstein et al., 2014; Pflueger and Viceira, 2015; Driessen
et al., 2014) and risk (Driessen et al., 2014) aspects of liquidity are priced, whereas em-
pirical findings from the Eurozone are restricted to nominal bonds (Darbha and Dufour,
2014; Pelizzon et al., minga; Schwarz, 2015). As opposed to this, to our best knowledge
this is the first study to present empirical evidence for selective default risk premium
in the relative pricing of nominal and inflation-linked bonds. Next to this, the main
contribution of the paper is coming from the identification strategy that helps better
understanding the relative pricing of inflation-linked and nominal bonds and to set up
clean asset pricing tests in a difference-in-differences setting, ensuring that the analysis
is the least contaminated by confounding effects.
Unlike the majority of the literature working with breakeven rates, we choose to focus
on maturity-matched bonds we construct the matched pairs by minimizing the mismatch
14Beta estimates presented might be estimated with considerable errors due to the short and imbal-
anced sample in addition to estimating them from individual assets.
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of the two bond maturities, as well as we try to match similar tenors to one another.
Consequently, we have breakeven rates on 5 or 10 year or mixed maturities. Due to
this heterogeneity in tenors, and the various contaminating effects that are eliminated
by the differencing, studying these yield spreads are less informative then doing so based
on their differences. Therefore, we focus the analysis on the SBEI series, for which we
use the pool of 27 maturity matched bond pairs. The resulting series are depicted in
Figure 1.3, where the different panels correspond to different country pairs. There are
twenty SBEI series with at least 12 months of data available in the sample: 6 of these
are taken between Germany and Italy, 5 pairs are formulated across German and French
bond pairs and 9 pairs are among Italian and French breakeven rates. The descriptive
statistics of these series are in Panel A of Table 1.4.
Panel A of Table 1.4 shows that the average breakeven spread is between -36 and 23 basis
points across all the pairs. The lowest value the spread takes is -272 basis points, for
Italian-French matched basis pair, whereas its peak is 401 basis points for a pair from
Germany and Italy. The latter series are the most volatile. The economic interpretation
of the German-Italian example based on the average series is that if an investor were
engaged in German and Italian ILB and nominal positions according to Equation 1.3,
her average return would amount to 23 yield basis points. However, the panel also
shows that holding the underlying positions results in volatile returns with large swings
ranging between a loss of 66 basis points or gains in the order of 4% per annum. This
suggests that even without taking transaction costs into account, there are potential
sizeable losses arising if the strategy cannot be held until maturity. This is even more
prominent in German-French and Italian-French bond pairs. However, discovering the
limits to the tradability and risk-return characteristics of the breakeven spread is not the
main focus of the paper. Instead, Table 1.4 contains the results estimated from monthly
repeated cross-sectional regressions of the SBEI series on the illiquidity and credit factors,
alongside with composite asset level liquidity proxies, based on Equation 1.10 and 1.12.
Net betas are portfolios of betas estimated from the first stage of market segment level
Fama-MacBeth regressions, as loadings on the Eurozone market, illiquidity and credit
factors. The results correspond to the period between July 2004 and February 2014.
This implies that (1) the spread on breakeven is exposed to systematic risk; (2) the
European interest rate or integrated market factor is likely to be capturing some aspects
of liquidity and credit risk. This is additional proof of how important these risks are in
the pricing of sovereign bonds. Nevertheless, this finding shows that liquidity differences
between nominal bonds and ILBs is probably more a within than an across-country effect.
Table 1.3 focuses on the effect of liquidity and sovereign risk differences between nominal
and inflation-linked sovereign bonds. Column 1 considers liquidity alone, which has a
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highly significant discount. This effect, evaluated at the mean net liquidity beta, explains
3.48 basis points of the SBEI series. However, this effect is not robust to the inclusion
of differential credit risk or bond group-level liquidity measures. The most striking and
key finding of the paper is that differential credit risk is priced in the cross-section of
Eurozone SBEI series. This implies that investors probably perceive ILBs riskier from
a sovereign risk perspective and see governments to be more likely to default on their
inflation-indexed obligations than on nominal debt. This observation is in accordance
with selective default events that occurred in Russia in 1998 with its ruble-debt, or
with Argentina between 2003 and 2005 that defaulted on eurobonds. Moreover, to our
knowledge this finding makes our paper the first to provide empirical evidence on such
phenomenon.
Finding significant credit effects can partly be explained by the existence of a non-
diversifiable euro-area credit risk as in Monfort and Renne (2014), and the constituent
assets’ exposure to such a factor. However, identifying any credit effects that does not
cancel out within a certain country suggests that this is selective default risk. The in-
clusion of credit risk almost doubles the R-squared compared to when only illiquidity is
considered. Credit risk carries a large discount, its market price is -126 basis points; and
accounts for a sizeable yield difference of 41.6 basis points evaluated at the mean net
credit beta. This effect is persistent and robust to the inclusion of liquidity level proxies,
among which the relative age of bonds also matters; and to incorporating systematic risk
by means of the market factor.
As unusual as pricing differential risk exposures might seem, the idea of comparing yields
of securities with similar exposures to certain risks is not new in the literature. Longstaff
(2004) compares yields of US Treasuries to those of bonds issued by the Refcorp (Resolu-
tion Funding Corporation), whereas Schwarz (2015) examines yield differences of German
federal government bonds and bonds issued by KFW, a government owned development
bank. The key feature of theses agency bonds is that they have explicit government
guarantees, and consequently the same credit risk as government bonds. However, the
liquidity of government bonds is substantially higher and thus the yield difference mea-
sures general market liquidity conditions. What we do in this paper is similar but goes the
other way around: while controlling for liquidity on both the nominal and inflation-linked
bond markets the same way, we show that the remaining yield difference is attributed
to sovereign risk. This idea is also consistent with the alternative interpretation of the
Refcorp and KfW spreads - some say that these yield differentials, rather than capturing
liquidity, can also be interpreted as breakup or selective default risk measures.
Figure 1.4 depicts the percentage yield risk premium due to relative illiquidity and credit
risk in all available breakeven spreads. It is calculated as the product of the cross-
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sectionally estimated risk premia and the respective net betas. The upper panel shows
the illiquidity premium estimated from Column 1 in the respective pairs, whereas the
lower graph depicts both liquidity and credit premia based on Column 2 of Table 1.3.
There are two noteworthy observations: 1) illiquidity is not robust to the inclusion of
credit risk, as both the magnitudes and sign of SBEI-level effects change across the
specifications; 2) the magnitude of the yield difference that is explained by credit risk
is tenfold compared to that of illiquidity, and in certain cases it is up to 1.5%. The
discussion at the end of this section reconciles the potential drivers of the size of the
credit effect.
The final step of examining the SBEI series is to evaluate the effect of risk adjustments.
This shows how would the series change if we took out the estimated liquidity and credit
premia, as in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.5. Table 1.4 presents descriptive statistics of the
average unadjusted series, in Panel A; and the liquidity, and liquidity and credit risk-
adjusted series in Panel B and C, respectively. The idea underlying the adjustment is
based on Equation 1.15, where we proxy the SBEI series by the portfolio of constituent
bonds. To calculate the adjustment for each bond quadruplet, we sum up the asset level
risk premia and deduct this sum from the spread. We apply this raw correction to all
bond pairs in the sample and recalculate the average of the adjusted spread series. Panel
B presents the specification when only illiquidity adjustment is applied. In all three
country pairs we find that by taking out the estimated (non time-varying) risk premia,
the spread shrinks considerably. Panel C shows the case when the adjustment is based
on the sum of liquidity and credit effects. As opposed to liquidity, taking both liquidity
and credit risks out deepens the spread. Also the extreme values show that the series are
shifted downwards, further from their equilibrium level of zero.15
Figure 1.5 gives a visual representation of the moments in the table. The top panel
shows the breakeven pairs matched between German and Italian bonds; the middle panel
refers to those from Germany and France; whereas the bottom panel depicts French-
Italian pairs. In all three panels the solid line refers to the average series, the dashed
one to liquidity, whereas the dotted line to the composite adjustment. The average series
presented are also imbalanced: their composition over which they are defined varies over
time.
The upper panel shows that the German and Italian spreads have their peaks at times
most likely coinciding with ECB intervention. Applying liquidity adjustment to this series
does not have a large effect. In general, the figure suggests that the corresponding liquidity
15Note that this adjustment does not allow me to incorporate time variation in risk premia; therefore,
we can only induce parallel shift in the series. Incorporating time variation would require splitting the
sample or using rolling window estimation that are not feasible due to the empirical issues explained
before.
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corrections are not too large and probably average out. On the other hand, applying
credit adjustment shifts the average further from zero: it deepens the yield difference if
the respective bonds in the strategy. This is not surprising, as these pairs contain the
smallest and the largest credit risk estimates and by definition of the portfolio formation,
the sum of these effects is expected to be negative. The middle section demonstrates
the average of the five Germany and France-based series, for which liquidity shifts the
average upwards, closer to zero. This helps to explain the price difference by illiquidity
differences, but taking credit risk into account moves the opposite direction. This result
is in line with the selective default story, where investors perceive ILBs riskier than their
nominal counterparts. And finally, the lower panel shows how the changing composition
of the average series influences the results: in the first period where the two adjustments
exhibit different dynamics, one matched bond pair is available. Once other pairs enter
the sample, the effect of credit risk goes to the same direction as that of the liquidity
correction: taking them out of the spread deepens the spread by pushing it further away
from zero.
1.4.4 Robustness tests and discussion
This section presents robustness tests. Unreported analyses include models with differ-
ent illiquidity and credit measures and additional controls. The effects of liquidity are
stronger when a funding liquidity proxy, the OIS spread, is included, whereas defining
the credit factor based on changes not levels of the CDS spread virtually produces the
same results. Age and time-to-maturity are also considered as proxies for asset level
liquidity, though results are mixed. Other tests of the benchmark specification of the
SBEI cross-sectional regressions are the following: 1) Quantifying the size of convexity
effects in BEI and SBEI series; 2) Easing the assumption that level liquidity effects have
to be the same across all four underlying bonds; 3) Pooled OLS to partly overcome the
statistical difficulties of the small number of breakeven spreads. This latter method does
not allow for direct examination of relative prices but helps to convince the reader that
these risks are important on the pricing of bonds in the sample. And finally, this sections
concludes with some discussion regarding selective default, alternative interpretations of
the results and the size of the credit effect.
Convexity in BEI and SBEI series
Kerkhof (2005) points out that part of the breakeven inflation captures compounding
and convexity differences between nominal and inflation linked bond issues. Convexity
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is the second derivative or the curvature measure of the price function and it measures
how the duration changes as interest rates (yields) change. As such, convexity is likely to
play a role in the analysis presented. However, the definition of convexity is somewhat
different across nominal and inflation-linked bonds: they are calculated with respect to
nominal and real rates, respectively. There are different market conventions to determine
the convexity of ILBs: 1) practitioners either base convexity on real yields and consider
the pricing of ILBs in a world without inflation risk; or 2) they use an older method
developed for UK Gilts, in which inflation assumptions are used to discount future cash
flows of an indexed bond. In our analysis we use this latter method, in which we assume
that the term structure of inflation is flat and constant at the level of 1.75%.16 Then
we calculate the convexity of a “quasi-nominal” bond that pays coupons and principal
adjusted for inflation, and its sensitivity is evaluated against the real yield.
As the cornerstone of our analysis is the breakeven rate, we examine the difference in
convexities within a country between nominal and inflation-linked bonds, as well as how
large this effect is across pairs of bond pairs of the SBEI series. To quantify the return or
yield effect due to convexity in nominal and indexed bonds, we multiply their respective
convexities by 1/2 and the variance of the change in yields similar to Campello et al.
(2008). We aggregate the product of the convexity effects and yield variances by summing
up these bond level effects according to the bond positions in the SBEI quadruplets. To
control for different levels of yield volatility in the nominal and indexed segment, we
assume here for simplicity that the variance of nominal yield changes equals to 1%, while
for ILBs we assume a value of 0.5%. The resulting calculation suggests that the yield
variance differential of nominal and real bonds leads to an effect on expected return of
17.87 and 35 basis points for German-Italian pairs and German-French pairs, while it is
52.86 basis points for Italian-French breakeven pairs.
In light of the magnitude of the estimated differential liquidity and credit premiums, these
convexity effects seem substantial, especially in a period where yields are particularly
volatile. Even if convexities of indexed and nominal bonds are not all that different,
accounting for the difference in yield volatility of these bonds can result in a sizeable
convexity correction that could affect the analyses. Consequently, as an extension of the
chapter, we are planning test the robustness of the cross-sectional relative prices of credit
and liquidity risks to estimation based on convexity-adjusted SBEI yields.
16This number is the average Eurozone (HICP) inflation since 1999, reported by the European Central
Bank and Eurostat.
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Weighted kappa
Equation 1.7 shows that expected returns on the SBEI series are defined as a sum of
differential credit and liquidity effects. This pricing equation assumes that the liquidity
level effect of the four bond in the SBEI portfolios are identical. In this section we relax
this assumption by adjusting this level effect by the size of the respective bond segments.
We do so, as the cross-sectional coefficient can be interpreted as turnover, as in Amihud
and Mendelson (1986). Turnover is typically defined as the ratio of traded volume of
a given asset or market segment over the overall volume outstanding thereof. Since we
do not have information on the overall size of the individual bond market segments, we
substitute this by the monthly trading volumes by primary dealers. To account for the
different size of nominal and real bond segments, we construct a measure that captures






where 𝑖 corresponds to the bond segments and t to the month between January 2006
and December 2013. The assumption underlying this measure is that the three Eurozone
issuers constitute all trading in the Eurozone sovereign markets and thus the shares
can be treated as a rough proxy for the turnover of a given segment. The weights for
nominal and inflation-linked bond segments can be seen in the upper and lower panels
of Figure 1.6, respectively. Note that the percentages of the two panel together add up
to a hundred percent. The figure reveals that the size and trading activity of nominal
and inflation-linked segments differ substantially: nominal segments have more trading,
with German Bunds being traded the most and indexed Bunds the least. Moreover, the
relative weights are rather stable over time.
The weights of Figure 1.6 are used to calculate the net level of liquidity measure as a
trading share weighted average of liquidity levels. To proxy for size of an issue, we use the












Substituting the new, weighted level of liquidity measure to our pricing equation, Equa-
tion 1.7, the following relationship arises:






















where 𝜅𝑖,𝑡 captures the level of liquidity premium, which takes into account the relative
size difference between the four underlying bond markets. Table 1.5 reports the results
for this robustness test, however since the volume data are only available between Jan-
uary 2006 and December 2013, these results correspond to a somewhat shorter period
than thereof Table 1.3. Column 1 is directly comparable, despite the shorter sample
period, the price of differential liquidity risk is lower and still insignificant, whilst that
of the differential sovereign risk is very similar in magnitude with a sign consistent with
expectations. Columns 2 to 4 contain trading volume-weighted liquidity level measures.
The effect of differential credit risk is robust to the inclusion of the weighted size and age
measures, however, its significance suffers once the weighted time-to-maturity is added
to the model in Equation 1.8. Once the weighted time-to maturity measure is included,
liquidity risk becomes highly statistically significant.
In general, we conclude that the results are rather robust to relaxing the assumption on
the level of liquidity proxies for the SBEI series, where we assume that the size of the
market segments are proportional to their respective trading volumes. Nevertheless, one
should remember that these regressions shed light on the relative pricing of inflation-
linked and nominal bonds, thus the estimated kappas cannot directly be interpreted as
turnover, nor should they be used to back out the implied holding period of the underlying
bond portfolios.
Pooled regressions
Disentangling liquidity and credit risks is a difficult task. Moreover, the sample of this
study is relatively short and highly imbalanced: despite that it spans ten years, there is
barely any assets that actually span the entire sample period. This is due to new bonds
being issued and old ones reaching maturity on a regular cycle. The resulting instability
in composition mostly affects the market factor, but is likely to also increase the standard
errors of other beta estimates. In addition, some markets are rather young and only a few
assets are traded, which makes it even more difficult to identify cross-sectional effects.
One way to alleviate the problem of small samples, although this does not allow for direct
comparison, is to pool all bonds together for the analysis. This helps to establish the
relationship between bond yields and liquidity and credit risks, and hopefully also to
convince the reader of the relevance of the differential pricing.
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To alleviate the above problems, we run regressions that are pooled across all bond mar-
ket segments and estimate euro area wide risk premia; results are presented in Table 1.6.
The shows that Eurozone interest rate or market factor is positive and significant across
all specifications. Including credit risk in the analysis strengthens the effect of illiquidity
risk: they are priced and highly significant together; moreover, their effects are robust
to the inclusion of any asset level liquidity proxy. Adding these two factors increases the
R-squared considerably. The average betas of both credit and illiquidity are negative;
therefore, the market wide illiquidity premium translates into a negative average effect.
Despite this unexpected effect, we find positive impact on yields, which is in line with eco-
nomic theory. Eurozone-wide credit risk has positive and stable average effect on yields,
yet its impact is negative. These inconsistent signs among average and interquartile
effects show that the betas are asymmetrically distributed.
These pooled regressions help to alleviate the burden of estimating market level models
from short and highly imbalanced subsamples. On the one hand, the identification based
on differencing of breakeven rates is very clean as the differencing takes out commonalities
between market segments and countries, but the cross-section of assets is very small (20
pairs of pairs), which aggravates the estimation error in betas and cross-sectional risk pre-
miums. Moreover, any estimated risk premiums are relative risk premiums, quantifying
the differential exposures of nominal and indexed bonds. This aspect of relative pricing
is the central question of the paper, nevertheless it limits our ability to further generalize
results or to formulate absolute statements. On the other hand, pooling together all asset
segments, we get to have more observations and any effects are absolute concepts, not in
the context of relative risk exposures. However, the drawback is that we should control
for all the effects that the differencing takes out in the other setting. To this extent, this
gives rise to an omitted variable bias, which should be controlled for.
Discussion
There are two potential economic mechanisms that could give rise to differences in
sovereign risk exposures of inflation-linked and nominal debt: selective default risk and
correlation between high inflationary states of the econoour and default. However, these
mechanisms are not trivial to disentangle in a purely empirical setting or by means of
the current dataset. This discussion describes these two mechanisms, as well as it aims
to add a note on the size of the estimated risk premia.
First, the section on the relative pricing of sovereign bonds refers to selective default risk
premium. We define selective default as an event, in which a sovereign issuer chooses
not to meet obligations on a class of bonds, while servicing her other debt. Practically
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selective default can range from rescheduling payments to non-payment, and it also serves
as a category that rating agencies use to rate sovereign issuers.17 Of course the question
arises which type of bonds to default on. Sovereign defaults are rare events in the post-
WW II era; moreover, there has not been a precedent for a sovereign issuer specifically
defaulting on her inflation-linked debt. This is partly due to the novelty of inflation-linked
products, however, the literature suggests that the choice might depend on reputation
(Duffie et al., 2003; Gennaioli et al., 2014) or riskiness of debt.
In the context of this paper, both motivations could play a role: 1) inflation-linked debt
is very similar to foreign-currency denominated debt in that it also bears an additional
risk, namely inflation risk. Additionally, the specific sample period of the study suggests
that selective default premium is identified from the increased sovereign risk of the euro
area countries during the financial and subsequent euro crises. Consistent with this idea,
although the likelihood of such an event is small, our analysis shows that investors could
have attached positive probability to Eurozone issuers to decide to strategically default
on their indexed debt. 2) the HICP-linked debt is primarily issued to foreign institutional
investors. Both Italy and France have ILBs that are linked to local inflation, so issuing real
bonds linked to the average Eurozone inflation seems to primarily target foreign investors
or institutions that for some reason prefer to hedge against this “average” European
inflation.
What scenarios could trigger partial default in the euro area? On the one hand, we can
interpret the main result as risk premium in ILBs compensating for larger sovereign risk
exposure or for selective default risk. This means that despite legal clauses like pari
passu, holders of real bonds perceive their claims less senior than those of nominal issues.
In this case the government or Treasury should communicate its intention to fulfill all
obligations at equal terms, or ensure debt holders that a collective action clause applies:
it allows the supermajority of bondholders (75%) to agree to a debt restructuring that
is legally binding to all debt holders. Since 2013, as part of the European Stability
Mechanism all bonds issued by Eurozone member countries and with maturities longer
than one year have mandatory collective action clause. On the other hand, the finding
can be stemming from inflation and default being highly correlated, which means that the
inflation protection is the most valuable exactly in the state when the default occurs. This
case the channel potentially driving the results is inflation, more specifically the difference
between the HICP inflation (what ILBs in our sample pay) and the French, Italian or
German inflation. In the past years there were periods when the HICP was above French
or Italian inflation. In such a case, it is more expensive to pay back HICP-linked debt
17“An ’SD’ rating is assigned when S&P Global Ratings believes that the obligor has selectively
defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations but it will continue to meet its payment obligations
on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely manner.” / Source: standardandpoors.com/
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than its French RPI-linked counterpart. Although these countries do not have full control
over their monetary policy, the decision to default on their debt is the issuers discretion.
Thus there could be instances where inflation, an additional risk factor, together with
financial difficulties of a country could trigger selective default on HICP-linked debt. This
scenario is potentially aggravated if in light of the European debt crisis the ECBs anti-
inflationary stance proved to be less credible to both the individual countries and holders
of HICP-linked debt.18
Lastly, we would like to add a note on the relative importance of credit and liquidity in the
relative pricing of indexed and nominal sovereign debt and the size of the credit effects.
The many attempts in the literature show that disentangling liquidity and credit risk in
sovereign bond yields is a non-trivial task. In the specific case of this analysis, there is
a possibility that the credit factor is picking up some aspect of liquidity, flight-to-safety
or maybe even a credit level effect. Then the presented method would overestimate the
effect of credit risk at the cost of liquidity risk.
Despite the lack of empirical evidence on expected credit risk or credit level effect in these
securities, we find it plausible to exist, similar to such effect corresponding to liquidity.
Nevertheless, testing for it is non-trivial: there is no cross-sectionally variable measure
of asset-level credit effect – ratings are given to countries not to their individual bond
issues, and due to the lack of actual sovereign defaults in developed countries (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2009) estimating the probability of default or the loss given default requires
a lot of assumptions. Additionally, although the EBA and ESRB conduct stress tests
on average on a bi-annual basis, this is still a global, country-level proxy that does
not allow for the estimation of the expected credit effect in the cross-section of bond
segments or individual bonds issues. For this reason, since our focus is predominantly
on the average credit effect measured by the product of the average net beta and the
estimated cross-sectional risk premium for differential credit risk between nominal and
inflation-linked bonds. However, we acknowledge that the size of our estimated effect
can be party explained by expected credit risk, if most of it does not cancel out by the
differencing across countries. If this effect persists, then finding a higher credit beta for
ILBs suggests also higher expected credit level effect, which could prove the point that
ILBs are implicitly less senior than nominal bonds of the same issuer.
The other potential bias could be due to the exposure of CDS contracts to liquidity
risk, although our choice of instrument, the 5-year quanto CDS contract, ameliorates
this problem. In the period between 2006 and 2014 there are two major trends in the
18A potential test of this underlying correlation between default risk and inflation would be to conduct
a subsample analysis in which we restrict the sample to months where HICP is above French or Italian
inflation.
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CDS market: in the beginning of the sample period there is a large increase in the
number of contracts and dollar volume traded in sovereign CDS. Especially around the
onset of the Euro crisis, there is increased interest in these products, alongside with
speculative trading, which have been said to destabilize sovereign debt markets of the
GIIPS countries. As a reaction to this, in October 2011 the European Union introduced
a rule to stabilize sovereign bond markets that banned naked CDS positions. This ban
came into effect on November 1, 2012. Due to this regulatory change the trading volume
of European CDS contracts drastically fell and the market shrunk to a small fraction
of its prior size: from 60 contracts traded per week to one. However, due to regulatory
pressure imposed by Basel III on the banking sector, safe haven CDS trading has been
reported to grow at the same time (Klinger and Lando, 2015).
In light of the above market developments, liquidity of CDS is possibly driven by different
factors in the two regimes. In the first half of the sample, especially during the financial
crisis, liquidity risk could be an issue, as the European CDS market was not subject to
clearing and thus these bilateral derivative transactions could have carried substantial
counterparty credit risk. This could potentially mean that when market liquidity freezes,
CDS liquidity might worsen in reaction. As opposed to this, in the second half of the
sample, the level of liquidity and the depth of the sovereign CDs segment decreases
substantially for riskier sovereigns. Given the complex market dynamics of the European
sovereign CDS segment and the different regulatory changes affecting thereof, we leave
empirically addressing this issue for future research.
1.5 Conclusion and extensions
This paper presents unique empirical evidence of selective default risk premium in inflation-
linked sovereign bond (ILB) yields of Germany, France and Italy. Selective default is an
event in which a sovereign issuer chooses not to meet obligations on a class of bonds, while
servicing her other debt. We identify this effect from the difference of breakeven rates
from country pairs. Differencing controls for common components, such as the effect of
inflation expectations, monetary policy or interest rate risk. We find that the remaining
part in breakeven rates is explained by two systematic risk factors, liquidity and sovereign
credit risks - both within and across countries. We link these findings to the ILB-nominal
puzzle, which shows that ILBs are underpriced relative to nominal bonds of the same
issuer. We show that this underpricing is in part due to relative risk premia differences
between nominal and inflation-linked debt: ILBs are less liquid, moreover investors per-
ceive them to have higher credit risk during the financial and euro crises. This implies
an implicit seniority and a subsequent convenience yield in nominal bonds.
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Nonetheless, the method presented above has its limitations. First, the description of the
results already pointed out specific features of the sample that make statistical inference
more challenging. Our strategy to overcome this burden is to improve the estimation of
the betas, either in a statistical or in an economic sense. The first could be performed
by using a statistical method that allows me to benefit from the use of data at different
frequencies as in Ghysels et al. (2007). By applying mixed data sampling or the MIDAS
method, we could estimate and profit from having daily observations on market returns
and credit risk, whereas we could simultaneously use these estimates with betas from
the monthly illiquidity regressions. An alternative improvement is to impose structure
on the beta estimation in an economic sense: make betas dependent on the asset char-
acteristics, such as maturity or to construct another, higher frequency liquidity measure.
Apart from the estimation, a natural extension would be to treat the identification as a
trading strategy and to further explore the (limits to) its tradability and the risk-return
characteristics.
Furthermore, and additional factor could be added to the analysis: the second PCA of
liquidity measures suggests to capture flight-to-liquidity or safety phenomena. Adding
this extra factor could help to further separate the liquidity and credit effects. Also, going
in a similar direction, taking care of changing CDS liquidity and finding a viable proxy
for expected credit risk could further improve the analysis. If such a proxy exists, another
robustness test arose: cross-sectional SBEI regressions could be performed based on yields
that are corrected for issuer credit risk, similarly to the corporate bond literature.
And finally, a related question to be answered is whether liquidity (and credit) proxies are
affected and how the relative pricing of bonds changes in reaction to quantitative easing
of the ECB. One could even go one step further to see how the spread of breakeven rates
changes due to such unconventional monetary actions, and whether these markets price
such events symmetrically in the nominal and inflation-indexed market segments. Studies
to date, like Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011); Krishnamurthy et al. (2015),
focus on the effects on different market segments separately, whereas one could look at
the relative, potential lead-lag effects across indexed and nominal bonds.
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Table 1.1
Descriptive statistics
The table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the two-stage estimation. Panel A to C present variables
for the analysis of German, French and Italian sovereign bond segments, respectively. All yields are quoted in annualized
percentages terms, whereas yield volatility is defined as the difference between the standard deviations of individual issues
and the cross-sectional average standard deviation of quoted yields. Age and time-to-maturity are defined relative to the
issue and maturity dates and are measured in days; while issued amount captures the size of a given issue in million EUR.
Proportion of zero returns is the percentage of days with zero returns over a month. ILLIQ is the monthly ratio of absolute
bond market returns over monthly aggregate trading volume, rescaled by 1 million EUR. Yields, volatilities and the zero
returns measures are in percentages, age and time-to-maturity are measured in days. The data correspond to the sample
period between July 2004 and February 2014.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of German sovereign bonds
ILBs Nominal bonds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
ILB yield 0.479 0.972 Nominal yield 1.606 1.158
Yield volatility 0.000 0.199 Yield volatility 0.000 0.037
Age 992.5 733.6 Age 2317.0 2351.8
Time-to-maturity 2183.0 1033.1 Time-to-maturity 4219.0 3204.2
Issued amount (million) 13,600 1,498 Issued amount (million) 17,240 4,797
Proportion of zeros 0.407% 1.588% Proportion of zeros 1.856% 8.331%
ILLIQ 1.176 1.649 ILLIQ 0.033 0.028
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of French sovereign bonds
ILBs Nominal bonds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
ILB yield 1.289 0.946 Nominal yield 2.926 1.272
Yield volatility 0.000 0.123 Yield volatility 0.000 0.039
Age 1694.9 1100.0 Age 2027.3 1788.5
Time-to-maturity 5032.8 3370.9 Time-to-maturity 4483.0 4002.6
Issued amount (million) 11,830 4,532 Issued amount (million) 24,770 7,852
Proportion of zeros 0.240% 1.362% Proportion of zeros 0.451% 2.037%
ILLIQ - - ILLIQ - -
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of Italian ILBs
ILBs 2+Nominal bonds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
ILB yield 3.330 3.124 Nominal yield 4.157 1.270
Yield volatility 0.000 231.155 Yield volatility 0.007 1.576
Age 1137.7 913.1 Age 1899.5 1620.5
Time-to-maturity 3798.0 3100.7 Time-to-maturity 4200.4 2976.3
Issued amount (million) 12,420 3,954 Issued amount (million) 18,900 6,878
Proportion of zeros 0.194% 1.160% Proportion of zeros 0.576% 4.360%
ILLIQ 1.049 1.475 ILLIQ 0.073 0.073
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Table 1.2
Beta estimates
The table presents descriptive statistics for betas estimated from the time-series regression of bond returns on market,
illiquidity and credit factors. The table consists of four major segments corresponding to the three countries and the
aggregated portfolio betas, henceforth net betas. Panel A contains beta estimates from the ILB and nominal sectors of
the German sovereign market, whereas Panel B and C do so for France and Italy, respectively. The forth part, Panel D,
presents net betas that serve as a starting point for the breakeven based estimation. We estimated market, illiquidity and
credit betas for all available German, French and Italian nominal and inflation-linked bond issues in the sample that spans
the period between July 2004 and February 2014.
Panel A: German beta estimates
ILBs Nominal bonds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Integrated market 𝛽 -0.2307 0.1939 Integrated market 𝛽 -0.2812 0.4833
Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 0.0002 0.0007 Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0008 0.0020
Integrated credit 𝛽 -0.0009 0.0011 Integrated credit 𝛽 0.0002 0.0017
Segmented market 𝛽 0.2669 0.3134 Segmented market 𝛽 0.2190 0.7175
Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0005 0.0003 Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0011 0.0012
Segmented credit 𝛽 -0.0011 0.0007 Segmented credit 𝛽 -0.0007 0.0010
Panel B: French beta estimates
ILBs Nominal bonds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Integrated market 𝛽 0.1716 0.3144 Integrated market 𝛽 -0.0007 0.4549
Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 0.0021 0.0050 Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 0.0013 0.0023
Integrated credit 𝛽 0.0007 0.0039 Integrated credit 𝛽 0.0033 0.0040
Segmented market 𝛽 0.3874 0.3303 Segmented market 𝛽 0.1729 0.5330
Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 0.0038 0.0031 Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 0.0025 0.0025
Segmented credit 𝛽 0.0004 0.0021 Segmented credit 𝛽 0.0029 0.0025
Panel C: Italian beta estimates
ILBs Nominal bonds
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Integrated market 𝛽 0.1696 0.3648 Integrated market 𝛽 0.0788 0.3468
Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0048 0.0045 Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0020 0.0048
Integrated credit 𝛽 -0.0102 0.0070 Integrated credit 𝛽 -0.0055 0.0036
Segmented market 𝛽 0.3711 0.4327 Segmented market 𝛽 0.0742 0.1231
Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 0.0000 0.0027 Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0013 0.0033
Segmented credit 𝛽 -0.0073 0.0080 Segmented credit 𝛽 -0.0060 0.0039
Panel D: Net beta estimates
Net betas
Mean St. Dev.
Net market 𝛽 -0.2100 0.4505
Net illiquidity 𝛽 -0.0005 0.0060
Net credit 𝛽 -0.0033 0.0057
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Table 1.4
Risk-adjusted SBEI series
This table presents descriptive statistics the risk-adjusted spreads on breakeven series presented in Figure 1.5. We apply two
adjustments, first only the effect of liquidity is considered, then following Equation 1.2, liquidity and credit risk premiums
are both taken out. All figures are percentage yields. Panel A reports the average series across pairs for a given country
pairing; whereas Panel B presents liquidity risk adjusted breakeven rates. Panel C also takes out the effect of credit risk.
The data correspond to 6 pairs formulated between Germany and Italy, 5 pairs between Germany and France and 9 pairs
from Italy and France for the sample period between July 2004 and February 2014.
Panel A: Average breakeven spreads
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Germany vs. France -0.360 0.287 -1.027 0.259
Germany vs. Italy 0.233 1.077 -0.666 4.009
Italy vs. France -0.290 0.533 -2.727 0.240
Panel B: Liquidity risk-adjusted breakeven spreads
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Germany vs. France -0.147 0.288 -0.806 0.478
Germany vs. Italy 0.181 1.081 -0.761 3.956
Italy vs. France -0.028 0.521 -2.417 0.545
Panel C: Liquidity and credit risk adjusted breakeven spreads
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Germany vs. France -1.873 0.264 -2.367 -1.361
Germany vs. Italy -6.453 1.139 -7.774 -3.475
Italy vs. France 2.788 4.594 -4.993 7.569
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Figure 1.1 Illiquidity and credit risk factors
The figure depicts the The country and the integrated Eurozone risk factors: the upper panel shows the
illiquidity factors, while the credit factors can be found in the lower panel. All factors are calculated as
the standardized residuals from autoregressive processes imposed on the underlying liquidity and credit
risk measures.
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Figure 1.2 Net betas
The figure depicts the net betas following Equation 1.10. Net betas are essentially a portfolio of integrated
betas of the four bonds in the spread-on-basis series. The upper panel shows the net illiquidity, the middle
one the net credit, whereas the lower panel one the net market betas of the 20 spreads available in the
sample. Labels indicate the pair of bases to which the individual betas correspond.
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Figure 1.3 SBEI series
The figure depicts the percentage difference between maturity-matched breakeven rate pairs from differ-
ent countries. In total there are twenty of such pairs: 6 pairs formulated between Germany and Italy
(upper panel), 5 pairs between Germany and France (middle panel) and 9 pairs from Italy and France
(lower panel).
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Figure 1.4 Risk premia identified in SBEI series
The figure depicts the size of percentage yield risk premium identified from spreads of cross-country
breakeven pairs. The respective risk premium is the product of a certain pairs net beta and the market
price of risk estimated from the cross-section of strategies. The upper panel shows estimates based on
Column 1, whereas the lower panel considers estimates from Column 2 of Table 1.3.
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Figure 1.5 SRisk-adjusted SBEI series
The figure depicts the risk-adjusted cross-country breakeven spreads net of liquidity, or the sum of
liquidity and credit effects. Solid lines denote the unadjusted, dashed the liquidity-adjusted, and dotted
lines indicate series that are adjusted by the sum of liquidity and credit effects. The upper panel shows
pairs from Germany and Italy, whereas the middle and lower panels depict German-French and French-
Italian pairs, respectively.
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Figure 1.6 Relative trading volumes of each bond segment
The figure depicts the relative trading volume of each bond segment in the sample. The upper panel
shows that of nominal bonds, whereas the lower panel contains the relative trading volume for the
German, French and Italian HICP-linked bond segments. Note that the percentages of the two panels
together add up to hundred percent.
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1.A Appendix
This appendix shows that the direct identification of differential liquidity and selective
default risk can not only be derived by using breakeven rates, but also by means of
the swapped ILB-nominal basis based on Fleckenstein et al. (2014) and Fleckenstein
(2013) . They define the basis or mispricing as the price difference between a nominal
sovereign bond and a synthetic bond, which replicates the nominal cash flows. The latter
is essentially an inflation swapped-indexed bond, whose cash flows are converted to fix
payments exactly matching those of the corresponding nominal bond. Moreover, the
maturities of the two nominal bonds are also matched.
To replicate this strategy, an investor buys an ILB issue and shorts a nominal bond at
the same time. Additionally, she executes a zero-coupon inflation swap contract with
the same maturity and notional amount as the ILB coupon and repeats this for each
coupon and for the principal amount, which results in the execution of an entire swap
portfolio. The rationale for swapping the bond is that the sum of the two cash flows
is constant if they are linked to the same index and equal to the nominal coupon or
principal. The investor also takes a small position in nominal principal STRIPS if there
is disparity between the nominal swapped ILB cash flows. Based on this logic, she applies
these steps to all coupon payments, which result in the successful conversion of the ILBs
variable cash flow stream to the fixed one of the corresponding nominal bond.19
In sum, the investor short sells the nominal bond, buys the inflation-linked bond issue and
holds portfolios of zero-coupon inflation swap contracts and nominal principal STRIPS.
Absent liquidity and credit effects, these three components exactly replicating the fixed
periodic coupons and the principal of the nominal bond should have the same price
as the nominal bond. Finally, we calculate and compare the price of the replicating
portfolio to that of the nominal bond. If in a frictionless world the resulting prices of
these to securities differ, an arbitrage opportunity would arise. However, there is empirical
evidence that both liquidity and credit risks affect European sovereign yield (Fontana and
Scheicher, 2010; Palladini and Portes, 2011; Pelizzon et al., minga; Darbha and Dufour,
2014; Monfort and Renne, 2014). Therefore, this price discrepancy, henceforth called the
swapped ILB-nominal basis, captured by this strategy, is most likely to be explained by
the differences in liquidity and credit risk premia in the constituent asset prices.
19I only focus on bonds and swaps, although there is some empirical evidence that STRIPS are exposed
to liquidity issues, see for instance Daves and Ehrhardt (1993); Jordan et al. (2000). Nevertheless,
Bühler and Vonhoff (2011) show that principal STRIPS, the ones used in the strategy, are less affected.
Consequently, we are less concerned that small positions that are further reduced in the spread-on-basis
strategy, taken in these assets would carry a sizeable liquidity premium that could distort our results.
Moreover, the potentially negative premium, which is in line with previous findings, would only work
against me by widening the basis.
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I construct the basis series in the spirit of Fleckenstein et al. (2014).20 The time series
evolution of these series is depicted on Figure 1.A.1, where the upper panel shows the
country average s, whereas the lower panel displays the overall average across all 27
pairs of ILBs and nominal bonds across the three countries. The figure shows that the
yield difference between the nominal and synthetic nominal bonds varies substantially
over time and across the three countries. Negative values of the basis suggest that the
nominal bond has a lower yield, thus higher price, than its replicating portfolio. A notable
difference between these series and the one presented in Fleckenstein et al. (2014) is that
unlike in the US, European series do switch signs over time. This means that the return
varies over time depending on market conditions. In Germany and France, the series have
a distinctive and large drop at the Lehman crisis, whereas the Italian series is the most
volatile, exhibiting large swings around the financial and euro crises. The series plummet
in late-2011 and mid-2012, potentially in reaction to ECB intervention, as discussed by
Krishnamurthy et al. (2015) and Pelizzon et al. (minga).
This strategy is an appealing way of looking at the relative pricing of the constituent
bonds. Fleckenstein et al. (2014) show that the basis cannot be due to differences in the
tax treatment of nominal and indexed Treasuries, trading costs, repo financing, collateral
value and pledgeability, eligibility of stripping or differences in their ownership structure.
However, one could argue that the illiquidity of inflation swaps and the deflation floor
of indexed bonds are accountable for the above price discrepancy. Unfortunately, these
alternative explanations are not possible to formally eliminate within this setting.21
An economically relevant side product of developing the spread on breakeven strategy
is that we improve upon the strategy of Fleckenstein et al. (2014) . We do so by ex-
ploiting the benefits of our cross-country sample: inspired by the difference-in-differences
approach, we scrutinize the swapped ILB-nominal basis across countries by taking the
difference of two such series, each coming from one of the countries in our sample. These
series are depicted on Figure 1.3. For instance, one such strategy we could be looking at
the difference between German and Italian bond pairs:









20A detailed technical description of the mechanics of the nominal-ILB mispricing or basis can be found
in Fleckenstein (2013), who as part of the G7 countries looks at Italian, French and German sovereign
bond markets.
21We know very little about the inflation swap market, where anecdotal evidence by citetFlemi2012b
suggests that illiquidity can be severe; and the deflation option cannot be hedged by inflation options
either. The asset that is closest to an inflation option is the inflation spread option that takes the
spread between two inflation indices and pays if the spread is positive. However, these assets are rarely
traded, thus they are illiquid, and carry a sizeable counterparty risk premium (Kerkhof, 2005). Moreover,
the value of the deflation option varies across bond maturities, as in Grishchenko and Huang (2013);
Christensen and Gillan (2013).
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The basis can be seen as the return of the Fleckenstein et al. (2014) strategy and thus
defined as a portfolio consisting of a nominal issue, an inflation-indexed bond and inflation


























denotes the return on a German nominal bond, whereas refers to that of the cash flow
replicating portfolio that consists of a maturity matched ILB issue and a portfolio of swap
components. IT superscripts refer to the same assets from a similar Italian bond pair.
Although the above strategy focuses on the relative pricing of nominal and inflation-
indexed bonds, due to the cash flow matching at all coupon dates, portfolios of inflation
swaps and STRIPS are required for the exact cash flow replication. To construct the
above strategy, we start with certain assumptions on asset positions within the strategy
that will be later relaxed to get to a more general case. We presume first, that:
Nominal bonds have the same coupon as the swapped indexed coupon. This applies
to the principal payments too. The swapped indexed coupons are equal across the two
countries; thus the swap positions are virtually the same. This happens if the indexed
bonds have the same coupon rate and coupon payment structure, for instance annual
coupons. Nominal and indexed bonds have the same maturity date.
If all three of these conditions applied, the swap portfolios in the German and Italian bases
would be the same and no STRIPS positions were required. Then we substitute expected













































where is the return on a portfolio of different swap positions within the respective strategy.
These positions depend on the coupon difference between the nominal and indexed bond
as well as on the indexation or reference inflation of the ILB. Note that if the swap
portfolios coincide, which holds by assumption, their respective returns cancel out. This
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leaves me with returns from the bond positions that, in expectation, can be proxied by
the differences in their yields.
Equation 1.A.4 shows that by differencing two basis series we get the difference of two
breakeven rates. In particular, this is an improvement of Fleckenstein et al. (2014), be-
cause differencing successfully eliminates the confounding effects in their strategy. It
cancels out any common factors, which offers a clean way of testing the drivers of the
relative pricing of indexed and nominal bonds in an international setting. First, the
deflation option that applies to all bonds in the sample identically is fully hedged out:
bonds in our sample are all indexed to the same inflation index, the HICP index. Further-
more, they also carry the same optionality regarding negative inflation their principal
is protected against deflation but not the individual coupon payments. Consequently,
after differencing the floors effect is fully diminished from this new strategy, so are any
common market factors for the same reason. Secondly, because in all three markets the
same HICP inflation swaps are traded, the inflation components also cancel out whenever
the inflation indexed and nominal coupon rates are the same in both countries. If this
does not hold, these positions are still negligibly small and the magnitude depends on the
coupon difference of the constituent nominal and inflation bonds across the two countries.
The two crucial assumptions for the inflation swap positions to cancel out are 1) either the
coupons of the nominal or the synthetic bonds coincide in which case the swap positions
cancel out within countries; or 2) we need the swapped ILB coupons to be equal across
countries. Note that the first assumption makes sure that no positions in STRIPS are
required. However, in reality maturities of bond pairs and index linked coupons are


































Where the superscript of the swap portfolio return indicates that the underlying swap
positions differ depending on which countrys mispricing series they are coming from. This
difference determines the residual swap position, which depends on the coupon difference
between the ILBs, and is likely to be small. Taking the generalization one step further,
another departure from the ideal case is when swapped ILB coupons do not match the
nominal ones. By relaxing the first assumption we get the closest to reality, where we
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The size of the STRIPS position depends on the difference between nominal and swapped
index coupons. They are in general small when regular coupon payments occur, however,
they might become sizeable for the principal payment. In order to circumvent large
STRIPS positions, we looked for the closest possible match in terms of both maturity and
tenor when maturity-matching nominal and indexed bonds in the sample. The benefit of
matching tenors comes from the fact that bonds issued in similar economic environment
(e.g.: low inflation) tend to have fairly similar coupons. This shrinks the position that
one has to take as the difference of the nominal coupon and the swapped-ILB coupon.
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Figure 1.A.1 Aggregate basis series
The figure depicts the aggregate basis series defined as the yield difference of a nominal issue and
its replicating portfolio following Fleckenstein et al. (2014). The upper panel shows the country-level
aggregate series, where Germany is displayed in medium gray jagged, France in solid black and the
Italian series is dotted and light gray. The aggregation takes places across all maturity-matched bond
pairs of a given country. The lower panel shows the average of these three series.
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1.B Appendix
This appendix contains graphs of the different liquidity and credit measures applied in
the analysis. Most of these serve as a basis for constructing the principal components that
are direct inputs for the risk factors. We also include the graph depicting the time-series
dynamics of the sovereign CDS prices.
Figure 1.B.2 The KfW spread
The figure depicts the aggregate basis series defined as the yield difference between a nominal issue and
its replicating portfolio following Fleckenstein et al. (2014). The upper panel shows the country-level
aggregate series, where Germany is displayed in medium gray jagged, France in solid black and the
Italian series is dotted and light gray. The aggregation takes places across all maturity-matched bond
pairs of a given country. The lower panel shows the average of these three series.
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Figure 1.B.3 The ILLIQ measures for the ILB sectors
The figure depicts the time evolution of ILLIQ measures for German (solid line) and Italian (dashed
line) ILBs
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Figure 1.B.4 The ILLIQ measures for the nominal sectors
The figure depicts the time evolution of ILLIQ measures for German (solid line) and Italian (dashed
line) nominal bonds.
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Figure 1.B.5 Sovereign CDS spreads
The figure depicts the time evolution of country-level CDS series. The solid line denotes Italy, whereas
German and French series are dotted and dashed, respectively.
Chapter 2




A substantial literature has studied liquidity effects in government bond markets. Several
studies show that, at least for the US, nominal bonds are very liquid and thus exhibit only
small liquidity premiums.1 Much less is known about liquidity effects in the markets of
inflation-indexed products, such as inflation-indexed bonds (TIPS) and inflation swaps.
In this paper we perform a detailed study of liquidity effects in these markets.
Understanding these liquidity effects is important for several reasons. First, liquidity
effects directly matter for the relative pricing of nominal and indexed bonds as well as the
breakeven inflation rate implied by these prices. Similarly, liquidity effects in inflation
swaps affect the inflation expectations that can be extracted from these swap prices.
Finally, recent work by Fleckenstein et al. (2014) finds evidence for large price differential
of nominal bonds relative to a replicating strategy of indexed bonds and inflation swaps,
and based on additional analyses they argue that this is due to mispricing of the indexed
bonds. We assess whether part of this price differential is not mispricing but due to
differences in liquidity premiums in the underlying asset markets.
This chapter is based on joint work with Joost Driessen and Theo Nijman. I would like to thank
Dion Bongaerts, Frank de Jong, Alexander de Roode, Stefan Ruenzi and the seminar and conference
participants of Tilburg Univeristy, Netspar Conference: Illiquid Investments and Robust Portfolio Choice,
Netspar International Pension Workshop, Netspar Pension Day.
1See for instance Krishnamurthy (2002), and Longstaff (2004), among many others.
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Our paper has two main contributions. The first contribution is that we show that in
both index-linked bond markets and inflation swap markets liquidity is an important
determinant of prices. We do so by estimating a model with both a liquidity risk factor
and asset-specific liquidity characteristics. The use of a liquidity risk factor is inspired
by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). To estimate the
effect of liquidity risk, we measure an asset’s exposure to our non-traded liquidity factor.
In addition to this liquidity risk exposure, the level of liquidity is proxied by asset-level
characteristics, following Krishnamurthy (2002) and Houweling et al. (2005). We also
study liquidity effects in nominal bonds in a similar way, so that in total we analyze
liquidity premiums in three markets.
We conduct our analyses based on two alternative assumptions – we either propose the
three markets being segmented, such that prices are independently determined, or inte-
grated markets.2 In our benchmark specification, corresponding to segmented markets,
we find in the TIPS market the effect of illiquidity risk is dominated by asset character-
istics such as age and the size of an issue, together carrying a sizable premium of 32.68
basis points estimated at the monthly frequency. This effect means that higher age and
lower size together increase the yield of a TIPS issue, which translates into a lower price.
Age and size are bond characteristics that capture liquidity of an issue as in Houweling
et al. (2005). They argue that the more time passes since issuance, the more likely an
issue gets locked up in buy-and-hold investor portfolios which decreases liquidity. On the
other hand, larger bond issues tend to be more liquid. As for inflation swaps, we find
that illiquidity risk is priced yet the premium and the implied economic effect, a monthly
1.65 basis points, is small. Finally, we find a small liquidity risk premium in nominal
bond markets.3 These novel results are robust to the inclusion of various controls and
to shifting to the proposition of integrated markets. Then results regarding TIPS and
nominal Treasuries are akin to the benchmark case, while for swaps the price of illiquidity
risk is negative and twice as large relative to the benchmark case, -3.41 basis points per
month.
Our second main contribution is that we scrutinize whether the above diversity in expo-
sure to liquidity and liquidity risk could explain the persistent difference in relative bond
prices, as documented in Fleckenstein et al. (2014). They show that there exist substan-
tial price differences between a nominal Treasury bond and its synthetic counterpart -
2Under the assumption of market segmentation, our estimates are bounded by the mathematics
of factor models: the average of our market betas is one and that of the liquidity betas is zero by
construction, whereas in the integrated case there are no such restrictions. Consequently, we define our
benchmark results as that corresponding to the segmented case. This specification is more conservative
and is also less prone to biased estimates due to omitted variables.
3The magnitude of our estimate is similar to the on-the-run spread of Krishnamurthy (2002), yet
smaller than the premium estimated by Fontaine and Garcia (2012).
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a swapped TIPS issue. We provide evidence that when controlling for liquidity, a large
part of this price differential disappears.
By showing the importance of liquidity for the three markets we contribute to the long-
standing literature on the effect of liquidity on asset prices (Amihud and Mendelson
(1986), Amihud (2002), Bekaert et al. (2007), and Bongaerts et al. (2011) among many
others). More specifically, we follow the footsteps of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) to show that liquidity risk is priced and provide novel
evidence for Treasury bonds and inflation swaps. Moreover, we are also among the first
ones to examine the effect of liquidity on inflation swaps, an important inflation derivative
market (see e.g.: Chen et al. (2007), Bongaerts et al. (2011), and Tang and Yan (2007)
on liquidity of other derivative markets, and Kerkhof (2005), and Fleming and Krishnan
(2012) on inflation swaps specifically).
The paper also contributes to the literature on inflation-indexed bond pricing; more
specifically we enrich the strand of papers that tackles liquidity of TIPS. For instance,
D’Amico et al. (2010), Gürkaynak et al. (2010), and Haubrich et al. (2012) propose term
structure models where they incorporate potential illiquidity of real bonds. Besides,
Fleming (2003), Fleming and Sporn (2012), and Fleming and Krishnan (2012) focus on
the microstructure characteristics of TIPS. Others like Campbell et al. (2009), Chris-
tensen and Gillan (2011), Pflueger and Viceira (2011, 2015), Fleckenstein et al. (2014)
and Fleckenstein (2013) specifically focus on the relative pricing of nominal and indexed
Treasuries, and the breakeven rate, which is the yield difference between these two secu-
rities. Our study deepens the understanding on this matter by examining the effect of
both liquidity and liquidity risk of these securities. Our work is distinguished from prior
literature by the empirical strategy that simultaneously examines the no-arbitrage rela-
tion between TIPS and nominal Treasures and the liquidity characteristics of constituent
asset markets within the framework of a tradable strategy.
The approach of this paper is the closest related to Pflueger and Viceira (2015) and
Fleckenstein et al. (2014). Similarly to Pflueger and Viceira, we identify risk premiums
and liquidity effects in bond yields.4 Yet unlike their paper, we do not incorporate a
time varying behavior of risk premiums and the consequent return predictability in our
analysis, as our primary objective is to quantify the effect of liquidity and liquidity risk
on expected returns of TIPS, nominal Treasuries and inflation swaps. We also aim to
answer to what extent the mispricing, found by Fleckenstein et al. (2014), is an artifact
of liquidity premiums. We view our work as an extension of Fleckenstein et al. (2014)
and Fleckenstein (2013), as we investigate the same no-arbitrage relationship between
4Like in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002, 2005), Vayanos (2004), and Buraschi and Jitsov (2005) among
others.
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nominal and indexed Treasuries. Fleckenstein et al. (2014) provide evidence that part
of this mispricing is caused by slow moving capital. (see Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Mitchell et al. (2007), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Duffie (2010) and Ashcraft
et al. (2010)), while we show that market liquidity premiums are important to understand
the price differences of indexed and nominal bonds.
In conclusion, our work differs from these abovementioned papers in four main aspects.
First, unlike Pflueger and Viceira (2015) and Fleckenstein et al. (2014), we estimate
the effect of liquidity based on a factor model that allows us to differentiate between
liquidity premiums stemming from level and risk effects. Second, our primary liquidity
proxy, the ILLIQ measure in Amihud (2002) does not rely on any implicit assumptions
on the relative liquidity of nominal and indexed bonds, like in Pflueger and Viceira (2015)
who assume nominal Treasuries to be perfectly liquid. In line with previous empirical
evidence, we allow nominal Treasuries to also carry compensation for liquidity risk or a
convenience yield Krishnamurthy (2002), Longstaff (2004), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2010)). Third, we study the liquidity effects in inflation swap markets. And
finally, we assess to what extent the price differential between indexed and nominal can
be explained by liquidity premiums.
Our data are an extended and updated version of Fleckenstein et al. (2014): we include
a larger cross-section of bond issues and longer span (July 2004 - December 2011). The
data consist of maturity-matched indexed and nominal issues and zero coupon inflation
swaps. We complement this data with input for liquidity proxies and additional controls
from multiple sources.5
To show that in both index-linked bond markets and inflation swap markets liquidity is
an important determinant of prices, we estimate a model with both a liquidity risk factor
and asset-specific liquidity characteristics. We define the risk factor as the surprise or
unexpected illiquidity which is captured by the residual from an autoregressive process
imposed on the illiquidity measure. This approach is similar to Acharya and Pedersen
(2005), while we use the ILLIQ measure of Amihud (2002). To estimate the effect of
liquidity risk, we measure an asset’s exposure to our non-traded liquidity factor. We
do this by following a two-stage Fama-MacBeth procedure in which we estimate market
and liquidity betas from excess returns in the first stage. In the second stage we run
repeated-cross sectional regressions of yields on these betas, the level of liquidity proxied
by asset-level characteristics and additional controls. We estimate betas and risk loadings
in each market separately and under the assumption of integrated or segmented markets.
Given the liquidity measures at hand, we are able to measure the covariation of a security’s
5Bloomberg, Datastream, Primary Dealer Historical Search database of the Federal Reserve of New
York, Kenneth French’s website and St. Louis Fed’s FRED database.
CHAPTER 2. THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE 59
return with the market liquidity, the same covariance as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
We also study liquidity effects in nominal bonds in a similar way, which allows us to
inspect the relative pricing of indexed and nominal Treasuries, following Fleckenstein
et al. (2014). The idea behind their TIPS-Treasury arbitrage is that an investor matches
the maturities and payoffs of a nominal bond issue and its synthetic counterpart. The
latter is essentially an inflation swapped-indexed bond, whose cash flows are converted to
fix payments exactly matching those of a corresponding nominal bond. We incorporate
the effect of liquidity by adjusting the yields of nominal and indexed Treasuries by the
estimated premiums of the benchmark cases. We also include the effect of liquidity on
inflation swap positions concerning every coupon payment within the strategy.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the
theory and the methodology of this study, whereas Section ?? describes the data and the
constituent asset markets. In Section 2.4 we present our empirical results, and finally,
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Pricing of liquidity in the Treasury bond, TIPS
and inflation swap markets
In this section we explain our empirical strategy to examine the effects of liquidity and
liquidity risk on prices of nominal and indexed Treasuries alongside with inflation swaps.
We base our empirical identification strategy on previous empirical findings: Amihud
and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) show that average liquidity is priced on stock
markets, both in the cross-section of stocks and over time. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
find that return sensitivity to market liquidity is priced, whereas Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) present a model that disentangles three sources of liquidity risk - each being priced
in the market.
We aim to test the following relationship between excess returns and liquidity:
E(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡) = E(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜆LIQ𝛽LIQ,𝑖 + 𝜆MKT𝛽MKT,𝑖, (2.1)
where E(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) is the unconditional expectation of the liquidity measure corresponding
to asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡, that aims to capture the level of liquidity of that asset. Furthermore
𝛽LIQ,𝑖 is the measure of an asset’s exposure to marketwide illiquidity risk, proxied by a
non-traded risk factor 𝜂𝑡. Likewise, 𝛽MKT,𝑖 captures the covariance between returns of an
asset and the market. 𝜆LIQ and 𝜆MKT are the marketwide prices of exposure to liquidity
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and market risks, respectively.
We examine the above relation by estimating the two-step procedure defined in Equa-
tions 2.2 and 2.3 in the time series of asset returns and in the cross-section of yields,
respectively:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽MKT,𝑖(𝑅MKT,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡) + 𝛽LIQ,𝑖𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,
for 𝑡 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇 for each 𝑖; (2.2)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜅𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽MKT,𝑖𝜆MKT,𝑡 + 𝛽LIQ,𝑖𝜆LIQ,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡,
for𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 for each 𝑡. (2.3)
That is excess returns on an asset are driven by our market and liquidity factors, whereas
excess yield can be explained by the level of liquidity as well as by exposure to the market
and liquidity risk premiums. Note, that the liquidity beta in our model corresponds to





The above beta captures the covariance between individual asset return and the market-
wide liquidity factor. This relationship implies that the more illiquid the market is; the
higher return investors would prefer.
To estimate the relationship described by Equations 2.1- 2.3, we apply the following five
steps:
1. We calculate monthly asset and market returns for each asset in all three markets.
2. We define both asset and market level liquidity proxies for each of the markets at
a monthly granularity and describe additional controls.
3. We construct a non-traded liquidity factor by taking the residual from an imposed
AR structure of the liquidity measure in our model.
4. We describe how we proxy expected returns
5. And finally we discuss in detail the estimation strategy: given the above theory we
test this relationship by means of factor models. In these models we incorporate
both the level and risk aspects of liquidity. For the latter we add a non-traded
liquidity factor to our analysis to see whether the risk exposure to liquidity affects
prices.
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2.2.1 Asset and market returns
For bond markets one can apply the standard return definition based on the ratio of
consecutive prices including a correction term when coupon payments occur.6 However,
calculating returns of zero investment products is nontrivial. We define returns on infla-
tion swaps in accordance with bond market conventions as the change in the swap rate
from one period to the other multiplied by the duration of the contract. We calculate
duration as that of a bond, which has a coupon rate that equals the swap’s yield and
maturity of the swap contract:78
𝑅swap,𝑖,𝑡 = −(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1) ·𝐷𝑢𝑟swap,𝑖,𝑡 (2.5)
In addition to asset specific returns, we also construct market returns as equally weighted
average returns, where we average over all available assets at a given point in time. This
is similar to for instance Amihud (2002) and Chordia et al. (2001), whereas Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) also test their model on value-weighted average returns. In our sample
there is no variable based on which we could weigh swap contracts and issuance amount
weighted bond return figures are virtually identical to the ones that we apply. Moreover,
by equally weighting our assets, we can compensate for overrepresentation of larger thus
potentially more liquid bond issues.
2.2.2 Liquidity proxies and additional controls
For our empirical analysis, we need to define both individual asset and market level
liquidity proxies. Unfortunately, in case of all three markets the data on the directly
observable candidate, on the bid-ask spread, do not seem to be reliable over our sample
period so we need to look for alternatives. Given the limited data availability in this
specific market, in order to capture swap market liquidity, we construct measures that can
be derived from the above swap return definition. Therefore, we propose the proportion
of zero returns and the Roll measures as liquidity proxies. Similarly to Bekaert et al.
(2007), the proportion of zero returns over a given period is measured as the percentage
of days with zero returns over a month. This measure is particularly useful for asset
classes where data availability is limited, like for the case of inflation swaps. Our second
swap liquidity proxy is based on Roll (1984). The Roll measure is derived from the
6This correction applied at the coupon date is essentially identical to what one would do to adjust
returns of a dividend paying stocks at dividend date.
7The minus of the quantity is taken to make the return definition resemble that of the convention for
bonds.
8An alternative return proxy is the swap breakeven rate itself, which is a similar concept to breakeven
inflation rate.
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autocovariance of returns, which captures the transitory component in observed prices.
It is calculated as the scaled autocovariance for the case when it is strictly negative –




−cov(𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1), if cov(𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) < 0
0, otherwise.
(2.6)
Measuring bond illiquidity also poses challenges, as many of the commonly applied mea-
sures, such as bid-ask spreads are unreliable, whereas the proportion of zero returns or
the Roll measure are uninformative over our sample period.10 Consequently, we turn to
certain asset characteristics that are linked to a security’s liquidity.
Houweling et al. (2005) propose issued amount and age of bond issues as such mea-
sures. The reasoning behind a bond’s age being a proxy for liquidity is simple: the more
time passes since issuance, the more likely that a bond gets locked-up in buy-and-hold
investors’ portfolios which decreases its liquidity. This suggests a positive relationship
between illiquidity and age, whereas issued amount is negatively related to the latter:
larger issues tend to be more liquid. We define age as the days since issuance, whereas
we used the natural logarithm of the original issued amounts.
In the spirit of Krishnamurthy (2002), we also include an indicator variable, that equals
1 if the given issue is on-the-run – meaning that it is the latest issued security of its
tenor – and zero otherwise. It can be concluded from the issuance calendars that TIPS
are issued on an annual basis, whereas the cycle for nominal bonds is six months, thus
the dummies are set accordingly. Based on the idea that new issues are more liquid as
previous ones therefore carry smaller liquidity premium if at all, we expect the sign of
this variable to be negative.
In addition to the previous liquidity proxies, we construct additional controls that we
include in our analysis, such as yield volatility or a control for the slope of term structure
of bonds. Yield volatility is defined as the difference between the standard deviations
of individual issues and the cross-sectional average standard deviation of quoted yields,
where the average is taken over the different maturities for a given month. This definition
is the same across both swaps and bonds.11 For bonds we also include time-to-maturity,
9A convenient interpretation of the Roll measure is the implied bid-ask spread, which is the bid-
ask spread that can be derived from the autocovariance of returns. However, an important underlying
assumption of the Roll measures interpretation is that asset returns are identically and independently
distributed over time.
10More specifically, over our sample period all bonds are traded on a daily basis, thus the proportion of
zero returns does not provide us with either cross-sectional or time series variation as for the Roll measure,
the basic assumption of i.i.d. returns is not fulfilled because bond returns have positive autocorrelation
in the sample.
11A bonds yield volatility could also serve as a proxy for liquidity, since it functions as a measure of
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which is defined as the days until maturity of a given issue. This variable is supposed to
control for the linear maturity structure of bonds and incorporate the slope effect of the
term structure.
2.2.3 The illiquidity factor
To answer whether liquidity risk is priced, we turn to specifying marketwide liquidity
proxies. These measures are calculated on a monthly frequency. By means of the ag-
gregate volume data12 on primary dealer bond transactions, it is a natural choice to
construct the ILLIQ measure13 of Amihud (2002). We define the measure as a ratio of
weekly absolute bond market returns over weekly aggregate trading volume, where the
volume is aggregated across all dealers and all securities within their class. As most of
our variables are at a monthly frequency, we smooth this variable by taking its average
over the four observations in a given month.
We use the ILLIQ measure to construct the illiquidity factor in our benchmark analysis,
but in the robustness checks we incorporate two alternative measures. In the first case
(BOND PC), we take the first principal component of the ILLIQ measures corresponding
to TIPS, all nominal Treasuries and to 10-year nominal bonds. Our second alternative
measure (ALL PC) aims to capture a wider definition of liquidity and investor sentiment,
by incorporating all bond ILLIQ measures, the TED spread, alongside with the VIX index
and the average Roll measure across all swap maturities for a given month. For the swap
market we simply apply either the average Roll measure as defined previously or the
ALL PC measure. This principal component approach is inspired by Korajczyk and
Sadka (2008).
To examine the effect of liquidity on asset prices, we construct a factor that captures
marketwide liquidity risk. In unreported regressions we show that our liquidity measures
yield uncertainty. In case of more volatile yields, investors and especially market makers are uncertain
of the bonds value, which increases bid-ask spreads and therefore leads to lower liquidity. On the other
hand, volatility is likely to be correlated with potentially omitted factors in our models, thus we decided
to include it in our regressions to partially control for those factors. Note that this makes it more difficult
for our liquidity affects to survive.
12Volume figures on primary dealer transactions can be accessed via the Federal Reserve of New York,
where they provide information on primary dealer transactions and holdings that are reported on a
weekly frequency. The published figures are aggregated over all primary dealers for a given security class
and week.
13In this study we calculate Amihuds measure based on holding period returns, while theoretically it
should be based on price returns. The difference between holding period and price returns is that the
former contains accrued interest and corrections for coupon payments, while the other is based on clean
prices. These mechanical effects should not greatly influence the price impact, which we confirm by
recalculating the measure based on price returns. The resulting ILLIQ measures are virtually identical
to those based on holding period returns, with a correlation of 99.9982%.
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are persistent, thus we can define this risk as the surprise or unexpected liquidity, which
is the difference between expected and realized liquidity. Thus for the aforementioned
market-wide liquidity measures we define the non-traded risk factor the following way:
𝜂𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑡 − E𝑡−1[𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑡] (2.7)
To compute these innovations, we impose an autoregressive structure for the liquidity
measures, similarly to Acharya and Pedersen (2005). To determine the number of lags
included in these models, we require the residual or unexpected liquidity to behave as
white noise. Consequently, we propose an AR(3) structure for the ILLIQ measure, and
AR(1) for the average Roll measure, and for the principal components BOND PC and
ALL PC. The underlying assumption of the above factor construction is that the AR
coefficients of the series entering the principal components are identical or at least very
similar. In the baseline specifications this assumption is met: the ILLIQ measures exhibit
very similar time-series patterns and their AR coefficients are also quite similar: 0.58
and 0.62 for nominal Treasuries and TIPS, respectively. For swaps, we impose the AR
structure on the Roll measure directly, thus for the benchmark specification of each
market segments the above assumption is met.
2.2.4 Measuring expected returns
We should point out that our estimation strategy differs from the standard asset pricing
approach in two aspects. First, we run our tests not on pre-sorted portfolios but on
individual assets to be able to take advantage of the larger cross-sectional variation. This
approach is inspired by Ang et al. (2008). Second, in asset pricing tests, one usually
proxies expected returns with their realized historical counterparts. However, in our
case returns seem to be too noisy, thus we turn to yields, which under a special set
of assumptions can be viewed as a forward-looking proxy for expected returns. This
approach is similar to Pflueger and Viceira (2015) as they also look at yields to identify
liquidity premium in TIPS prices.
These assumptions vary across our three assets. In general, we have to assume that mar-
kets are frictionless and that the term structure of expected returns is flat. For nominal
bonds this relationship holds if we assume that yields follow a random walk process. For
TIPS, in addition to the previous assumption we need that inflation is constant in ex-
pectation and it is independently and identically distributed with yields. For swap one
would ideally show that the swap rate equals the breakeven rate. In frictionless markets
the breakeven inflation rate does not contain any inherent risk premiums, thus it can be
proxied by the difference of nominal and real yields. Then the difference between two
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random walk processes of these yields would also follows random walk dynamics.
2.2.5 Estimation strategy
In this section we study how liquidity can affect expected returns. For that we estimate
the marketwide premiums on market and liquidity factors as well as on our liquidity
proxies.
In light of existing evidence on liquidity being priced in sovereign bond markets (Kr-
ishnamurthy (2002), Goyenko et al. (2011), Fleckenstein et al. (2014), and Pflueger and
Viceira (2015) among many others), the purpose of this section is to show whether liquid-
ity risk carries a premium in Treasury bonds. In addition, we also want to discover the
aforementioned question in the context of the inflation swap market. So far no empirical
evidence has been published on the relationship between inflation swaps and liquidity,
despite the anecdotal evidence on the market not being perfectly liquid at all times.14
We approach the above question by following a two-stage Fama-MacBeth procedure in
which we estimate market and liquidity betas from excess returns in the first stage,
whereas in the second stage we run repeated-cross sectional regressions of yields on these
betas and additional controls. We estimate betas and risk loadings in each market sep-
arately. Given the liquidity measures at hand, we are able to measure the covariation of
a security’s return with the market liquidity, as shown in Equation 2.4. This covariance
suggests that market liquidity affect required returns positively, such that the more illiq-
uid a market is, the higher returns investors expect which decreases the asset’s price. In
the first stage we run the following time series OLS regressions to obtain the betas:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽MKT,𝑖(𝑅MKT,𝑡 −𝑅f,𝑡) + 𝛽LIQ,𝑖𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,
for 𝑡 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇 for each 𝑖; (2.8)
where we include excess market returns and unexpected liquidity, which is the residual
from the AR process discussed above. In the second stage we run repeated cross-sectional
regressions of yields on the betas estimated in the previous step, asset level liquidity
proxies and additional controls, such as the volatility of yields. Estimates from the
repeated regressions are averages across time and the errors include both a 12-lag Newey-
14See for instance Fleming and Sporn (2012).
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West correction15 and account for the averaging of the coefficients:16
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑌f,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜅𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽MKT,𝑖𝜆MKT,𝑡 + 𝛽LIQ,𝑖𝜆LIQ,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡,
for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 for each 𝑡. (2.9)
As a result of this step we get estimates of the market price of liquidity and liquidity risk
as well as each asset’s individual exposure to this risk. These models can be formulated
based on two opposed propositions: either we assume that these markets are perfectly
segmented and all forms of liquidity are priced separately on the three markets or we price
liquidity risk in fully integrated markets. The difference between the two approaches is
stemming from the consequent definition of the market. In the integrated case the market
return is that equally weighted average of all asset that are in positive net supply: thus
nominal and indexed bonds. Given the evidence that nominal bonds are the most liquid
among our test assets, this method is likely to produce larger liquidity effects for swaps
and TIPS. On the other hand, in segmented markets, the average of market betas is
one, whereas that of liquidity betas is zero by construction. As opposed to this, in the
integrated case, our estimates are not bounded by the mathematics of factor models. We
choose the segmented case to be our benchmark as these estimates are more conservative
for the aforementioned reasons.
2.3 The data and the three markets
In this section, we describe in detail the data and the markets with evidence on liquidity
issues for both nominal and indexed Treasuries and inflation swaps.
2.3.1 The data
The data consist of daily closing mid prices of TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds along-
side with zero coupon inflation swap quotes. These data are obtained from Bloomberg
and are similar to Fleckenstein et al. (2014)17 as they span most of the existing TIPS
issues and only include a fraction of the long-term nominal Treasury market. The data
15Later on, we are planning to incorporate a Shanken-type error correction that take into account the
errors-invariable problem, which is stemming from the fact that both our liquidity measures and the
consecutive betas are pre-estimated. We might incorporate clustered errors too, where we would cluster
by assets. See Petersen (2009).
16For the exact formula see pp. 229 in Cochrane (2005).
17Our data are an extended and updated version of Fleckenstein et al. (2014) as we include a larger
cross-section of bond issues, as well as we have a longer time span. Moreover, we complement this data
with input for liquidity proxies and additional controls as described below.
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contain maturity-matched18 indexed and nominal issues19 , whose maturities range be-
tween 2007 and 2041. The daily closing bond prices are adjusted by accrued interest
following the market convention. Moreover, our sample contains inflation swap quotes
that are the constant rate on a fixed contract’s leg. Following Fleckenstein et al. (2014),
we choose contracts with maturities ranging between 1 to 10, 12, 15, 20, 25 and 30 years.
We apply the simplest approach to get intermediate (non-traded) maturities: we use a
linear interpolation technique and include no correction for potential seasonal patterns
in inflation20 . We collect data for the US market from July 2004 to December 2011.
As our main purpose is to investigate the effect of liquidity on these three markets, we
need to construct proxies for liquidity. Therefore, we also gather information on the
bonds’ issue and maturity dates, the amount issued and their coupons. To formally test
whether liquidity risk is priced we download additional controls from Bloomberg, such
as the TED spread and the VIX index next to deriving measures from prices themselves.
We complement these data with zero coupon yield curves that Datastream constructs
from the par yield curve.
To construct our benchmark liquidity proxy, we need volume figures on primary dealer
transactions. These data can be accessed via the Primary Dealer Historical Search
database of the Federal Reserve of New York, where they have information on primary
dealer transactions and holdings that are reported on a weekly frequency. The published
figures are aggregated over all primary dealers for a given security class and week.
Finally, to run the asset pricing tests we also obtain risk free rates from Kenneth French’s
website and risk free yield from St. Louis Fed’s FRED database.
2.3.2 Constituent asset markets
In this section we provide a short description of the TIPS and inflation swap markets
specifically focusing on market characteristics that could lead to illiquidity. We also
contrast the liquidity features of the three markets under scrutiny based on prior empirical
work.
18For the exact procedure of maturity matching, see Fleckenstein et al. (2014).
19The original sample consisted of 41 TIPS and 40 maturity-matched nominal issues. However, for the
asset pricing test we decided to apply two filters: we omitted issues from the sample that had less than 24
months of data and also only kept observations up to six months before a bonds maturity. Interestingly
both bonds after issuance and quotes preceding maturity are considerably more volatile than the rest of
the sample and they resulted in extreme beta and premiums estimates.
20The inflation index based on which both the principal amount of TIPS and swap contracts are
adjusted on a daily basis is CPI-U or CPI for All Urban Consumers.
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The TIPS market
The first TIPS auction took place in 1997 and ever since the market gradually grew into
one of the largest and most-actively traded fixed income markets in the world (Flecken-
stein et al., 2014). As of the end of our sample period 41 individual TIPS issues have
been auctioned on a regular cycle, with five-year, 10-year and 30-year maturities.21
TIPS in most respects are similar to nominal Treasuries, the main difference being that
the principal amount is adjusted on a daily basis to changes in CPI to All Urban Con-
sumers.22 This implies that semiannual coupons, that are a fixed percentage of the
principal linked to changes in inflation, also vary over time. Another noteworthy feature
of TIPS is the embedded deflation option, which protects investors from losses: in any
case investors are entitled to the maximum of the final principal amount or its inflation-
adjusted counterpart. Despite the growing size of the market, an increasing number
of studies have shown that TIPS carry a liquidity premium compared to their nominal
counterparts of similar maturities (Fleckenstein et al., 2014; Pflueger and Viceira, 2015;
Haubrich et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 2009). Moreover, we also know from those studies
that liquidity carries a positive premium, as one would expect in a positive net supply
market.
The inflation swap market
Kerkhof (2005) argues that the US zero-coupon inflation swap market has been a rapidly
growing segment of the inflation derivatives market in the past decade as market partici-
pants began making markets to hedge their inflation risk exposures. However, the current
size of the market is still about a couple of percent that of nominal interest rate swaps
and is atomic compared to Treasury securities. In line with this, Fleming and Krishnan
(2012) report that there are relatively few trades occurring in this market.
An inflation swap is a bilateral derivative transaction in which one party agrees to swap
a fixed payment to a floating one that is tied to inflation, for a given notional amount
and period of time. Inflation swaps, similarly to TIPS, are also linked to CPI-U, and
the fixed rate is negotiated in over-the-counter transactions that are traded in a dealer-
based market Fleming and Krishnan (2012). The most frequently traded inflation swap
contracts are the zero coupon contracts, in which cash flows are only exchanged at the
maturity of the contract.
21Previously TIPS with 20-year maturities were also issued by the Treasury.
22This is a non-seasonally adjusted inflation rate corresponding to urban consumers in the US.
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So far, only a handful of studies investigated the breakeven rate or its relationship with
inflation swaps (Campbell et al., 2009; Gürkaynak et al., 2010; Christensen and Gillan,
2011; Pflueger and Viceira, 2015; Fleckenstein et al., 2014), but as Fleming and Krishnan
(2012) point out empirical evidence on inflation swap liquidity is still lacking: no study
ever considered modeling the liquidity of this market. Despite that size of the market
and the fact that trades occur rarely suggest that liquidity is likely to have an effect on
swap returns, we cannot predict its expected direction. Bongaerts et al. (2011) show that
a battery of factors, such as non-traded risk exposures in investors’ portfolios, individ-
ual risk aversion liquidity’s correlation with investors’ hedging demands, determines the
direction of liquidity’s effect on markets that are in zero net supply (e.g.: derivative mar-
kets). Since these factors are unobservable, especially on the aggregate level, we cannot
predict the expected sign of liquidity.
The nominal Treasury market and liquidity
In fact, many claim the nominal Treasury bond market to be the most liquid and most fre-
quently traded fixed-income market in the world and thus it is often taken as a reference
point in investigating other securities’ liquidity. Krishnamurthy (2002) uses the commer-
cial paper-T-bill spread to capture changes in liquidity demand, whereas Longstaff (2004)
applies the Refcorp-Treasury spread to capture flight-to-liquidity premium in economi-
cally distressed times. Pflueger and Viceira (2015) treat nominal Treasuries as perfectly
liquid to quantify the premium inherent in TIPS returns and determine bond return
predictability.
On the other hand, Krishnamurthy (2002) has shown that the liquidity of nominal bonds
does vary significantly over the issuance cycle therefore liquidity premium can indeed
be found in Treasury returns too. For this reason, we also take a look at these bonds’
liquidity.
Note that although our sample contains all available TIPS that are issued prior to De-
cember 30, 2011, it could contain significantly more nominal issues. This is because the
data has been collected in the spirit of Fleckenstein et al. (2014), such that it comprises
of maturity-matched indexed and nominal bond pairs alongside with inflation swap con-
tracts. Besides, we believe that our sample of bonds exhibits enough variation in liquidity
features such that our results can be generalized to the entire population of long-maturity
nominal Treasuries. In this case having a larger sample of bonds would only make our
results stronger.
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2.4 Empirical results
This section presents the result of estimating the two-stage model described in Section
I. We first discuss the descriptives and our estimated betas from Equation 2.4, alongside
with the properties of the liquidity factor. We proceed with showing our benchmark
results for all three markets. Next, we also provide robustness tests including other
liquidity measures or alternative assumptions regarding the relationship of our markets.
And finally, we demonstrate how our results apply to the trading strategy described in
Fleckenstein et al. (2014).
2.4.1 Descriptives, betas and the illiquidity factor
Table 2.1 contains the descriptives of our liquidity proxies for all three markets in our
sample, whereas Table 2.2 provides the distribution of the betas estimated in the first
stage of our analysis. Table 2.1 reports all quantities but the ILLIQ measure and the on-
the-run dummy in percentages and shows the main characteristics and the distribution of
our liquidity measures. In the swap market the average yield is 2.47%. The relative yield
volatility measure by construction equals to zero, but individual issues can significantly
differ from the cross-sectional average. The Roll measure implies an average bid-ask
spread of 24.5 basis points. On average 5.82% of the times we have zero returns on this
market this suggests no trading activity on average 1.8 days a month.
For TIPS the average yield is 74 basis points and yield volatility of individual issues varies
in a wider range than for swaps. The age of the average bond in our sample is 4.38 years
with average time to maturity of 9.12 years. The average issue size is $16.1 billion. The
dummy variable shows that 12.67% of the issues are on-the-run. We also present the
ILLIQ measure, a price impact proxy in our sample.23
In comparison, nominal Treasuries have higher yields, on average 1.58%, with lower
relative yield volatility than TIPS or inflation swaps. These bonds are older, with the
average age of 5.86 years with also somewhat longer time to maturity, 9.48 years. The
average nominal issue is also larger than that of TIPS, with $21 billion. Only 4% of the
issues are on the run, which is less than for TIPS.24
Figure 2.1 depicts the time evolution of our non-traded liquidity factors that are residuals
from autoregressive processes: AR(3) for ILLIQ measures concerning TIPS, and AR(1) for
23The ILLIQ measure is the absolute dollar change triggered by volume, however this number depends
on rescaling.
24This is not surprising given that the nominal bond issuance cycle is half that of TIPS, thus 6 months.
CHAPTER 2. THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE 71
the nominal Treasury ILLIQ and the average Roll measure. The TIPS and nominal bond
series are relatively highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.6131, whereas
their correlation with the inflation swap market series is 0.1680 and 0.4133, respectively.
Apparently the TIPS liquidity factor has larger swings and more spikes than the other
two series, whereas the nominal bond and inflation swap factors shoot up during the
recent financial crisis. Both time paths are in line with anecdotal evidence and previous
empirical findings of illiquid periods in the corresponding markets.
For the sake of brevity,25 Table 2.2 focuses on the distribution of betas that we estimate
from time-series regressions26 of returns on the market excess return and the illiquidity
factor. Note that our market factor in this context is practically an interest rate risk or
duration factor, which explains the patters in Figures 2.2- 2.4. These graphs depict the
betas sorted on average age of an issue for TIPS and nominal Treasuries and contract
maturity for inflation swaps. We present result for both cases of integrated and segmented
markets27.
In the case of inflation swaps, when considered as a segmented market, we see that
liquidity betas have a larger spread than market betas. Loadings on the market factor
are all positive. In the integrated case, where we take market as the sum of the nominal
and indexed bonds, our estimates change: the average market beta is still close to zero
however certain issues load on the market factor with negative sign. We also see that the
magnitude and the spread of liquidity betas substantially increase, whereas they always
have a negative sign. The two panels of Figure 2.2 confirm these findings.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 expose that in both the segmented and integrated cases TIPS and
nominal bonds have strictly positive market betas, which vary in a narrower range than
those of swaps. We observe a similar difference in range for segmented liquidity betas
of TIPS. Ex ante we would expect TIPS prices to decrease if liquidity decreases. In
contrast with expectations, when we assume markets are integrated, most TIPS issues
load positively on our illiquidity factor, whereas nominal bonds tend to have negative
and sizeable illiquidity betas.
25After applying our data filters, we estimate market and liquidity betas for 15 swap, 31 TIPS and 32
nominal bonds. Thus given the large number of individual assets, in the table we focus on the distribution
of our estimates.
26We conclude from unreported regressions, that market betas are highly significant in case of most
assets, whereas the statistical significance of individual liquidity betas varies a lot.
27In segmented markets, the average of market betas is one, whereas that of liquidity betas is zero
by construction. As opposed to this, in the integrated case, our estimates are not bounded by the
mathematics of factor models.
72 2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
2.4.2 Benchmark results
We estimate our benchmark models (i) under the assumption of market segmentation;
(ii) using illiquidity factors derived from ILLIQ for bonds and average Roll measure for
inflation swaps; (iii) for the period between July 2004 and December 2011. To define the
baseline specification, we pick models that are significant yet parsimonious. Consequently,
for nominal Treasuries and inflation swaps we pick the model with the market and the
illiquidity factors as our baseline specifications; whereas for TIPS, based on unreported
univariate regressions, we extend the latter model with two characteristics: age and issued
amount of a bond. We also include the economic effect of risk premiums in the last rows
of the tables, which are based on the monthly holding periods implied by the regressions.
To capture the impact of market and liquidity risks, we calculate the interquartile spread:
the estimated price of risk multiplied by the difference between the betas corresponding
to the first and third quartile in the cross-section of betas. Parameter estimates of the
benchmark cases can be found in the first columns of Tables 2.3, 2.5, and 2.7.
The first column of Table 2.3 presents the benchmark case for inflation swaps. Although
there is no prior literature on inflation swap liquidity, anecdotal evidence from Fleming
and Krishnan (2012) suggest it may have an effect on swap yields. However, we cannot
predict its expected direction as there are many factors that determine how liquidity
impacts markets that are in zero net supply.28 The key result that we find for inflation
swaps is that both market and liquidity risks are priced on this market. The market
price of liquidity risk is positive and it is statistically significant, nevertheless the implied
monthly economic impact is 1.65 basis points. This effect is small as is often the case in
derivative markets. On the other hand, the economic impact of market risk is a sizable
43.92 basis points.
Table 2.5 reports our benchmark case for TIPS. The growing literature on TIPS illiquidity
suggests TIPS prices to convey liquidity discount.29 Therefore, we expect liquidity risk to
be priced. As for the included characteristics, for age we expect a positive sign as the more
time passes since issuance, the more likely an issue gets locked up in buy-and-hold investor
portfolios, which increases illiquidity. On the other hand, larger bond issued tend to be
more liquid, therefore the expected sign of size of an issue is negative. Our main finding
is that for TIPS the effect of illiquidity risk is dominated by asset characteristics such as
age and the size of an issue. While market risk is priced, illiquidity is both statistically
and economically insignificant. Age of an issue is both statistically and economically
28Bongaerts et al. (2011) show that non-traded risk exposures in investors portfolios, individual risk
aversion liquiditys correlation with investors hedging demands are such factors. Since these are unob-
servable especially on the aggregate level, we cannot predict the expected sign of liquidity.
29Including Campbell et al. (2009), Christensen and Gillan (2011), Pflueger and Viceira (2011, 2015),
Haubrich et al. (2012), Fleckenstein et al. (2014)
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important driver of TIPS liquidity, with an impact of 41.71 basis points. If a bond gets
one year older, its yield will increase with 9.09 basis points, which implied a decrease
in its price. Moreover, the size of an issue also matters its effect is -9.03 basis points.
Similarly to age, once a TIPS issue gets 1% larger, we expect its yield to decrease by 0.31
basis points, thus its price increases.
Turning to nominal Treasury notes and bonds, the benchmark case can be found in the
first column of Table 2.7. In line with previous literature, we presume nominal bonds
are more liquid than other securities – as in Krishnamurthy (2002), Longstaff (2004) or
Pflueger and Viceira (2015), among many others. Our benchmark specification focuses
on the two factors: market and illiquidity. Ex ante, the sign of the illiquidity premium
is not clear, as for instance Fontaine and Garcia (2012) find negative liquidity premium
in nominal Treasuries which makes these securities good liquidity hedge in periods of
flight-to-liquidity. We find that in the nominal Treasury market illiquidity risk is priced
and carries a positive but fairly small premium of 13.13 basis points. At the same time,
the economic effect of the market is substantial, with 183.22 basis points.
2.4.3 Robustness tests
To check the robustness of our benchmark specifications, we include additional controls,
as well as test the effect of the assumption of integration. In unreported results we
also construct and assess other liquidity factors alongside with splitting our period into
subsamples.30 We also test whether the price of liquidity risk is different in different
liquidity regimes: when we restrict our sample to those months when our aggregate
market illiquidity factor increases, and separately to those when it increases.
Taking another look at Table 2.3, we find that the fore mentioned benchmark case is
robust to the inclusion of asset characteristics and controls, such as the proportion of
zero returns or the volatility of swap yields. In all cases the economic impacts of market
and liquidity risk exposures do not change substantially either in sign or magnitude. In
contrast, we also perform a similar analysis under the assumption swap and bond market
integration. From Table 2.4 we see that both the market and illiquidity betas are priced.
These effects are also highly significant and robust to the inclusion of volatility. It is in
line with our expectations that the sign corresponding to the price of illiquidity changes
and the implied premium also doubles in size: it is between 18.2 and 34.1 basis points.
The negative premium implies that the less liquid a swap issue is, the lower the price and
thus the higher the expected return on and the yield of that asset is.
30We are planning to incorporate these analyses in later versions.
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For TIPS we observe that age and the size of an issue matter more than liquidity risk.
Other columns in Table 2.5 show accordingly. However, if we only include the market and
the illiquidity factor, in column 2, liquidity risk seems to carry a significant and sizeable
premium of -22.6 basis points, and this remains so after the inclusion of the on-the-run
dummy, issued amount and yield volatility. Nevertheless, once age or time-to-maturity
is included, these variables wipe out the factor’s significance. Similarly to swaps, we
repeat the analysis for integrated markets – Table 2.6 contains the corresponding results.
In general results do not change: the magnitude of the effects is both statistically and
economically similar to the previous case. Therefore, we conclude this market is not as
sensitive to this assumption as inflation swaps.
Looking at nominal Treasuries, we show that the market and illiquidity premiums are
robust to inclusion of asset level characteristics and controls. Interestingly age next to
being significant in all specifications, has the wrong sign.31 Our time-to-maturity control
suggests the slope of the term structure to matter, besides other variables, such as the on-
the-run dummy, issued amount and yield volatility, are never significant. In comparison if
we take the integrated market case in Table 2.8, the characteristics and controls seem to
carry a more important role. The market and illiquidity factors are highly significant with
similar premiums estimates as under market segmentation assumption. Age still has the
wrong sign, but now the size and yield volatility of an issue are significant determinants
of yields.
In Table 2.9, we present results conditional on whether market liquidity is increasing
or decreasing. To do so, we pool together months where changes of market liquidity are
either positive or negative, respectively. What we find is that in all three market segments
both the signs, as well as the magnitudes of the estimated risk premia are stable across
liquidity regimes. This suggests that our results are robust to liquidity regimes, however,
we could further extend the analysis to examine if Treasury and inflation swap markets
react to extreme downside liquidity Ruenzi et al. (2016).
2.5 The relative pricing of TIPS and nominal Trea-
suries
In this section, we apply the result of the previous section to look at the effect of liquidity
on the relative pricing of nominal and indexed Treasuries that we inspect by the trading
31We suspect that age might have a nonlinear relationship with yields; therefore, in the future we are
planning to examine such effects.
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strategy of Fleckenstein et al. (2014).32 The idea behind their TIPS-Treasury arbitrage
is simple: an investor matches the maturities and payoffs of a nominal bond issue and
its synthetic counterpart. The latter is essentially an inflation swapped-indexed bond,
whose cash flows are converted to fix payments exactly matching that of the corresponding
nominal bond.
To replicate this strategy, an investor should buy a TIPS issue and short a nominal
bond at the same time. Additionally, she needs to execute a zero-coupon inflation swap
contract with the same maturity and notional amount as the TIPS coupon – and repeat
this for each coupon and for the principal amount, which results in the execution of an
entire swap portfolio. The rationale for swapping the bond is that the sum of the two
cash flows is constant and equal to the nominal coupon or principal. The investor also
needs to take a small position in Treasury STRIPS33 due to the disparity in the nominal
and TIPS coupon payments. Based on this logic the investor applies these steps to all
coupon payments, which results in the successful conversion of the TIPS variable cash
flow stream to the fixed one of the corresponding nominal bond.
In sum, the investor would short sell the nominal bond, buy the TIPS issue and hold
portfolios of zero-coupon inflation swap contracts and Treasury principal STRIPS. The
latter three components exactly replicate the fixed periodic coupons and the principal of
the nominal bond. Finally, to calculate what Fleckenstein et al. (2014) call mispricing,
we first price the synthetic bond by calculating the yield to maturity and then the price
of the replicating portfolio.34 Thus, if the resulting prices of the nominal bond and the
replicating portfolio differ, a potential arbitrage opportunity arises.
To incorporate the direct effect of liquidity, we adjust the yields of nominal and indexed
Treasuries by the estimated premiums of the benchmark cases. We also include the effect
of liquidity on inflation swap positions concerning every coupon payment within the
strategy. To take account of the liquidity-adjustment in swap contracts35, we calculate
32A minor change we apply to Fleckenstein et al. (2014) is that when we calculate the mispricing,
instead of the ones with accrued interest, we apply clean prices. The reason is that the coupon date
of most bond issues on our sample coincide, therefore the price differential based on dirty prices has a
jagged pattern, representing the average accrued interest at a given point in time. To circumvent this
problem, we use clean prices.
33We are aware that STRIPS might also be exposed to liquidity issues (see for instance Daves and
Ehrhardt (1993) or Jordan et al. (2000)), however Bühler and Vonhoff (2011) find that principal STRIPS
are less affected. As the trading strategy presented in this paper uses principal STRIPS, we are less
concerned that small positions taken in these assets would carry a sizable liquidity premium that could
distort our current results. A potentially negative premium, which is in line with previous findings,
would only work in our favor by reducing the mispricing.
34Practically we also need to adjust the price of the nominal bond for the potential maturity mismatch
between the two securities.
35As the strategy consists of zero coupon inflation swaps, we only need to apply this formula once,
corresponding to the maturity o the underlying swap contract.
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the difference between the fixed and the floating cash flows of the inflation swap contract
by the following formula:





That is the value of the liquidity corrected position is the estimated price of liquidity for a
given swap contract, 𝛽LIQ,swap𝜆LIQ multiplied by the swapped TIPS coupon (𝑠) discounted
by the appropriate rate from a nominal zero-coupon yield curve, where (1 + 𝑦swap,𝑛,𝑡)
𝑛 is
the forward of the contract with n years maturity36 and (1 + 𝑦zc,𝑛,𝑡)
𝑛 is that of a zero-
coupon bond with the same maturity. 𝑦swap,𝑛,𝑡 is the quoted swap yield of an n-maturity
contract at time 𝑡, whereas 𝑦zc,𝑛,𝑡 is the nominal zero-coupon yield of the same maturity
at the same point in time.
The result of the liquidity correction of the price differential can be found in Figure 2.5
and Table 2.10. Figure 2.5 compares the replicated ’mispricing’ of Fleckenstein et al.
(2014)) and its adjusted counterparts under the assumptions of segmented and integrated
markets. Our key result is that once we take out the estimated liquidity premiums from
prices, the price differential shrinks considerably, if not disappears. This is in accordance
with our expectations and the results from previous sections. The shrinkage of price
difference is true for both specifications, although the effect of our liquidity adjustment
is larger for the segmented market case. Table 2.10 confirms these findings: whereas all
values regarding the replicated series are positive, the corrected series based on market
segmentation are mostly negative. We also define the difference between the mispricing
series, as the difference between the original strategy and our corrected version. We find
that this disparity is always positive and often times considerable in magnitude, especially
in proportion to the uncorrected series.
2.6 Conclusion
We show that in both index-linked bond markets and inflation swap markets liquidity is
an important determinant of prices. We do so by estimating a model with both a liquidity
risk factor and asset-specific liquidity characteristics. To estimate the effect of liquidity
risk, we measure an asset’s exposure to our non-traded liquidity factor. In addition to this
liquidity risk exposure, the level of liquidity is proxied by asset-level characteristics. We
also study liquidity effects in nominal bonds in a similar way, so that in total we analyze
liquidity premiums in three markets. We conduct our analyses based on two alternative
36For non-traded and fractional maturities we apply linear interpolation to get the forward rate, as
well as the liquidity premium.
CHAPTER 2. THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE 77
assumptions – we either propose the three markets being segmented, such that prices are
independently determined, or integrated markets.
Additionally, we also scrutinize whether the exposure to liquidity and liquidity risk could
explain the persistent difference in relative bond prices, as documented in Fleckenstein
et al. (2014). They show that there exist substantial price differences between a nominal
Treasury bond and its synthetic counterpart – a swapped TIPS issue. We provide evidence
that when controlling for liquidity, a large part of this apparent mispricing disappears.
Yet on the empirical side several extensions of the paper are possible and considered.
In important question to be addressed is whether our liquidity proxies are affected by
unconventional monetary policy actions, like quantitative easing during the crisis, as
studied by Christensen and Gillan (2013) or D’Amico and King (2013). Some other
issues also remain to be solved. For instance, we are planning to add a stylized model that
justifies our use of yields as a proxy of expected returns. We also want to incorporate more
robustness checks regarding other liquidity factors and dividing our data into subsamples
where premiums are separately estimates. One could also consider incorporating time-
varying risk premiums.
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Table 2.1
Descriptive statistics: swap and bond markets
The table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the two-stage estimation. Panel A present variables for the
analysis of inflation swap markets, whereas Panel B and C show those for TIPS and nominal Treasuries, respectively.
Swap yields are percentage quoted rates of a swap contracts, whereas yield volatility is defined as the difference between
the standard deviations of individual issues and the cross-sectional average standard deviation of quoted yields. The Roll
measure is the scaled autocovariance of inflation swap returns, while the proportion of zero returns is measured as the
percentage of days with zero returns over a month. Age and time-to-maturity are defined relative to the issue and maturity
dates, respectively. The on-the-run dummy is an indicator variable, that equals 1 if the given issue is the latest issued
security of its tenor and zero otherwise. ILLIQ is the monthly average ratio of weekly absolute bond market returns over
weekly aggregate trading volume. Yields, volatilities, the Roll and the zero returns measures are in percentages, age and
time-to-maturity are measured in years. The data correspond to the sample period between July 2004 and December 2011.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of inflation swap markets
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
Swap yield 2.47 0.71 -3.83 2.33 2.87 3.41
Yield volatility 0 0.06 -0.35 -0.02 0.01 1.14
Roll measure 0.25 0.43 0 0 0.31 5.58
Proportion of zeros 5.82 13.63 0 0 5 100
Average Roll m. 0.25 0.24 0 0.09 0.36 1.92
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of TIPS
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
TIPS yield 0.07 1.67 -3.02 -1.26 1.34 7.47
Age 4.38 3 0 1.95 6.54 13.72
Time-to-maturity 9.12 6.93 16 3.80 15.48 27.73
Issued amount 23.50 0.39 22.34 23.43 23.72 24.06
Yield volatility 0 0.07 -0.42 -0.02 0.01 1.08
On-the-run 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 1
ILLIQ 1.51 0.45 0.87 1.19 1.77 2.91
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of nominal Treasuries
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
Nominal yield 1.58 1.31 -0.67 0.46 2.59 4.51
Age 5.86 3.98 0 2.50 8.63 16.88
Time-to-maturity 9.48 7.10 0.13 3.90 16.56 26.56
Issued amount 23.77 0.42 23.07 23.43 24.06 24.92
Yield volatility 0 0.03 -0.17 -0.01 0.01 0.23
On-the-run 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 1
ILLIQ 2.38 0.55 1.55 2.01 2.56 5.22
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Table 2.2
Beta estimates
The table presents descriptive statistics for betas estimated from the time-series regression of asset returns on market and
non-traded illiquidity factors. Panel A present variables for the analysis of inflation swap markets, whereas Panel B and C
show those for TIPS and nominal Treasuries, respectively. We estimate market and illiquidity betas for 15 swaps, 31 TIPS
and 32 nominal Treasury issues in our sample that spans the period between July 2004 and December 2011.
Panel A: Inflation swap market
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
Segmented market 𝛽 1 0.57 0.22 0.57 1.40 2.18
Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 0 1.50 -4.14 -0.29 0.68 2.95
Integrated market 𝛽 0.02 0.26 -0.43 -0.27 0.24 0.43
Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 -4.09 3.09 -12.78 -5.59 -2.37 -0.30
Panel B: TIPS market
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
Segmented market 𝛽 0.96 0.45 0.29 0.53 1.42 1.92
Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 0.01 0.39 -0.90 -0.26 0.35 0.47
Integrated market 𝛽 0.99 0.59 0.16 0.46 1.61 2.04
Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 0.46 0.44 -0.68 0.06 0.73 1.17
Panel C: Nominal Treasury market
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
Segmented market 𝛽 0.96 0.57 0.17 0.39 1.66 1.90
Segmented illiquidity 𝛽 -0.07 0.25 -0.67 -0.16 0.10 0.51
Integrated market 𝛽 0.95 0.56 0.19 0.37 1.66 1.85
Integrated illiquidity 𝛽 -0.37 0.37 -1.21 -0.65 -0.12 0.50
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Table 2.3
Monthly swap yields and illiquidity – Market segmentation
The table reports estimates for the second step (Equation 2.5) of the Fama-MacBeth procedure under the assumption of
markets being segmented. The dependent variable is the inflation swap yield. Market and illiquidity betas are estimated
based on Equation 2.4 as loadings on the market and non-traded illiquidity factors. The Roll measure is calculated as
the scaled autocovariance of returns for the case when it is strictly negative otherwise the measure is truncated at zero.
The proportion of zero returns is measured as the percentage of days with zero returns over a month, whereas (lagged)
yield volatility is defined as the difference between the standard deviations of individual issues and the cross-sectional
average standard deviation of quoted yields, where the average is take over the different maturities for a given month.
Displayed coefficients are average figures from monthly repeated cross-sectional regressions, where errors take into account
the averaging and include a 12-lag Newey-West correction. The economic impact is captured by the interquartile spread:
we multiply the coefficient by the difference between the betas that correspond to the first and third quartile in the cross-
section of betas. The sample period is July 2004 until December 2011. t-statistics are given in parentheses and *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Benchmark (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market beta 0.5338 0.4269 0.5796 0.5330 0.4518 0.4466
(3.91)*** (4.38)*** (3.25)*** (3.77)*** (3.93)*** (3.80)***
Illiquidity beta 0.0171 0.0092 0.0048 0.0226 0.0056 0.0106
(2.18)** (2.21)** (1.06) (1.91)* (1.67)* (1.96)*
Yield volatility𝑡−1 -2.0809 -1.7160 -1.5542
(1.78)* (-1.62) (-1.64)
Roll measure -0.1647 0.0516 0.0588
(-0.86) (0.65) (0.79)
Proportion of zero returns -0.0158 -0.0091
(-1.46) (1.67)*
Intercept 1.9402 2.0428 1.9189 1.9602 2.0200 2.0401
(6.88)*** (8.63)*** (6.57)*** (7.03)*** (8.18)*** (8.27)***
Adj. R2 0.67 0.85 0.71 0.68 0.86 0.87
Number of obs. 1,350 1,335 1,350 1,350 1,335 1,335
Impact of market risk 0.4392 0.3512 0.4768 0.4385 0.3717 0.3674
Impact of liquidity risk 0.0165 0.0089 0.0046 0.0218 0.0053 0.0102
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Table 2.4
Monthly swap yields and illiquidity Market integration
The table reports estimates for the second step (Equation 2.5) of the Fama-MacBeth procedure under the assumption
of integrated markets. The dependent variable is the inflation swap yield. Market and illiquidity betas are estimated
based on Equation 2.4 as loadings on the market and non-traded illiquidity factors. The Roll measure is calculated as
the scaled autocovariance of returns for the case when it is strictly negative otherwise the measure is truncated at zero.
The proportion of zero returns is measured as the percentage of days with zero returns over a month, whereas (lagged)
yield volatility is defined as the difference between the standard deviations of individual issues and the cross-sectional
average standard deviation of quoted yields, where the average is take over the different maturities for a given month.
Displayed coefficients are average figures from monthly repeated cross-sectional regressions where errors take into account
the averaging and include a 12-lag Newey-West correction. The economic impact is captured by the interquartile spread:
we multiply the coefficient by the difference between the betas that correspond to the first and third quartile in the cross-
section of betas. The sample period is July 2004 until December 2011. t-statistics are given in parentheses and *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market beta 0.4531 0.2626 0.4130 0.4729 0.2508 0.2674
(2.44)** (2.38)** (2.38)** (2.36)** (2.40)** (2.33)**
Illiquidity beta -0.0662 -0.0462 -0.0621 -0.0607 -0.0402 -0.0353
(5.03)*** (6.25)*** (4.23)*** (5.34)*** (5.39)*** (5.92)***
Yield volatility𝑡−1 -3.2833 -3.3298 -2.8924
(2.65)*** (2.60)** (2.82)***
Roll measure -0.1200 0.3478 0.3463
(-0.64) (1.22) (1.20)
Proportion of zero returns -0.0051 -0.0084
(-0.62) (-1.40)
Intercept 2.1947 2.2759 2.1716 2.2202 2.2578 2.2978
(10.85)*** (13.04)*** (10.41)*** (12.03)*** (12.52)*** (13.43)***
Adj. R2 0.59 0.75 0.62 0.61 0.78 0.80
Number of obs. 1,350 1,335 1,350 1,350 1,335 1,335
Impact of market risk 0.2330 0.1351 0.2124 0.2432 0.1290 0.1375
Impact of liquidity risk -0.0341 -0.0238 -0.0319 -0.0312 -0.0207 -0.0182
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Table 2.9
Liquidity regimes
The table reports estimates for the second step (Equation 2.5) of the Fama-MacBeth procedure under the assumption of
markets being segmented, but considering months of increasing and decreasing liquidity separately. The dependent variable
is either the bond yields or the swap. Market and liquidity betas are estimated based on Equation 2.4 as loadings on the
market and the non-traded liquidity factors. We define age as the days passed since issuance, and time-to-maturity as the
days until maturity. To proxy for size, we use the natural logarithm of the original issued amounts. Displayed coefficients
are average figures from the monthly repeated cross-sectional regressions where errors take into account the averaging. The
sample period is July 2004 until December 2011. T-statistics are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: Monthly TIPS yields
Benchmark Increasing illiquidity Decreasing illiquidity
Segmented market beta 0.932 0.892 0.975
(10.08)*** (6.33)*** (8.22)***
Segmented illiq. beta -0.032 -0.048 -0.013
(0.88) (0.85) (0.31)
Age 0.088 0.090 0.085
(23.07)*** (14.70)*** (19.71)***
Size -0.239 -0.247 -0.230
(19.35)*** (13.91)*** (13.39)***
Constant 4.241 4.605 3.844
(13.01)*** (9.88)*** (8.50)***
R2 0.87 0.86 0.88
N 2,216 1,155 1,061
Panel B: Monthly nominal Treasury yields
Benchmark Increasing illiquidity Decreasing illiquidity
Segmented market beta 1.372 1.421 1.311
(13.41)*** (10.17)*** (8.66)***
Segmented illiq. beta 0.524 0.537 0.508
(8.05)*** (5.96)*** (5.35)***
Constant 0.230 0.244 0.214
(3.49)*** (2.56)** (2.37)**
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89
N 2,252 1,255 997
Panel C: Monthly inflation swap rates
Benchmark Increasing illiquidity Decreasing illiquidity
Segmented market beta 0.534 0.555 0.511
(10.46)*** (7.12)*** (7.76)***
Segmented illiq. beta 0.017 0.018 0.017
(6.41)*** (4.37)*** (4.71)***
Constant 1.940 1.917 1.965
(18.54)*** (11.79)*** (14.88)***
R2 0.72 0.71 0.72
N 1,350 690 660
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Table 2.10
The mispricing
This table presents descriptive statistics of the replicated trading strategy of Fleckenstein et al. (2014) (FLL). In this
strategy we compare the prices of a nominal Treasury issue to its replicating portfolio that consist of a maturity matched
TIPS issue, inflation swap contracts and STRIPS issues. Panel A presents the results of the replication for our sample,
alongside with the two cases of liquidity corrections applied to this strategy. The correction is based on adjusting yields
with estimated liquidity premiums from Equation 2.5, both under the assumption of the three markets being segmented
and integrated. Panel B exhibits the difference between the original strategy and the adjusted versions, where the difference
is defined as the FLL mispricing minus the corrected series. The data correspond to 26 bond pairs in the sample period
between July 2004 and December 2011.
Panel A: Mispricing and corrections
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
FLL mispricing 3.07 1.69 0.42 2.22 3.32 11.80
Segmentation-corrected price differential 0.77 1.62 -1.64 -0.07 0.95 9.20
Integration-corrected price differential 0.39 1.78 -2.12 -0.52 0.68 9.64
Panel B: The effect of liquidity correction
Mean St. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max
Difference in segmentation 2.31 0.21 1.80 2.19 2.45 2.90
Difference in integration 2.68 0.31 1.97 2.47 2.83 3.79
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Figure 2.1 Illiquidity factors
The figure depicts the time evolution of the non-traded illiquidity factors. They are residuals from
autoregressive processes: AR(3) for ILLIQ measures of nominal and indexed bonds, and AR(1) for the
average Roll measure of inflation swaps.
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Figure 2.2 Inflation swap market and illiquidity betas
The scatter plots depict the betas estimated from the time series regressions of inflation swap returns
on market and illiquidity factors. The above plot focuses on illiquidity betas, whereas the lower panel
presents market betas, both estimated under the assumption of market segmentation and integration.
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Figure 2.3 TIPS market and illiquidity betas
The scatter plots depict the betas estimated from the time series regressions of TIPS returns on market
and illiquidity factors. The above plot focuses on illiquidity betas, whereas the lower panel presents
market betas, both estimated under the assumption of market segmentation and integration. Betas are
sorted on average age of bond issues.
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Figure 2.4 Nominal Treasury market and illiquidity betas
The scatter plots depict the betas estimated from the time series regressions of nominal Treasury returns
on market and illiquidity factors. The above plot focuses on illiquidity betas, whereas the lower panel
presents market betas, both estimated under the assumption of market segmentation and integration.
Betas are sorted on average age of bond issues.
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Figure 2.5 Mispricing and the effect of liquidity correction
The figure depicts the time-series behavior of the equally weighted average mispricing series across 26
maturity matched bond pairs, based on Fleckenstein et al. (2014). The mispricing is the price difference
between a nominal Treasury issue and its replicating portfolio that consists of a maturity matched TIPS
issue, inflation swap contracts and STRIPS issues. This panel also depicts the liquidity-adjusted series,
where corrections based on segmented or integrated markets are applied. In the lower panel, we show
the difference between the replicated and liquidity-corrected series.
Chapter 3
Much ado about nothing: A study of
differential pricing and liquidity of
short and long term bonds
3.1 Introduction
European pension funds and insurers managed more than e3.5 trillion worth of assets in
2015. For these institutions it is crucially important to attain precise estimates of long
term discount rates for their asset management and valuation of liabilities for regulatory
purposes. Despite its practical importance and potential welfare consequences, modelling
and examining the long end of the nominal term structure has attracted little attention
in the academic literature.
This paper aims to fill this gap by studying the differential pricing of short and long
maturity bonds, especially focusing on segmentation in yields and liquidity. To address
this question, we explore the channels through which this affects the pricing of short and
long ends of the German nominal term structure between 2005 and 2015. In this period,
it is conceivable that there was investor segmentation or formation of clienteles due to
regulation-induced demand pressure or the effect of unconventional monetary policy on
yields. Liquidity differences might have arisen during the financial crisis, while during
the euro crisis potential credit premium differences could have emerged, alongside with
the effect of safe haven flows of Eurozone investors. The confounding presence of the fore
This chapter is based on joint work with Joost Driessen and Theo Nijman. I would like to thank
Dion Bongaerts, Frank de Jong, Daniel Havran, Stefan Ruenzi and the conference participants of the
Summer Workshop of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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mentioned forces makes this market and time period an ideal testing ground to study
whether these events have a differential effect on long and short maturity bonds.
The key result of our paper is that although there are statistically significant differences
in the pricing and drivers of short and long maturity bonds, the corresponding economic
effects are rather small. This means that long yields are not extensively distorted by
demand pressure, default or liquidity premiums, therefore there is little evidence for
substantial yield segmentation. This finding has important policy implications. Part of
the policy discussion on valuation of pension and insurance liabilities is how to model
long term discount rates. The current approach is based on the ultimate forward rate,
which is an extrapolation method used to calculate discount rates for maturities beyond
twenty years. For longer maturities, there is a variety of methods that use interest rate
swaps. However, in light of our results, this practice seems unnecessary: if long maturity
bond yields are not distorted, we could extrapolate long term discount rates from these
yields observed in bonds markets. Is the ultimate forward rate discussion much ado about
nothing? One the one hand, there is a lot of money at stake, thus making sure that this
wealth is properly valuated is crucial. On the other hand, it seems that we can trust
yields of long maturity bonds, as any existing effects of yield segmentation are negligibly
small.
Our second key finding is that we present evidence for some degree of liquidity segmenta-
tion across short and long maturities. This finding is in line with the theory of liquidity
segmentation (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Beber et al., 2012), however due to the
small cross-section of long maturity bonds, we cannot formally test price segmentation in
long and short yields. Nevertheless, we show that the nature of liquidity varies along the
curve: liquidity of short maturity bonds seems more systematic in nature, whilst liquidity
of long maturity bonds behaves independently from other market measures. These results
seem plausible as long maturity bonds are likely to be held by long horizon buy-and-hold
investors, who might be inherently less concerned about the issue level illiquidity and
cost of trading, as opposed to investors of shorter maturity bonds.
Our empirical approach is as follows. First, to study segmentation, we construct a pair
of measures similar to that of Hu et al. (2013). The noise measure is a liquidity proxy
that is based on the pricing errors of observable yields compared to a smooth theoretical
yield curve. We fit a Nelson-Siegel model to bonds up to twenty years of maturity to
determine the theoretical curve, which we extrapolate for longer maturities.1 Next, we
construct two measures of noise that allow us to focus on deviations of long and shorter
1By using this method, we cannot exclude the possibility that the whole curve could be affected by
some bias. However, we claim and provide empirical evidence that the long end of the yield curve is
relatively more distorted.
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maturities separately: the average root mean squared pricing error for short maturities
is 7.91 basis points, while it is 19.39 basis points for maturities longer than 20 years.
The size of long noise measure suggests that with even such a simple model we get
good predictions of long maturity bond yields. We find that the two measures capture
different aspects of liquidity: short noise is related to the age of the bond and to market
and funding liquidity; while long noise is linked to bond issue level illiquidity and the US
noise measure. Nevertheless, the low explanatory power of conventional liquidity proxies
suggests that the two noise measures capture an aspect of illiquidity that correlates, but
goes beyond traditional liquidity measures.
Next, to further examine the pricing of bonds, we also look at the average fitting error of
long maturity bonds, called the bias. This fitting error is on average -9.25 basis points
and is persistently negative, meaning that the observed long yields are consistently below
those implied by our pricing model, although this difference economically quite small
especially given the simple model we fit for the yield curve. In search for the reason
why long yields are too low’, we find that the bias is linked to the Roll implied bid-
ask spread, time to maturity of bonds, liquidity risk and the Ted spread, flight-to-safety
flows and the credit risk of Germany. To deepen our understanding of the time-series
drivers of short and long maturity bond yields, we study their exposures to proxies of
demand pressure, default premium and liquidity. The yield decomposition reveals little
evidence of significant segmentation in German sovereign bond markets. Short yields are
driven by short noise and large scale asset purchases; the latter is indirect evidence that
these unconventional monetary measures have an effect on yields of targeted maturities.
Additionally, we find that both long and short yields are strongly linked to German
credit quality and flight-to-safety flows. This suggests that when periphery credit quality
declines, the overall German yield curve becomes a target to safe haven flows of euro
zone investors. Although these results are statistically significant, the economic effects,
measured by one standard deviation change of the explanatory variables, are in the
magnitude of 1-3 basis points.
Looking at liquidity segmentation, we study how yields of the short and long ends of the
yield curve are linked to a wide range of liquidity measures. The effect of short noise
on the average short yield is significant and robust to the inclusion of other measures,
moreover, it varies over time. As opposed to this, we find that the average long yield
has a weaker connection to long noise, while we find evidence of liquidity spillover from
the short to the long end of the yield curve. We also consider if short and long noise are
related to different market forces. Short noise is sensitive to large scale asset purchases of
the ECB, as well as to changes in stock market volatility and flight-to-safety flows. The
long noise measure has a similar relationship to safe haven flows. However, the fitting
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errors of long maturity bonds are also sensitive to declining credit quality of the issuer,
as well as to breakup risk.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related
literature, while Section 3.3 explains the channels of yield and liquidity segmentation
in bond markets. Section 3.4 presents the data, and the German nominal sovereign
bond market and elaborates on how we measure the effect of bond market segmentation
by the two noise measures. After establishing noise as a proxy for liquidity, Section 3.5
introduces the bias and presents the results of the decomposition of short and long yields,
as well as the drivers of yield and liquidity segmentation. Finally, Section 3.6 discusses
policy implications of our results and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature overview
This paper studies the differential pricing of short and long maturity bonds, especially
focusing on segmentation in yields and liquidity. But why would there be differences that
are maturity dependent? In answering this question, we build on previous research on
market segmentation, limits of arbitrage, liquidity and credit risk of sovereign bonds, the
term structure of liquidity premium, flights-to-safety and the effects of unconventional
monetary policy on sovereign bond yields. Nonetheless, the distinctive feature of our
analysis is that we take a comprehensive approach of examining yields and liquidity
features of bonds from a wide range of the maturity spectrum. In particular, we focus
on bonds with tenors between 2 to 30 years to study the differential effect and channels
of demand pressure, default risk and liquidity along the yield curve. To do so, we use a
method closely related to Hu et al. (2013).
Hu et al. (2013), henceforth HPW, develop a measure of bond liquidity that is based on
the pricing error of observable yields compared to a theoretical smooth curve. They show
that this measure is linked to the amount of arbitrage capital on the market: the pricing
error is larger and more persistent when funding liquidity conditions deteriorate and ar-
bitrageurs lack the resources to trade substantial price deviations away. We construct a
similar measure, but instead of aggregating all information along the yield curve, we focus
on deviations of long and shorter maturities separately. These two measures of noise help
us explore how prices and liquidity can differ across maturities. First, some investors
might not have access to the overall yield curve due to either regulatory constraints or
endogenous choice regarding their investment horizon. This gives rise to market segmen-
tation. Second, if local demand shocks are accompanied by limited arbitrage capital,
pricing inefficiencies cannot be eliminated and become persistent. Third, if short and
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long maturity bonds are exposed to risk factors to a different extent, different levels of
risk premiums will emerge.
Addressing the first explanation, we contribute to the literature on market segmentation.
Among other factors, such as time-varying expectations of future rates, changes in bonds
yields can be attributed to changes in demand or supply. On the one hand, bond demand
might be driven by preferred habitat investors. Vayanos and Vila (2009) show that if
investors have preferences for specific maturities, bond markets become segmented, in
which case demand shocks affect the cross-section of bonds differently. Greenwood and
Vayanos (2010) provide empirical evidence for a preferred habitat induced demand shock
following the 2004 UK pension reform. Related to this, our study also aims to deepen
the understanding of how demand pressure due to regulatory changes, specifically those
concerning the natural clientele of the bonds in our sample, affect yields and liquidity in
the cross-section of maturities. On the other hand, supply factors also play a role in the
determination of yields.Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) and Guibaud et al. (2013) explain
and present models of how supply and maturity structure of sovereign debt influences
bond yields.
Another channel through which local demand pressure arises is unconventional monetary
policy.2 While Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) show that quantitative eas-
ing (QE) in the US caused a supply shortage for certain clientele demand, pushing yields
downwards, Christensen and Gillan (2013) provide evidence on how market liquidity is
improved by such measures. D’Amico et al. (2012) present similar evidence on the effect
of large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAP) on the preferred habitat and duration of
sovereign bonds, alongside with D’Amico and King (2013) who show that LSAP often
causes market segmentation. There is also growing evidence from the intervention of
the European Central Bank (Eser and Schwaab, 2016; Krishnamurthy et al., 2015) and
its effect on the liquidity of European sovereign bond markets (De Pooter et al., 2013;
Pelizzon et al., 2014, minga). Our contribution to this literature lies in looking at how
yields and liquidity of bonds with different maturities are affected by these measures and
how this could lead to structural distortions of the yield curve.
We also consider the second reason for differences. In a well-functioning market, distor-
tions local to certain maturities could be traded away by arbitrageurs constantly search-
ing for such mispricing to profit from. However, market frictions, for instance margins,
haircuts and other constraints, might prevent such investors from trading on these ineffi-
ciencies, as the limits of arbitrage literature describes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gromb
2A study that does not specifically focus on unconventional measures, but buyback programs is that of
Phillips (2003), who documents significant bond market reactions to Treasury announcements of reduced
supplies of 30-year bonds, only local to the yields of those bonds.
98 3.2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
and Vayanos, 2002; Liu et al., 2006; Gorton and Metrick, 2010; Ashcraft et al., 2010). Ad-
ditionally, arbitrage capital might move too slowly to eliminate such opportunities, due
to capital constraints or agency problems of delegated asset management, as in Mitchell
et al. (2007); Duffie (2010).
The third driver leading to differential pricing could be alternate levels of risk premiums
in short and long term yields. We consider the following premiums in our analysis:
flight-to-safety premium, liquidity premium, credit risk premium and partial default or
breakup risk premium. By studying whether short and long maturity bonds have different
sensitivity to flight-to-safety flows, we also enrich the literature on this component of
bond demand. These episodes occur when due to a credit shock, investors reallocate their
portfolios towards safer assets. This can happen both within, as well as across asset classes
(Næs et al., 2011) and is typically accompanied by flights-to-liquidity (Longstaff, 2004).
Beber et al. (2009) disentangle flight-to-safety and liquidity episodes using a sample of
Eurozone bonds from 10 countries, whereas Baele et al. (2015) develop a methodology to
identify such episodes in a sample of 23 countries. Ejsing et al. (2012) identify safe haven
flows in German and French bond markets. We also provide evidence that when periphery
credit quality declines in the Eurozone, the entire German yield curve, irrespective of
maturities, becomes a target for such flows.
Further, our paper contributes to the existing literature on liquidity and the term struc-
ture of liquidity premium in bonds. Liquidity premium of government bonds can be
analyzed along two dimensions. Early studies typically estimate liquidity premium by
identifying pairs of assets that are otherwise similar, but have different levels of liq-
uidity. These assets can either have the same issuer and differ in their seasonedness
(Krishnamurthy, 2002; Gürkaynak et al., 2007; Bühler and Vonhoff, 2011; Schuster and
Uhrig-Homburg, 2013; Kempf et al., 2012; Fontaine and Garcia, 2012) or provide the same
guarantees while being issued by different institutions (Longstaff, 2004; Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Schuster and Uhrig-Homburg, 2013; Schwarz, 2015). How-
ever, this latter measure is often criticized as it not only captures liquidity premium, but
also breakup or partial default risk.
Much less is known about liquidity differences in the cross-section of different bond tenors,
especially of the very long maturities. Most papers that study this question focus on the
US corporate bond market: Ericsson and Renault (2006) find a decreasing term structure,
while Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) find that liquidity premium increases with maturity.
Gehde-Trapp et al. (2016) provide a third view: they find a U-shaped premium, where
the very short and very long maturities carry the largest compensation for illiquidity.
Goyenko et al. (2011) study liquidity premium differences and explain the on- and off-
the-run premiums of three maturity buckets: short maturity T-bills, 2-5 year and 10-year
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bonds. Despite its practical importance, the long end of the term structure has attracted
much less attention in academic research. Our study aims to fill this gap, by showing
how yields and liquidity can substantially differ among longer and shorter maturities of
nominal German sovereign bonds.
And finally, this paper also relates to the strand of literature that separates liquidity and
credit effect in sovereign yields. Beber et al. (2009) disentangle the effects of liquidity
and credit quality in 10 Eurozone countries. Similarly, Schwarz (2015) separates the
components of yields due to liquidity and credit risk. Ejsing et al. (2012) quantify liquidity
and credit risk premiums in German and French government bond yields based on a state-
space model with two latent factors. Bai et al. (2012) examine what caused the recent
sovereign bond crisis illiquidity of markets or deteriorating credit conditions. Darbha
and Dufour (2014) study the term structure of default and illiquidity in a sample of
nominal Euro area government bonds, whereas Monfort and Renne (2014) present an
arbitrage-free model with joint dynamics of euro-area bond spreads that are driven by
liquidity and credit risk. Besides, we not only consider the sovereign risk of the issuer,
but test for breakup or partial default risk component in German yields, as in De Santis
(2015); Simon (2015).
3.3 Bond market segmentation
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) postulates that risk premiums
on long-term bonds, the expected excess returns of long maturity bonds over their short
ones, should be constant over time. If EHTS holds, then risk premiums would not vary
over time. Consequently, as Pflueger and Viceira (2011) point out, investors could not
earn predictable returns on switching between long and short maturities. As such, bonds
of short and long maturities should be close to perfect substitutes and the shape of the
yield curve should only depend on investors’ expectation of future rates.
However, there is ample evidence of predictable and time-varying risk premiums in bonds
(Bliss and Fama, 1987; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Pflueger and Viceira, 2015). More-
over, in reality different maturities are not perfect substitutes due to the presence of
investor clienteles with preferences for specific maturities. As a consequence, the inter-
est rate for a given maturity is also influenced by demand and supply shocks specific
to that maturity. Vayanos and Vila (2009) show that if investors have preferences for
certain maturities, bond markets become segmented. Additional evidence for the pres-
ence of preferred habitat investors is presented by Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), who
find that the average maturity of government debt predicts excess bond returns. On the
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other hand, Guibaud et al. (2013) show that catering to maturity clienteles is an optimal
issuance policy, as a welfare-maximizing government issues longer maturity debt when
the fraction of long to short horizon investors increases. Additional evidence from the
corporate bond market also suggests that corporations engage in gap-filling behavior,
issuing long-term debt at times when the supply of long-term government debt decreases
(Greenwood et al., 2015).
In light of the above evidence, we think that segmentation is a result of either regulatory
constraints or endogenous choice due to which investors choose to hold only a part of the
yield curve. Prominent examples of such regulation are the Basel and Solvency regulatory
frameworks that incentivize banks and insurers and pension funds, respectively, to tilt
their asset portfolios towards certain maturities. On the other hand, clienteles can also
arise due to the costs of trading or investors’ holding period. Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) show that investors with different holding periods trade assets with different rela-
tive spreads, whereas the recent work of Beber et al. (2012) show that in the presence of
investors with heterogeneous investment horizons, the pricing of liquidity also becomes
segmented. In segmented market, short and long maturity bonds are not perfect sub-
stitutes and therefore investors cannot achieve the same risk exposures by holding only
certain bond tenors. This would be otherwise in integrated markets, where all parts
of the market are spanned by the same risk factors. This paper aims to discover the
extent to which German sovereign bonds are subject to segmentation and the channels
through which this segmentation affects the pricing of short and long maturity bonds.
More specifically, we are interested in whether segmentation implies pricing differences
along the yield curve, and what underlying drivers can cause these differences. We also
examine how liquidity of long and short bonds differs and whether they it is priced dif-
ferently. The next subsections will present the implications of segmentation on sovereign
yields and on their liquidity features.
3.3.1 Segmentation in observable yields
In integrated markets, where risk premiums are the same along the yield curve, a term
structure model fitted on observable yields would have an equally good fit across different
maturities. However, if markets are segmented, we are likely to observe larger fitting
errors on the part of the curve where yields are most distorted by segmentation. The fore
mentioned fitting errors are a good measure for these structural distortions and are used
in this study to proxy for segmentation in long maturity bonds. We define the bias as the
average fitting error of long maturity bond yields compared to the Nelson-Siegel curve
CHAPTER 3. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 101
that we estimate from yields of German sovereign capital market securities.3 The idea of
using the quality of fit to proxy for segmentation effects is similar to that of HPW. They
show that the mean squared fitting error of yields is a proxy for market-wide liquidity,
capturing the aspect of liquidity that is closely linked to the available arbitrage capital
and funding liquidity dry ups around crises.
We analyze whether the size and sign of this structural distortion in yields captured by
the bias varies over time, depending on the forces that drive the short and long ends
of the yields curve. To measure the differential effect of these drivers, we separately
decompose short and long yields in our sample. Our yield decomposition is inspired
by Krishnamurthy et al. (2015), henceforth KNVJ, who show that yields of Eurozone
sovereign bonds contain the following components: an expectations hypothesis term and
term premium, default risk premium, redenomination risk premium and a residual term
that arises due to illiquidity frictions. While focusing on differences between short and
long yields, we expand the list of potential yield components. We take a broader view
on segmentation and liquidity frictions to concentrate on the following channels through
which it can affect yields: demand pressure, default premium and differential liquidity of
short and long bonds.
Demand pressure can arise due to regulatory changes, flight-to-safety flows and as a
product of unconventional monetary policies, such as LSAPs and QE. First, regulatory
changes matter if they affect only part of the investor clientele. For instance, the Basel II
capital regulation of banking sector has an asset only view, and thus incentivizes banks
to hold 10-year government bonds in their investment portfolios. This is because long
maturity bonds are seen to be more risky and therefore they require higher capital buffers.
As opposed to this, Solvency II focuses on asset and liability management of pension funds
and insurers. Since these institutions have long term liabilities, which have to be hedged
by minimizing the duration gap between assets and liabilities, the regulation encourages
them to hold bonds with maturities longer than 20 years. To (indirectly) capture the
effect of regulatory demand pressure, we include a time trend in our analysis. The second
channel of demand pressure arises during the financial and euro crisis, when investors are
flying to safe haven countries from the riskier periphery bonds. We capture this effect
by a variable linked to changes in the default risk of periphery sovereign issuers in the
Eurozone. And at last, the unconventional monetary policy measures applied during the
fore mentioned crises have an effect on bonds that are part of the policies of the European
Central bank (ECB), such as the Securities Markets Programme, the Outright Monetary
Transactions, and the Long-Term Refinancing Operations. To capture the sum of these
monetary policy actions, we control for the growth of the asset side of the ECB’s balance
3The detailed description of how this measure is constructed can be found in the section on measuring
the effect of market segmentation.
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sheet.
Similar to KNVJ, we also differentiate between two types of default risk premium. Seg-
mentation could also result in a differential effect of sovereign risk on the short and long
ends of the yield curve. We proxy issuer credit risk by the 5-year USD-denominated
German CDS spread. Despite that Klinger and Lando (2015) show that the CDS spread
of a safe haven country, like Germany, is a poor proxy for its credit risk due to reg-
ulatory hedging requirements of investment banks, this is consensually the best proxy
for sovereign risk. Nevertheless, we also consider breakup and selective default risks.
We define selective default, as the government strategically defaulting on certain type
of obligations, affecting only certain clientele groups. For instance, in case of insolvency
the government could default exclusively on short maturity bonds, as they are due in the
near future, while keeping promises on long maturity bonds mostly held by institutional
investors. Selectively defaulting on bonds could also result in the exit from the Eurozone,
a scenario in which the sovereign issuer would fulfill obligations in a currency other than
in euros. This constitutes a risk for investors, who as a consequence would be paid in
a depreciated currency. This risk is called the redenomination risk, closely linked with
selective default and a direct consequence of the breakup of the Eurozone. We capture
selective default and breakup risk by the KfW spread from Schwarz (2015). This spread
is similar to the Refcorp spread of Longstaff (2004), and is defined as the yield difference
between the 10-year KfW agency bond and the German Bund of matching maturity.
Simon (2015) shows that if investors expect selective default to happen, a compensation
for bearing this risk will be reflected in bond yields.
3.3.2 Segmentation in bond liquidity
Vayanos and Vila (2009) show that if investors have preferences for certain maturities,
bond markets become segmented. Investors can choose to hold only a part of the yield
curve due to either regulatory constraints or endogenously. The latter typically arises due
to the costs of trading or investors holding period. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show
that investors with different holding periods trade assets with different relative spreads.
The concept of liquidity segmentation is motivated by investors with different holding
periods, but has an effect that goes beyond relative trading costs. Beber et al. (2012) show
that if investors have different investment horizons, liquidity also becomes segmented.
They also show this has an effect on the pricing of liquidity, as accounting for investment
horizon gives rise to cross-sectional differences in liquidity risk premiums. Moreover, it
is also plausible that for investors with different horizons, different aspects of liquidity
would matter: this is the reason why we find that our short and long noise measures
CHAPTER 3. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 103
are primarily driven by different aspects of asset, market and market liquidity risk. We
provide further evidence for liquidity segmentation by constructing separate liquidity
measures for the long and short ends of the curve, inspired by the noise measure of Hu
et al. (2013). Our bond sample does not allow for formal cross-sectional pricing tests of
liquidity, however we can investigate the exposures of yields of short and long maturity
bonds to the segmented noise measures in the time series context. Moreover, we also
allow for liquidity spillovers between the two ends of the yield curve.
As part of our analysis, we link the segmented noise measures to other proxies of liquidity,
which can shed light on the differential nature of liquidity along the yield curve. It is
conceivable that due to investment horizons, the aspect of liquidity that we capture will
differ across shorter and long maturities. On the one hand, an investor with longer
holding periods is not concerned about transaction costs per se, since they do not have
to trade frequently. Taking this to the extreme, a buy and hold investor should not
be concerned about liquidity risk either, as unless she has to liquidate, she will hold
that asset until maturity. On the other hand, actively managed portfolios have to be
rebalanced regularly. These investors will have a preference for more liquid and cheaper
to trade assets, moreover, they will be more exposed to dry ups of market and funding
liquidity. We also link the segmented measures of liquidity to other measures of market
distress, volatility and default risk and presume that short and long end liquidity will
correlate with these proxies to a different extent.
3.3.3 Why German sovereign bonds?
To discover the effects of market segmentation on yields and liquidity, we focus on Ger-
man government securities between 2005 and 2015. This period is characterized by the
financial crisis, a major liquidity event; and the euro crisis, a time period when Germany
became a safe haven sovereign in the euro area. Moreover, a harmonized regulatory
reform affecting the natural clientele of this securities also coincides with this period,
namely the preparatory phase to the introduction of Solvency II.4 Additionally, German
bonds have been subject to large scale purchase programs improving market liquidity,
and since the beginning of 2015 also to the quantitative easing (henceforth QE) of the
European Central Bank. Thus in the past ten years we are likely to observe investor
segmentation (preferred habitat or clientele), regulation-induced demand pressure, the
4The Solvency II Directive codifies and harmonizes regulation of insurers and pension funds in the
European Union. Its main concern is similar to those of the Basel regulations, it regulates the amount
of capital insurers and pension funds are obliged to have as reserves to decrease the risk of insolvency.
Solvency II also has risk management and governance considerations, along with consumer protection,
transparency and disclosure requirements.
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effect of LSAP and QE on yields, alongside with flight-to-safety episodes. These events
might have a differential effect on long and short maturity bonds, and the confounding
presence of them makes the German bond market an ideal testing ground to study these
effects of bond market segmentation.
3.4 Measuring the effect of market segmentation
3.4.1 The data
The data of this study are from multiple sources. Daily closing mid quotes of German
capital market securities, bond characteristics, CDS quotes, and quotes of EONIA and
Euro swap contracts of different maturities are from Bloomberg. Size of the asset side of
ECB’s balance sheet also comes from the same source. This information is complemented
with KfW5 agency bond quotes from Datastream, Ted spread and VIX from the FRED
database of the St. Louis Fed and the value of the DAX index from the Deutsche
Bundesbank. We also use data provided by the Deutsche Finanzagentur6 on aggregate
primary dealer transaction volumes.
The starting point to measure the effect of market segmentation is the noise measure,
which we construct from daily cross-sections of bond returns from 2005 through 2015.7
We focus on showing whether there is segmentation in yields, as well as in liquidity along
the yield curve; therefore, we use all German sovereign nominal capital market securities
in our analysis. Bonds in our sample have fixed maturities and coupons, the same market
conventions and microstructure; and can be assigned to one of the three groups: Schtzes,
which are 2 year notes; Bobls are 5 year notes; and Bunds are either 10 or 30 years of
maturity. Similar to other studies in the yield curve literature, we drop bonds with less
than 6 months to maturity due to liquidity problems, however, we do not impose an
upper bound on time to maturity. This is because we are specifically interested in how
yields of long maturity bonds differ from their shorter counterparts and whether different
market forces drive them.
In the resulting sample we have on average a cross-section of 52 bonds, out of which
5KfW or Kreditanstalt fr Wiederaufbau is a German government-owned development bank in Frank-
furt. Its majority owner if the Federal Republic of Germany, which explicitly guarantees bonds KfW
issues in capital markets.
6German Finance Agency, the German equivalent of the Treasury.
7Our dataset starts at January 2000 but we choose to restrict our analysis to the last ten years
of the sample, where not only data quality is better, but controls for identifying the effect of market
segmentation on yields are available.
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on average 5 bonds are of maturities longer than 20 years. However, the cross-section
varies over time: its size ranges between 41 and 61 issues of capital market securities,
with 1 to 8 long maturity bonds at a time. The average maturity of bonds is 8.34 years,
whereas their average age is 8.71. These two values remain relatively stable in the sample,
alleviating the concern that our result would be driven by the time series variation of bond
characteristics. Nevertheless, in our analysis we control for maturity of long and short
maturity bonds. The average coupon is 2.97%, with a standard deviation of 1.82% and
that maturity dates of bonds range between February 2005 and August 2046.
3.4.2 German sovereign bond market
The Federal Government of Germany is one of the largest issuer of government securities
in the Eurozone. These securities are not only highly liquid; they also carry small issuer
risk and managed to preserve their triple-A rating even during the Euro crisis. German
government bonds have maturities ranging from 6 months to 30 years and they practically
span the entire yield curve with 60-70 tradable securities at any point in time. Capital
market securities consist of four types: Federal Treasury notes (Schtze), Federal notes
(Bobls) and Federal bonds (Bunds) with the fore mentioned maturities ranging between
2 and 30 years. Since 2006, the Federal Government has also been issuing inflation-linked
securities, but in this study we restrict our focus to nominal bonds.
German sovereign bonds are typically placed to primary dealers in the form of single issues
via auctions, which can be followed by multiple re-openings. The average outstanding
volume of a single issue is around 15-20 billion. Re-openings help to keep the market
liquid and facilitate delivery of futures contracts on these bonds. The relative share of
each security type is relatively stable over time: 2-year notes constitute 9%, 5-year notes
21%, 10 years Bunds 44,5% and 30 year Bunds 17% of the overall public debt issued
by the Federal Government in 2015. This means that our sample of these bonds cover
about 90% of all German tradable government debt. Moreover, these securities also
account for 70% of the total issuance. All capital market securities have fixed maturities
with redemption on maturity at the full nominal value, as well as annual fixed interest
payments. These assets are also repo and ECB-eligible, moreover, Bunds are strippable.8
8We believe that this feature does not give rise to a large enough convenience yield in the respective
bonds that this would distort our results.
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3.4.3 Curve fitting
To fit the term structure of interest rates, the two most common approaches are the
estimation of either spline-based or function-based models. The latter is a parsimonious
parametric function that describes the entire yield curve. We choose to work with the
model of Nelson and Siegel (1987), which provides a smooth, flexible parametric function.
As De Pooter (2007) describes, this model is capable of capturing many of the typically
observed shapes9 that the yield curve can take over time. The Nelson-Siegel model
assumes the following functional form for the instantaneous forward rate f:















where 𝑚 denotes time to maturity and 𝑏 = (𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝜏) are model parameters to be
estimated. The three elements of the above sum have a clear interpretation: 𝛽0 is the
long term component, which is the same for every maturity; the component on 𝛽1 is
the short term component, which starts at 1 and decays to zero at an exponential rate;
whereas the one on 𝛽2 is the middle-term component, which can generate hump shapes
of the yield curve. 𝜏 is a time invariant constant, which determines at which maturity
the middle-term component reaches its maximum. Additionally, Diebold and Li (2006)
show that the tree betas can be interpreted as three dynamic latent factors, governing
the level, slope and curvature of the yield curve, respectively.
Following HPW, we use the parameterized forward curve of Equation 3.1 to derive the
corresponding zero-coupon yield curve. This can be used to price any coupon-bearing
bonds. Consequently, we can use market prices of bonds to back out the parameters in
𝑏. In particular, on each day of our sample we estimate the above model from observ-
able market prices of German notes and bonds in our sample with remaining maturities
between 6 months and 20 years. The result of this exercise on that day is a vector of
parameters, based on which we can predict the theoretical values of the observed bonds.
In order to fit the model, we choose parameters 𝑏𝑡 by minimizing the weighted sum of











where 𝑁𝑡 is the number of bonds for a given day, 𝑃𝑡 are the prices observable on the
market, whereas 𝑃 𝑖(𝑏) is the model-implied price for bond 𝑖 given the model parameters 𝑏,
and 𝐷𝑖 is the MaCaulay’s duration for bond 𝑖. Following the yield curve fitting literature,
we apply duration-weighting to bonds when estimating the parameters that minimize
9Which are monotonic, humped and S-shaped.
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their pricing errors.
In fact, one deviation from the approach of HPW is that we do not estimate all parameters
in Equation 3.1 freely, but keep 𝜏 fixed for the analysis. In preliminary unrestricted
estimations 𝜏 turns out to be badly identified with very extreme values on days when the
yield curve is flat. Due to suggested multicollinearity of the parameters in our sample, we
decided to fix 𝜏 at its the median value (2.58) based on preliminary unrestricted estimation
of the model. Then keeping 𝜏 fixed at its unconditional median, we re-estimated the rest
of the parameters and obtained the fitted curves for each day in our sample.
Although we conduct most of our analysis keeping 𝜏 fixed at its unconditional median,
we find that results are highly similar when we use a completely unrestricted estimation
of tau allowing 𝜏 to be different day by day. Nevertheless, we added a robustness section,
where we show how sensitive the resulting noise ad bias estimates are to different values
of 𝜏 , e.g. half, twice or ten times the unconditional mean value.
Figure 3.1 depicts the fitted par-coupon curves and the observable yields for three days in
our sample: January 3, 2005, September 15, 2008 and February 23, 2015. The left panels
depict the short end of the yield curve, bonds with less than 20 years to maturity to which
the curve is fitted; whereas the right panels show maturities longer than 20 years. For
these bonds we extrapolate the fitted curve, thus the long end serves as an out-sample
test of fit. The first day is a normal day’, we can see that the short end on the curve
fits rather well to the increasing term structure, while in the long end the deviations are
larger, around 10-15 basis points. For the day of the Lehman bankruptcy, September 15,
2008, fitting errors on both the short and long ends are larger, so are they some days
after the announcement of the quantitative easing of ECB on February 23, 2015.
3.4.4 Measures of noise
To construct the noise measure, we follow HPW. For each day in the sample, given a set
of parameters 𝑏𝑡 from Equation 3.2, they calculate the difference between the observable
market yield and their model implied counterparts. They define noise as the dispersion of
yields around the (entire) fitted yield curve, which is measured as the root mean squared
pricing error in a given cross-section of bonds. Our approach differs from theirs in that
we want to focus on the shorter and long ends of the curve separately. Consequently, we
construct two sets of noise measures the following way.
For each date 𝑡, let 𝑏𝑡 be a vector of parameters with 𝜏 = 2.58. On the given date 𝑡,
there are 𝑁short,𝑡 notes and bonds in our sample with maturities between 6 month and 20
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years and 𝑁long,𝑡 bonds with remaining maturities exceeding 20 years. Then for each of




the observed market and the model-implied yields, respectively. Then we define noise as
dispersion around the given segment of the fitted curve, which we measure as root mean



















To fit the yield curve, we restrict our sample to bonds with maturities between 6 months
to 20 years, but we construct the noise measure for bonds with a wider range of maturities.
Consequently, the noise measure of the longer end also serves as out-of-sample’ test of
the fitted curves. Our choice of the 20-year breakpoint is not arbitrary; we base it on
the ultimate forward rate discussion of Solvency II. The ultimate forward rate is an
extrapolation method that used to calculate long term discount rates used in valuation of
liabilities for regulatory purposes for maturities beyond the last liquid point. This point
for euro-denominated interest rates is set at 20 years to maturity. In addition, the yield
curve beyond 20 years to maturity could be structurally distorted due to liquidity, market
segmentation, demand pressure and differences in default premium across the curve. This
is one of the questions we aim to answer in this paper.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the noise measures, whereas Figures 3.2 and 3.3
depict the different noise measures. Panels A and B of Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 focus on
the noise measures of the short and long ends of the yield curve. The average short noise
is 7.91 basis points between 2005 and 2015, whereas the long average is more than twice
as much: with 19.39 basis points. In the long end, the standard deviation of noise is also
larger. The range of noise is between a couple of basis points to 20.46 in the short and
49.58 in the long end. Figure 3.2 shows that the magnitude of the noise measures varies
over time with large peaks around the financial and euro crises. Long yields have a poorer
fit during this period, with their noise persistently staying high. However, this fit is still
much better than what the regulatory discussion (on ultimate forward rates) considers
as a starting point, especially given that we use such a simple curve fitting method.
Figure 3.3 compares our measures of noise to that of Hu et al. (2013). Panel C of
Table 3.1 also gives descriptive statistics for the US noise measure. Its mean is 3.1 basis
points with the range 0.72 to 20 basis points. The three measure exhibit a large spike
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at the financial crisis, but the US measure goes back to near zero afterwards, whereas
the German measures, in reaction to the euro crisis, fluctuate at higher levels. However,
we should point out that these three measures are not fully comparable due to their
different composition and methodological choices. First, HPW fit their model to bonds
of maturities shorter than 10 years, also including T-bills in their analysis. Noise is
calculated for a somewhat smaller set of bonds and averaged over the whole curve. As
opposed to this, we exclusively focus on notes and bonds. We fit the yield curve to bonds
with maturities up to 20 years, but part of our analysis focuses on issues with even longer
tenors. Noise is also separately calculated for short and longer maturity bonds. Second,
due to our smaller cross-section of bonds we choose to fit a Nelson-Siegel curve, whereas
HPW use the more elaborate Svensson method.
Despite the differences, we believe that our noise measures are proxies for market illiq-
uidity, which show how prices deviate from fundamentals. To demonstrate this, the next
section presents the link of noise measures to various asset level and market liquidity
proxies. We analyze the direction and magnitude of the effects, especially focusing on
the economic effect that is captured by one standard deviation change in explanatory
variables or by 1% change in the asset growth of the ECB balance sheet.
3.4.5 Do German noise measures capture illiquidity?
Hu et al. (2013) show that the noise measure is a proxy for market-wide liquidity that
is related to the arbitrage capital available in the market: the pricing error is larger
and more persistent when funding liquidity conditions deteriorate and arbitrageurs are
lacking resources to trade substantial price deviations away. To this extent, this measure
captures funding liquidity, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) or in Fontaine and
Garcia (2012). We construct a pair of similar measures, but instead of aggregating all
information along the yield curve, we focus on deviations of long and shorter maturities
separately.
Table 3.2 reports the results of monthly regressions of changes (first differences) in short
and long noise measures separately, regressed on a series of asset and market level liquidity
proxies. Panel A shows that changes in the short end noise measure are linked to changing
time to maturity or age of the bond. One standard deviation decrease in time to maturity,
the bond gets 30 days older, increases the noise by 0.67 basis points. That is, that the
older the bonds gets, the more likely it gets locked up in buy and hold investors’ portfolios,
which decreases the issue’s liquidity, which in turn increases deviation from the theoretical
yield. Similarly, short noise is linked to the changes in on-the-run spread of 10-year bonds
and the Ted spread, with smaller but positive economic effects, which result in 0.29 and
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0.38 basis points increases, respectively. This suggests that as the level of market liquidity
or funding conditions worsen, noise tend to increase.
Panel B shows that the noise of long maturity bonds increases with the proportion of
zero returns. If zero returns change by 0.63%, the noise increase 0.56 basis points. As
for market liquidity proxies, long noise significantly links to US noise, which is a crisis-
related aspect of funding liquidity. If the latter changes by one standard deviation, noise
of German long maturity sovereign bonds increases by 0.91 basis points. Interestingly,
the measures are not related to the implied bid-ask spread of Roll (1984) or to liquidity
risk measured as the unexpected changes of the ILLIQ measure of German nominal bonds
market. However, even the statistically significant connections are not very strong as the
R2 of these regressions are rather low, between 2 to 15%. HPW find similarly weak links
to other measures of liquidity, which they claim to be an indication of noise capturing an
aspect of liquidity beyond the typical measures used in the literature.
To summarize, we find that our measures of noise from the short and long ends of the
yield curve capture somewhat different aspects of liquidity. Short noise is related to the
age of the bond, as well as to market and funding liquidity; while long noise is linked to
asset level illiquidity (zero returns) and the US noise measure. Nevertheless, similar to
HPW, we find that even these statistically significant relationships have low explanatory
power. This suggests that noise captures an aspect of illiquidity that correlates, but goes
beyond conventional asset and market liquidity measures.
3.5 Segmentation effects: empirical evidence
3.5.1 The bias
To examine whether the long end of the German yield curve exhibits structural distortions
that could result from market segmentation, we construct a measure, which is the average










The bias is the average of differences between the observed, 𝑦long,𝑖𝑡 , and model implied
yields, 𝑦long,𝑖(𝑏𝑡), of bond issues with maturities exceeding 20 years.
Panel D of Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the bias. To complement this,
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Figure 3.4 is composed of two panels. The upper panel depicts the overall bias, whereas
the lower one differentiates between the maturity bucket of 20-25 years and maturities
longer than 25 years. Table 3.1 suggests that the average bias throughout most the sample
period is negative, -9.25 basis points, and ranges between -47 basis points to 25.74.
Interestingly, it switches sign twice around the financial crisis, but stays persistently
negative for the rest of the sample period. Figure 3.4 shows that the bias is not only
negative after the financial crisis, but this effects is even more pronounced for the 25+
years to maturity bucket. Nevertheless, the figure does not indicate a clear trend which
could result from, for instance regulation-induced demand pressure.
According to Equation 3.5, negative bias means that the observed yields are consistently
lower than those implied by our pricing model. Could this be because those yields are
distorted by demand pressure of clientele investors, or flight-to-safety, liquidity or credit
risk premiums? To provide answer to this question, Table 3.3 presents evidence of the
results of monthly regressions (of first differences) in which we link the bias to asset and
market level liquidity measures, proxies for demand pressure, default risk, both in a uni-,
and multivariate setting.
According to Panel A of Table 3.3, the link between the bias and bond level liquidity
proxies, namely the Roll measure and time to maturity are both statistically and econom-
ically significant. If change in Roll’s implied bid-ask spread increases by one standard
deviation, thus bond liquidity decreases, the bias would get larger by 0.91 basis points.
Similarly, if time to maturity decreases by 30 days, or alternatively if the bond gets a
month older, the bias is also likely to grow by 0.75 basis points. The bias is also linked to
changes in liquidity risk and flight-to-safety flows. Liquidity risk is measured as the sur-
prise component of the monthly ILLIQ measure of the German nominal sovereign bond
segment, while flight-to-safety flows are proxied by the PCA of CDS spreads of Eurozone
periphery countries. We see that as credit or default risk of periphery countries increases
(by one standard deviation), long maturity bond yields get 2.59 basis point further from
the predicted smooth curve. Similarly, the bias seems to react to changes in German
credit risk, as well as to changes in volatility or investor sentiment captured by the VIX
index.
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the results of multivariate analysis. Column 1 pools together
all asset and market level liquidity proxies. The Roll measure is still significant with an
even larger economic effects (1.33 basis points), while the effect of time to maturity and
liquidity risks are washed away by the inclusion of the US noise measure. This latter
implies that as US funding conditions worsen and pricing errors on Treasuries grow, the
bias on German long maturity bonds also get wider. Column 2 looks at variables of
demand pressure, default risk and volatility combined, out of which the German credit
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quality seems to matter the most. If the German CDS spread increases by 7.24 basis
points, the bias also increases by 1.28 basis points. And finally, in Column 3 we pool
all explanatory variables together and find that the Roll implied bid-ask spread stays
significant with an effect size comparable to previous cases (1.31 bps), while the the Ted
spread, our proxy for funding liquidity, is also significant, but with a sign opposing our
expectations.
All in all, we find that the bias for most of the sample period is negative. This means
that the observed yields are consistently below those implied by our model. In search
for causes, we consider various proxies for demand pressure of clientele investors, flight-
to-safety, liquidity and credit risk premiums. We find that the bias is linked to the Roll
implied bid-ask spread, time to maturity of bonds, liquidity risk, flight-to-safety flows
and the credit risk of Germany in a univariate setting. If considered in multivariate
regressions, the Roll measure, German CDS and Ted spread are robust to the inclusion
of other varables. In the next section we further analyze why long yields are too low’ by
looking at differences in drivers of yields of short and long maturity bonds.
3.5.2 Decomposing short and long maturity yields
If due to regulation, institutional features or given holding period, certain investors have
limited access to the yield curve, this can create clientele demand, specific to certain bond
maturities. Alongside with this, safe haven flows during the Euro crisis or large scale asset
purchases of central banks and ECB can also put demand pressure on certain parts of the
curve. Should these phenomena coexist with market frictions that limit arbitrage capital
to flow into the sovereign bond market, the sum of these effects can persistently distort
the part of the yield curve where it has the most prevalent effect.
Ideally one would like to test the influence of the above channels by formal cross-sectional
pricing tests, but the data at hand, especially the small cross-section of long maturity
bonds, does not grant us sufficient power for identification. Then the second best solution
is to investigate the exposures of yields of short and long maturity bonds in the time series
context. To do so, we decompose these yields in way similar to Krishnamurthy et al.
(2015). According to their analysis, yields of Eurozone sovereigns contain the following
distinguishable components: a risk free component, term premium, default risk premium,
redenomination risk premium and a residual term that arises due to illiquidity frictions
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+ 𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑝𝑟.𝑖,𝑡 +𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑟.𝑖,𝑡 +𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑟.𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 (3.6)
where yields are explained by a risk free component based on the expectations hypothesis,
a term premium and components that test segmentation of yields and liquidity with
additional controls. The idea behind this decomposition is that it allows for separate
examination of long and short yields, moreover, the resulting two sets of regressions
coefficients are directly comparable.
To capture the first two components, we construct the risk free curve as the intersection
of the EONIA overnight swap and euro swap curves. In our regressions we regress the
average residual yields, the average of the difference between these two components and
the observable yields from the market, on proxies of demand pressure, default premium,
liquidity and other controls We proxy for demand pressure by including a time trend
to capture regulatory changes; a variable capturing safe haven flows, derived from CDS
of distressed Eurozone countries; and the percentage growth of the asset side of ECB’s
balance sheet, controlling for LSAP and the effects of QE. We also decompose the default
premium component to the credit risk of the issuer, captured by the German CDS spread,
and to breakup risk proxied by the KfW spread. This latter controls for selective default
premium in which case the German government would default only on a set of its obli-
gations, e.g. agency bonds or certain maturities. To show the robustness of our results,
we also include additional controls, such as measures of market liquidity, we also control
for the maturity structure by adding the time-series of the average time-to-maturity for
daily cross-sections, as well as we add the US noise measure. We also examine whether
there are liquidity spillovers between the short and long ends of the term structure by
adding the respective noise measures to the regressions.
The resulting empirical relationships for the average short and long residual yields are
the following:
Δ[𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡] =𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒short𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+ 𝛽3Δ𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡+
+ 𝛽4Δ𝐹𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽5Δ𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽6Δ𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘+
+ 𝛽7Δ𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
long
𝑡 +𝐵 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (3.7)
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and
Δ[𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡] =𝛽0 + 𝛽1Δ𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒long𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑+ 𝛽3Δ𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡+
+ 𝛽4Δ𝐹𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽5Δ𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽6Δ𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘+
+ 𝛽7Δ𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒
short
𝑡 +𝐵 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (3.8)
Panels A and B of Table 3.4 report the results for Equations 3.7 and 3.8, respectively.
Column 1 of both panels show the results without additional controls, while Column
2 includes all additional controls. At first glance, it seems that the noise measure is
more important for long maturity bonds. Its effect not only survives the inclusion of
other liquidity proxies and the US noise measure, but it is statistically and economically
significant. One standard deviation change in the change of long noise, 4.23 basis points,
leads to a shift of 1 yield basis point. The larger the pricing error, measured by the noise
measure, the larger yields will be, which translate into lower prices due to illiquidity.
Interestingly, the inclusion of the opposite noise measure does not affect yields on either
ends of the curve: there is no evidence for liquidity spillover between the two segments.
If we look at the channels of demand pressure, we see that the time trend is insignificant
with a negligible economic effect, whereas ECB asset purchase activity has an impact
on shorter maturities. The effect of LSAPs is measured by the change of the natural
logarithm of the asset side of ECB’s balance sheet. It shows that 1% change in ECB
asset growth decreases short yields by 0.28 basis points. This translates into an increase
in bond prices, which is in line with decreased supply, providing suggestive evidence of
ECB policies affecting sovereign yields. The third channel of demand pressure are flight-
to-safety flows. We assume that the occurrence of these flows coincides with deteriorating
credit quality of periphery and other large euro area countries. This has an effect on
both short and long maturity bond yields to a similar extent. We see that one standard
deviation decrease in periphery credit quality increases short and long yields by 3.02 and
2.94 basis points, respectively.
Next, we also look at whether default premium differs across short and long maturity
bonds. We find that changes in the German CDS trigger a significant positive effect
on yields: if the CDS changes by one standard deviation, short and long yields increase
by 0.96 and 1.84 basis points, respectively. This means that as German credit quality
deteriorates, yields will go up, while bond prices will decline. Nevertheless, this effect is
rather small, taking into account that 1) Klinger and Lando (2015) show that safe haven
CDS contracts are poor proxies for credit quality, as their demand is primarily driven by
regulatory hedging requirements of investment banks 2) German CDS do increase over
the euro crisis, but it stays low and stable relative to other Eurozone CDS contracts. We
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also examine how average yields correlate with breakup risk, as in De Santis (2015) or
Simon (2015). We find that changes in the KfW spread, the yield spread on German
agency and maturity-matched Treasury bonds, widens by 6.62 basis points, short yields
decrease by 1.18, whereas their long counterparts by 1.42 basis points. The negative
coefficient on the spread is inconsistent with the idea of breakup risk, it rather captures
a flight-to-safety premium in sovereign bonds compared to the KfW agency bonds.
Interestingly, the constant terms of both specifications are insignificant, which suggests
that the above factors not only capture the driving forces of yields, but also pick up their
general downward trend in our sample. The R2 of the decomposition is almost twice as
high for short maturity bonds than for long ones. Moreover, all the fore mentioned effects
are robust in sign and also in magnitude to the inclusion of additional controls, including
the off-the-run spread, Ted spread and liquidity risk to control for market liquidity, the
US noise measure and the average time to maturity of the given yield segment. Figure 3.5
depicts the rolling correlation of changes in short and long yields and provides further
proof of negligible segmentation effects: we cannot observe any major trends in the
comovement of these yields. Their correlation has a noticeable drop around the financial
crisis, but even at its bottom it is 65%, while it peaks in 2012 during the euro crisis at
93.5
Overall, the presented yield decomposition reveals little evidence of substantial segmenta-
tion in German sovereign bond markets. Short yields are mostly driven by short noise and
large scale asset purchases, while both long and short yields are strongly linked to flight-
to-safety flows and to German credit quality. Our results show that although there are
statistically significant differences in the drivers of short and long maturity bonds, long
yields are not substantially distorted by demand pressure, default or liquidity premiums.
3.5.3 Yields and liquidity
This section studies the link between yields and different market wide and maturity-
specific liquidity measures. Our aim is to discover whether liquidity has a differential effect
on short and long maturity bond yields. Although our bond sample does not allow for
formal cross-sectional pricing tests of liquidity, to answer this question we investigate the
exposures of yields to the different liquidity measures in a time series context. Moreover,
we also allow for liquidity spillovers between the two ends of the yield curve and scrutinize
how the financial crisis, a major liquidity dry up, affected liquidity characteristics of
German sovereign bonds.
Table 3.5 reports results of yield differences regressed on a set of segment specific and
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market wide liquidity measures. Panel A shows the results of bonds with less than 20
years to maturity. The average short yield is significantly related to changes in the
corresponding noise measure: if short noise increases by 1.75 basis points (one std.), the
average short yield decreases by 0.92 basis points. This effect is robust to the inclusion
of a wide range of market liquidity measures, especially that of the Ted spread, although
previous analysis suggested that the noise measure is also related to funding and market
liquidity. Additionally, the Ted spread is also highly significant, with an economic effect
of 1.71 bps yield change if the spread widens by 25 basis points; alongside with a large
increase in the R2 from 5% to 26% if market liquidity measures are included. Another
feature of the short noise measure is that its effect on yield varies over time as can be seen
if it is interacted with an indicator variable of the financial crisis. The sign and magnitude
of the coefficient of noise changes between the pre and post crisis and no crisis regimes:
after the financial crisis changes in the short noise measure decrease average short yields
(by 1.17 bps), while before it has a less significant, but positive coefficient, which doubles
in size compared to the crisis period. Usually one would expect that yields go up when
liquidity decreases, thus finding contradictory evidence over the crisis is puzzling.
Panel B focuses on liquidity of long maturity bonds. Similarly to the average short
yield, the average long yield has a tie to the fitting error of long maturity bonds. This
relationship is definitely weaker than that of short yields and short noise, and is not
robust to the inclusion of market liquidity measures. However, the economic effect is
comparable: 0.89 basis points. Besides, unlike for the average short yield, there is evidence
for a liquidity spillover from the short end to the long one: if short noise increases
by one standard deviation, the average long yield would increase by 0.75 basis points.
Interestingly the difference between the pre and post financial crisis periods is smaller
that of short bonds: after the crisis the long noise measure does not have a statistically
significant relation with the average long yield, whereas the interaction of long noise and
the pre-crisis period is borderline significant with a positive coefficient. R2 of all five
specifications are low, in the range of 3 to 7
In conclusion, we find that yields of the short and long ends of the yield curve are linked
to a wide range of liquidity measures. The effect of short noise on the average short yield
is statistically and economically significant and robust to the inclusion of other measures.
Moreover, the effect of short noise varies over time in relation to the financial crisis. As
opposed to this, the average long yield has a weaker connection to long noise measure,
while we find evidence of liquidity spillover from the short to the long end of the yield
curve. The next section further discovers variables that could be driving the two noise
measures.
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3.5.4 Drivers of liquidity segmentation
We have not found evidence for substantial segmentation in yields, but the differential
effect of long and short noise measures suggests that liquidity of the corresponding bonds
is less correlated than their yields are. This low correlation could be indicative evidence
of liquidity segmentation. In section we provide further evidence, by exploring whether
these differences stem from the underlying forces that drive liquidity of each segment.
Table 3.6 compares how short and long noise measures relate to demand pressure, default
risk and volatility measures in Panels A and B, respectively. In previous analyses we
linked the noise measures to various asset and market liquidity proxies. We concluded
that the short noise measure captures market liquidity, which is beyond the off-the-run
and Ted spreads; while the long noise seems to behave independently from other market
variables. As expected, there are also some differences in their exposures to the fore
mentioned measures: short noise significantly correlates with flight-to-safety flows and
the asset growth of the ECB’s balance sheet. As the credit quality of periphery countries
worsen, the change in short noise increases by 0.33 basis points. This is due to the
increased demand in safe haven bonds, which pushes prices away from the theoretical
value suggested by the fitted yield curve. Similarly, as ECB purchases shorter maturity
German bonds, 1% growth of the ECB assets increases noise by 0.57 basis points. Panel
A also suggests that noise is sensitive to volatility captured by the VIX index or the
German stock market volatility index, DAX.
Panel B shows that long noise has a similar relationship to safe haven flows as short noise.
This suggests that these flows are not exclusive to certain maturities, hence the overall
German yield curve becomes attractive if periphery credit quality declines. Interestingly,
long noise is more exposed to changes in German credit quality or breakup risk, captured
by changes in the German CDS and the KfW spread, respectively. Their economic effects
are also sizable: if the CDS spread increases by 7.28 basis points, the noise on the long
end of the curve increases by 1.04 basis points; while 6.62 basis point change in the KfW
spread triggers a similarly sized: 1.19 basis point increase. Long noise is also correlated
with volatility, with economic effects that are twice as large as those of the short noise.
Figure 3.6 depicts the 180-day rolling correlation of changes in the short and noise mea-
sure. Noise measures exhibit high correlation before the financial crisis and during the
post-crisis recovery period. There is a significant drop at the crisis, although the cor-
relation stays positive, unlike after 2011, where the correlation becomes negative and
persistently stays there for months. Similarly to the correlation between short and long
maturity bond yields, we cannot see a clear pattern that would suggest a high level of
liquidity segmentation, however this correlation has a considerably larger range: -45 to
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In summary, we find that short and long noise measures are related to somewhat different
market forces: short noise is sensitive to large scale asset purchases of the ECB, as
well as to changes in stock market volatility and flight-to-safety flows. The long noise
measure has a similar relationship to safe haven flows, which suggests that these flows
are not exclusive to certain maturities, hence the overall German yield curve becomes
attractive if periphery credit quality declines. The long noise is also sensitive to declining
credit quality of the issuer, as well as to breakup risk, however all the above effects are
economically rather small.
3.5.5 Robustness tests
In this section we aim to test how sensitive the long maturity noise and bias measures
are to changing the shape parameter, 𝜏 , of the Nelson-Siegel curve. In preliminary un-
restricted estimations, 𝜏 turns out to be poorly identified with very extreme values on
days when the yield curve is flat. Consequently, we fixed 𝜏 at its the median value (2.58)
and conducted most of our analysis keeping it fixed. In unreported regressions we find
that results are highly similar when we use a completely unrestricted estimation of tau
allowing tau to be different day by day.
Alternatively, we could also impose structure on the shape parameter, as Quaedvlieg
and Schotman (2016) propose in their paper. Any moving average or ARMA process
could be applied, as long as there are not prolonged periods of days with very flat term
structure.However, imposing such a structure on the shape parameter is non-trivial. On
the one hand, in our sample, especially around the onset of the financial and the peak
of the euro crises, we have a multitude of days with very flat term structure. On the
other hand, another obstacle for implementing their procedure is that it is numerically
challenging when using coupon bonds, since in this case one cannot filter out the other
parameters on each day from the zero yields similarly to Quaedvlieg and Schotman (2016).
Given our data limitations, we choose a more feasible alternative, which is to show that
the size and time series characteristics of the long noise measure and the bias do not
depend on the choice of the shape parameter, 𝜏 .10 The four panels of Figure3.7 aim
to prove this point: they depict the noise and bias measures for bonds with maturities
longer than 20 years, from unrestricted estimation or 𝜏 fixed at different values.
10We focus on measures of the long end as those are ’out-of-sample’ tests of the curve, where deviations
and thus the differences arising due to alternative values of 𝜏 are expect to be larger.
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First, we compare the long noise and bias measures for 𝜏s from the unrestricted estimation
and the one, where 𝜏 is fixed at its unconditional median. The upper panels of Figure3.7
show that in both cases, maybe even more so for the bias, the time-series patterns are
rather similar. The most significant difference is that the series based on the unrestricted
estimation exhibit more spikes, those are typically days, where the numerical optimization
did not converge to global maximum. To circumvent this problem, we decided to restrict
the shape parameter at its median value based on the unrestricted results.
How much our results are driven by the choice of 𝜏? In answering this question, we
estimate the long noise and bias measures given different fixed levels of 𝜏 . These are
half of the median, median, twice and ten times the unconditional median. Since 𝜏 is the
time invariant constant, which determines at which maturity the middle-term component
reaches its maximum, we believe that our choice or at most twice the median could be
reasonable values. The lower panels of Figure3.7 show that even an unrealistically large
𝜏 , 25.8, would not generate noise and bias measures that are inexplicably large. While
the median value produces an average long noise and bias of 18.82 and -9.25 basis points,
taking this extreme value leads to 50.26 and -14.77 basis points, respectively. These
values still fall in the reasonable range, despite that such a 𝜏 economically would not
make sense.
3.6 Discussion and policy implication
This section aims to address three issues: first, we would like to compare the extrapolated
Nelson-Siegel curve to the one used by the regulator for liability valuation of pension and
insurance funds. Second, we perform a thought experiment, in which we quantify eco-
nomic effects from the asset and liability management point of view of two hypothetical
pension funds with different characteristics. And lastly, we explain the European pol-
icy discussion and specify our contribution thereof, also pointing towards directions for
further research.
3.6.1 Regulatory vs. extrapolated Nelson-Siegel curves
How different is the extrapolated Nelson-Siegel curve from the one used by regulators?
In answering this question, we compare the ultimate forward rate (UFR) curve provided
to us by the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) to the one we propose in this paper. The UFR
method is an extrapolation technique to calculate long term discount rates for valuation of
liabilities for regulatory purposes, for maturities beyond the last liquid point. This point
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for euro-denominated interest rates is set at 20 years and the curve reaches its maximum
value of 4.2% well beyond 60 years. The UFR curve provided by DNB is constructed
followings the guidelines provided by EIOPA and it is based on German interest swap
data from Bloomberg.
Figure3.8 presents the comparison between the UFR and the extrapolated curve we fitted
on German bond data. The upper panel depicts the UFR curve as it has been provided
by the DNB. It is immediately apparent that fitting the curve on swap rates gives rise
to an approximate 35 basis point differential between the two term structures. This is
most likely the sum of compensation for counterparty risk in bilateral swap transactions
and illiquidity of different contracts maturities. Nevertheless, this differential seems to
widen especially beyond the last liquid point, where our market-based estimates for long
term yields are much lower than their swap-based UFR counterparts. To confirm this
increase in the difference, the lower panel shows the same Nelson Siegel curve together
with the UFR curve net of swap premium. The assumption underlying the swap premium
correction is that the counterparty and liquidity risks are independent of the contracts
maturity. Then we define the swap premium as the average difference between the NS
curve fitted on bond data and the UFR curve based on swap data up to 20 years to
maturity. The corrected curve is parallel to the original but then shifted downwards so
that short yields are fairly similar and deviations for longer maturities reflect differences
in the extrapolation.
This difference in extrapolation is likely to have a sizeable effect on liability valuation,
which the next section will examine in more detail.
3.6.2 Liability valuation: a thought experiment
In previous sections we claim that the economic effects of segmentation are rather small:
they are in the ballpark of 1-3 basis points. Eventually, by the use of leverage arbitrageurs
could profit from any mispricing or from small risk premium differences between different
maturities. However, a more interesting aspect of economic significance is how liability
valuation of pension funds would be affected by switching from the UFR curve to our
proposed term structure based on bond market data.
Our aim is to quantify the effect of different discount curves on liability valuation. To
perform this thought experiment, we use the two curves on the lower panel of Figure 3.8.
We assume there are two hypothetical pension funds. Both funds pay out e100 in total
over a payment schedule of 60 years. Participants join a fund at the age of 25 and pay a
steady stream of equal contributions over the years, until they reach retirement age at 65.
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At 65 they get a steady stream of defined cash flows until they die at the age of 85. The
first fund is a large fund with a constant number of participants uniformly distributed
between the age of 25 and 85 years. This implies that in each period, the fund has to
pay 1/60 fraction of its total liabilities, thus e1.67 out. The other fund is a young fund,
in which participant are between the age of 25 and 50 years old and are in a constant
supply. This means that in the first 15 years the fund does not have any payouts, but as
participants gradually reach retirement age, payouts increase. They do so until the 35th
year of the schedule, when the younger fund also reaches a steady state: equal number
of people entering the fund at 25 and dying at the age of 85.
The upper panel of Figure 3.9 depicts the payout schedule of the two funds, while its lower
counterpart shows the comparison between the difference in liability values discounted
by either the UFR or the extrapolated NS curve.
We find that the choice of the discount curve matters: the present value of liabilities
is smaller when the UFR approach is applied. Despite that the value difference is more
sizeable for the younger fund, where the duration of the liabilities is longer, its magnitude
is around 1% As opposed to this, the discount rates predicted by the extrapolated Nelson-
Siegel curve result in higher liability values. Although, this analysis is incomplete without
considering the asset side of a pension portfolio and the funding ratio, we refrain from
further investigating the asset side given the large number of assumptions required to
quantify these effects. Even by means of such simple analysis we can conclude that the
choice of the discount rate matters: we find that by switching from one curve to another,
the present values of liabilities are different.
Looking at the actual size of the difference and the volatility of the present value, we would
have expected switching from the one curve to another to have a larger effect. This implies
that the impact on the funding ratio of a typical pension fund is rather small, especially
compared to the annual fluctuations of funding ratios due to market returns and interest
rate changes. Note, however, that the presented difference is likely conservative as it relies
on the UFR curve net of the swap premium, therefore the actual difference is likely to be
more significant than presented here. By taking the swap premium out, we eliminated a
potential distortion that might affect the overall UFR curve, without respect of maturity
segments. Nevertheless, this thought experiment already points to a direct implication on
asset and liability management: all else equal, larger liability value decreases the funding
ratio. This smaller value on one side of the balance sheet would have to be compensated
with larger asset value and/or potentially stricter risk management.
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3.6.3 Policy discussion and the scope of our contribution
The primary aim of this paper is to explore yield and liquidity segmentation of (a rep-
resentative) European nominal term structure. In particular, we analyze whether the
behavior and drivers of short and long maturity bonds yields differ and how their liquid-
ity characteristics are driven by investor groups with different holding periods. However,
in doing so, this paper also contributes to the European policy discussion on the asset
and liability management of pension and insurance funds. Namely, we suggest a viable
alternative to the UFR method proposed by Solvency II and EIOPA. The UFR method
aims to specify the construction of long term discount rates, by means of extrapolating
swap rates beyond the last liquid point of the term structure.
There are three distinct issues regarding the current industry practice: 1) how to fit the
curve and how to extrapolate beyond the last liquid point; 2) where to set the last liquid
point; and 3) based on which information should long term discount rates be determined.
This paper does not tackle all three of these issues. We propose a simple method to fit
a smooth forward curve and to extrapolate that beyond the last liquid point. We only
partially assess which extrapolation method, our simple extrapolation based on bond
data or the UFR approach, performs better in the thought experiment of the previous
section. Second, we take the last liquid point suggested by EIOPA and set it to 20 years
to maturity. There is an open debate on where this point should be set, while EIOPA
and the Netherlands uses 20 years for the division point, in Sweden the last liquid point
is set at 15 years to maturity. Then the question arises, where is the actual segmentation
point along the yield curve? And finally, our results suggest that long maturity bond
yields might be appropriate for the valuation of long-term liabilities - especially if the
distortion in long yields due to segmentation is smaller than risk premiums in observable
swap quotes.
Nevertheless, finding that long maturity bond yields are not substantially distorted has
important policy implications. Part of the policy discussion on valuation of pension and
insurance liabilities for regulatory purposes is how to model long term discount rates.
The current approach is based on the ultimate forward rate method, which in light of
our results might seem unnecessary if yields beyond the last liquid are not distorted.
This case one could extrapolate long term discount rates from yields observed in bonds
markets. Then the question arises: is the ultimate forward rate discussion much ado
about nothing? One the one hand, the answer is no, as there is a lot of money at stake:
pension funds and insurers together managed e3.5 trillion worth of assets in 2015, thus
making sure that this wealth is properly valuated is crucial. On the other hand, the
answer could be yes: it seems that we can trust yields of long maturity bonds as any
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existing effects of yield or liquidity segmentation are quite small.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the differential pricing of short and long maturity bonds. Our aim
is to study whether there is segmentation along the German yield curve and discover the
channels through which this would affect the pricing of short and long maturity bonds. In
summary, we find low levels of yield segmentation: our results suggest that although there
are statistically significant differences in the pricing and drivers of short and long maturity
bonds, the corresponding economic effects are rather small. This means that long yields
are not substantially distorted by demand pressure, default or liquidity premiums.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, to study segmentation of long and shorter
maturity bonds, we construct a pair of noise measures similar to that of Hu et al. (2013).
The noise measures are liquidity proxies that are based on the pricing errors of observable
yields relative to a smooth curve. We find that these measures capture different aspects
of liquidity: short noise is related to the age of the bond and to market and funding
liquidity; while long noise is linked to bond issue level illiquidity and the US noise measure.
Nevertheless, conventional liquidity proxies do not fully explain the two noise measures
suggesting that they capture an aspect of illiquidity that correlates but goes beyond those
measures.
Next, to further examine the pricing of bonds, we also look at the average fitting error,
called the bias. We find that the bias is persistently negative, meaning that the observed
yields are consistently below those implied by our pricing model. To explain why long
yields are too low’, we link the bias to the Roll implied bid-ask spread, time to maturity
of bonds, liquidity risk and the Ted spread, flight-to-safety flows and to the credit risk of
Germany. To deepen our understanding of time-series drivers of short and long maturity
bond yields, we study their exposures to proxies of demand pressure, default premiums
and liquidity. The yield decomposition reveals little evidence of significant segmentation
in German sovereign bond markets. Short yields are mostly driven by short noise and
large scale asset purchases, while both long and short yields are strongly linked flight-to-
safety flows and to German credit quality.
Looking at liquidity segmentation, we study how yields of the short and long ends of the
yield curve are linked to a wide range of liquidity measures. We find that short noise
has a significant and robust effect on average short yield, which varies over time. As
opposed to this, we find that no such effect in the average long yield, while there is a
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liquidity spillover from the short to the long end of the yield curve. We also consider
if short and long noise are related to different market forces and find that short noise
is sensitive to large scale asset purchases of the ECB, and to changes in stock market
volatility and flight-to-safety flows. We conclude that these findings are in line with the
theory of liquidity segmentation (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Beber et al., 2012), the
economic effects of liquidity segmentation are rather small. Nevertheless, we show that
the nature of liquidity varies along the curve: liquidity of short maturity bonds seems
more systematic in nature, whilst liquidity of long maturity bonds behaves independently
from other market variables.
Finding that long maturity bond yields are not substantially distorted has important
policy implications. Part of the policy discussion on valuation of pension and insurance
liabilities for regulatory purposes is how to model long term discount rates. In light of our
results the current regulatory practice and the use of the UFR method seems unnecessary
if yields beyond the last liquid are not distorted. This case one could extrapolate long
term discount rates from yields observed in bonds markets. Then the question arises: is
the ultimate forward rate discussion much ado about nothing? One the one hand, the
answer is no, as there is a lot of money at stake: pension funds and insurers together
managed e3.5 trillion worth of assets in 2015, thus making sure that this wealth is
properly valuated is crucial. On the other hand, the answer is yes: it seems that we can
trust yields of long maturity bonds as any existing effects of yield or liquidity segmentation
are quite small.
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Table 3.1
Summary statistics of noise measures and the bias
The table presents descriptive statistics of different noise measures and the bias. Noise measures and the bias are derived
from the difference between the observable market yields and their theoretical counterparts, based on Nelson-Siegel curves
fitted on German bonds. Panels A and B contain information on short and long noise measures, respectively. Noise is the
root mean squared pricing error of yields. Panel C present the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) (HPW), which is based on
US Treasuries, obtained from the website of Jun Pan. Panel D presents the bias, the mean pricing error of long maturity
bond yields. All measures are in basis points.
Panel A. Short noise
# of bonds Mean St.dev Min Max
2000-2015 38-56 6.4168 2.7791 2.0036 23.8380
2005-2015 38-55 7.9122 7.8396 2.3838 20.4675
Panel B. Long noise
# of bonds Mean St.dev Min Max
2000-2015 1-8 18.8233 10.7720 1.7053 50.3190
2005-2015 1-8 19.3881 10.4078 1.7053 49.5880
Panel C. US noise measure from HPW (2013)
# of bonds Mean St.dev Min Max
2000-Dec 2014 appr. 165 3.1009 2.6507 0.7232 20.4675
2005-Dec 2014 appr. 165 3.0891 3.1842 0.7232 20.4675
Panel D. Bias
# of bonds Mean St.dev Min Max
2000-2015 1-8 -1.5346 19.9604 -47.9043 50.2931
2005-2015 1-8 -9.2537 17.4175 -47.9043 25.7488
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Table 3.3
Drivers of the bias – structural distortions in the curve
This table presents OLS coefficients of monthly regressions in differences, where stars denote conventional significance
levels. T-statistics are based on Newey-West errors of 3 month lags. Panel A shows results of univariate regressions of the
bias on liquidity, demand pressure, default risk and volatility proxies, whereas Panel B repeats the analysis in a multivariate
setting. Variable description of liquidity proxies can be found of Table 3.2. Flight-to-safety is the first PCA of CDS spreads
of distressed Eurozone countries, and ECB asset growth is the change in the logarithm of the asset side of the ECB balance
sheet. KfW spread is the yield difference between 10-year KFW agency bond and a maturity-matched German Bund,
and VIX is the volatility index issued by CBOE. The sample period is January 2005 - June 2015. All spreads and noise
measures are in basis points. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the reported coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate regressions Panel B: Multivariate regressions
Asset liquidity
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ΔZeroReturn -0.278 ΔZeroReturn 0.409 0.090
ΔRoll -2.560* ΔRoll -3.749** -3.686**
ΔTtm -3.131* ΔTtm -2.374 -1.875
R2 0 0.04 0.03 ΔUS noise -1.283*** -0.498
# of months 124 124 124 ΔOntherun 0.291 0.401
ΔLiq. risk -17.381 -13.117
Market liquidity ΔTed 0.022 0.035*
(1) (2) (3) Time trend -0.007 -0.006
ΔOntherun 0.333 ΔFTS -2.602 -2.352
ΔLiq. risk -26.516** ΔECB asset 0.017 -0.117
ΔTed 0.016 ΔCDS -0.176** -0.142
R2 0.01 0.05 0.01 ΔKfW 0.050 0.029
# of months 120 93 124 ΔVIX -0.082 -0.091
R2 0.20 0.15 0.31





R2 0.00 0.08 0.01






R2 0.12 0.01 0.02
# of months 124 101 124
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Table 3.4
Yield decomposition - the effect of segmentation
This table reports results of monthly OLS regressions of yield differences. Variables with delta are differences, whereas
time trend and the ECB asset growth are in levels. Short noise is the squared mean pricing error of these bonds relative to
the smooth Nelson-Siegel curve. Description of variables can be found in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Crisis dummy is defined to be
1 for the period after September 2008, whereas No crisis dummy equals 1 before that date. The sample period is January
2005 - June 2015. All spreads and noise measures are in basis points. The absolute value of Newey-West 3 month-lagged
t-statistics are in parentheses, while *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A. Decomposition of short yields Panel B. Decomposition of long yields
(1) (2) (1) (2)
ΔShort noise -0.3214 -0.2692 ΔLong noise 0.2211 0.2333
(1.59) (1.29) (1.73)* (1.72)*
Time trend -0.0111 -0.005 Time trend -0.0162 -0.0255
(0.89) (0.21) (0.90) (0.72)
ECB asset growth -0.2807 -0.1472 ECB asset growth 0.0752 -0.0755
(2.84)*** (1.23) (0.54) (0.42)
ΔFlight-to-safety -9.0968 -11.2594 ΔFlight-to-safety -8.8555 -8.4888
(2.88)*** (3.41)*** (1.99)** (1.71)*
ΔCDS 0.1325 0.1779 ΔCDS 0.2538 0.2412
(1.91)* (2.40)** (2.60)** (2.14)**
ΔKfW -0.1787 -0.1583 ΔKfW -0.2181 -0.2752
(2.89)*** (2.40)** (2.50)** (2.73)***
ΔLong noise 0.0713 0.0522 ΔShort noise 0.3815 0.4264
(0.79) (0.58) (1.34) (1.36)
Constant 7.0829 5.2419 Constant 9.8386 21.3583
(0.92) (0.55) (0.91) (1.42)
Time to maturity No Yes Time to maturity No Yes
ΔUS noise No Yes ΔUS noise No Yes
Market liquidity pr. No Yes Market liquidity pr. No Yes
R2 0.31 0.46 R2 0.17 0.24
N 101 92 N 101 92
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Figure 3.1 Fitted par-coupon yield curves and observable short and long yields
The figures depict the fitted par-coupon curves and the observable yields for three days in the sample:
January 3, 2005, September 15 2008 and February 23 2015. The left panels show the short end of the
yield curve with bonds of less than 20 years to maturity, whilst the right panel shows maturities longer
than 20 years. For these bonds noise is based on the extrapolated curve.
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Figure 3.2 Daily timeseries of noise measures in basis points
The figure plots the daily time series of the noise measures for the long and short ends of the yield curve,
where long bonds are those of maturities longer than 20 years. Noise is the root mean squared deviation
from the smooth Nelson-Siegel curve fitted on German sovereign notes and bonds with maturities between
6 months and 20 years. For bonds with longer maturities, noise is based on the extrapolation of this
smooth curve.
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Figure 3.3 Comparison of German and US noise measures
The figure compares the time-series of noise measures of the short and long ends of the German yield
curves to the noise measure fitted on US Treasuries by Hu et al. (2013).
134 3.8. TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 3.4 Daily time series of the bias
The upper panel of the figure plots the daily time series of the bias. The bias is the structural deviation
of long maturity bonds, measured as the fitting error of long maturity bonds relative to the smooth
Nelson-Siegel curve, which is fitted on German sovereign notes and bonds with maturities between 6
months and 20 years. The lower panel plots these fitting errors for two maturity buckets: 20-25 and 25+
years to maturity.
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Figure 3.5 Correlation between the change in short and long yields
The figure plots the correlation between first differences of short and long maturity bonds yields, esti-
mated with a 180-day rolling window.
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Figure 3.6 Correlation between the change of short and long noise
The figure plots the correlation between the first differences in noise measures of short and long maturity
bonds, estimated with a 180-day rolling window.
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Figure 3.8 Regulatory vs. Nelson Siegel curves
The figures above depict the yield curve on February 23, 2015. Both panels compare the UFR curve,
fitted on in interest swap data, to the Nelson Siegel curve of the study extrapolated beyond 20 years to
maturity. The panel above depicts the UFR curve as it has been provided by the Dutch Central Bank
(DNB, while the panel below shows the unchanged Nelson Siegel curve together with the UFR curve net
of the swap premium. The swap premium likely reflects the sum of compensation for counterparty risk
in bilateral swap transactions and illiquidity of certain contracts.
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Figure 3.9 Welfare effects of liability valuation: a thought experiment
The figure depicts the liability payout schedules and present values of these liabilities for two hypothetical
pension funds: a large and a small and young fund. The upper panel depicts the cash flow structures
assumed for the two pension funds in the calculation of welfare effect when one switches from the current
regulatory curve to the one we propose for liability valuation. The lower panel compares the present
values of liabilities of the two hypothetical funds, where liabilities are either discounted by the shifted
UFR or by the extrapolated Nelson Siegel curves.
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